Video: Are Large Banks Too Big for Trial?

As perhaps part of the growing evidence that Too Big to Fail is becoming a bipartisan issue (more on this here), the below video incredibly has already garnered 150,000 page views at the time of this post.

Paraphrasing the key exchange:

Warren's Q: "When was the last time regulators took a bank charged with wrongdoing to trial?"

Regulator's A: "Uhh, we'll have to get back to you on that."

h/t Counterparties

"Those whom the gods would destroy, they first encourage to borrow cheaply"

Today's must read on the next financial panic.

All About 'The Blob'

Read it and weep.

Who Wants to Break Up Too Big to Fail Banks?

Quite a few former Too Big to Fail bank CEOs, actually.

h/t Simon Johnson.

Video: Phase Three of the Global Crisis

This is from a year ago but still worthwhile if you haven't seen it.

Speaker: Paul Mason

This event was recorded on 31 January 2011 in Sheikh Zayed Theatre, New Academic Building

As countries adopt competitive exit strategies from the global crisis Paul Mason surveys the political economy of a flat recovery. He argues that mainstream economics have still refused to draw the lessons of asset price bubbles and situates the divergent recovery, east and west, within a long-wave explanation of the crisis. Paul Mason is the award-winning economics editor of BBC Newsnight, covering an agenda he describes as 'profit, people and planet' and author of the Idle Scrawl blog , which was shortlisted for the Orwell Prize 2009. His first book, Live Working or Die Fighting: How the Working Class Went Global, was longlisted for the Guardian First Book Award. This event marks the publication of his latest book Meltdown: The End of the Age of Greed.

Naked Capitalism Uses a Single Data Point to Disprove Financial Repression

A post over at Naked Capitalism titled 'Why Is The Term “Financial Repression” Being Sold?' by the Roosevelt Institute's Matt Stoler purports to "fact check" a statement about the negative effects of financial repression.

That sounds useful, for as Stoler points out financial repression is much in the news these days. However, there's just one big problem: Stoler's fact checking consists of looking at just one country, the U.S.

Never mind that the Reinhart and Sbrancia paper about financial repression which Stoler references includes a 10-country data sample (and information about dozens of other countries), or that other studies on the effects of financial repression have looked at data from 20 or more countries. And Stoler clearly couldn't be bothered with checking to see that most of the research on financial repression has in fact focussed on its impact on economic growth in developing countries, and not advanced economies like the U.S.

Following Stoler's breathtakingly brief analysis of the single U.S. data point he concludes:

"So we see that the financial repression meme is at heart an aristocratic concept."

Sorry, Matt, but it's not quite that simple.

Who exactly are financial repression's winners and losers? As some of the commenters on Stoler's post note the not insignificant dose of inflation which accompanies financial repression hits everyone who saves money. Also, the large rentier may have additional means at his/her disposal to mitigate the effects of financial repression. However, the small rentier (aka 401K holders, pensioners, retirees on fixed incomes) may not easily be able to, for example, shift assets to Lichtenstein.

But there may be a more simple answer to this question of winners and losers. To work as intended financial repression depends on government rules and regulation. In short, this means that under a system of financial repression those who follow the law are the ones who are punished by the law. Sound like a place you'd like to live?

Podcast: Carmen Reinhart on the Coming Financial Repression

Link to audio stream here.

Video: Meltdown - Documentary (all 4 parts) on the Financial Crisis

h/t Barry R.

Why the Vickers Report on Banking Reform Failed the UK and the World

Kotlikoff rips the Vickers commission's final recommendation:

The Independent Banking Commission’s final report is a grave disappointment. The ICB (chaired by Sir John Vickers) seeks to reinstate Glass-Steagall by ring-fencing good banks and letting bad banks do their thing and, if they get into trouble, suffer the consequences. This proposition was tested by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, whose failure nearly destroyed the global financial system. 

The commission retains the current system apart from some extra requirements primarily imposed on the good banks (the retail banks). The main impact of this is likely to be to foster more financial intermediation to run through the bad banks, i.e. if you impose more regulation on financial companies that call themselves X and less on companies that call themselves Y, companies that call themselves X will start to call themselves Y. In short, the commission has in effect taxed good banking while sanctifying shadow banking. The commission has also chosen to regulate based on what a bank calls itself, rather than on what it does.

A year back, Mervyn King, Bank of England governor, described the current banking system as the “worst possible.” In a speech, delivered at the Buttonwood Conference in New York, he called for the analysis of Limited Purpose Banking — a reform plan that I developed, which replaces traditional banking with mutual fund banking and makes no distinction between financial intermediaries.

At the end of last year, I travelled to London and met the commission staff to discuss Limited Purpose Banking. I had thought the commission would take the proposal and my discussion with them seriously. That was not to be. In fact, the commission spent very little space discussing the proposal, despite Mr King’s urging that it be carefully studied, and notwithstanding its remarkably strong endorsement by economics Nobel Laureates George Akerlof, Robert Lucas, Edmund Phelps, Edward Prescott, and Robert Fogel as well as by former US secretary of state and former US secretary of the treasury, George Shultz, by Jeff Sachs, Simon Johnson, Niall Ferguson, Ken Rogoff, Michael Boskin, Steve Ross, Jagdish Bhagwati, and many other prominent economists and policymakers.

Do the opinions of the governor of the Bank of England and all these prominent authorities on finance and economics deserve to be dismissed in seven sentences? For seven sentences is all the commission was able to spare when it came to discussing Limited Purpose Banking, notwithstanding the 358 page length of its report.

Full article here.

Video: Banks Should Be Public Utilities

The SEC: Just When You Think You've Run Out of Outrage...

SEC Commissioner Mary Schapiro

Things were starting to look up for the beleaguered-since-Madoff  U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with its spate of successful prosecutions of high-profile insider trading criminals. But for the U.S. stock market cop it continues to be a case of one step forward, four steps back.

Rolling Stone's Matt Taibbi delivers the latest bombshell:

For the past two decades, according to a whistle-blower at the SEC who recently came forward to Congress, the agency has been systematically destroying records of its preliminary investigations once they are closed. By whitewashing the files of some of the nation’s worst financial criminals, the SEC has kept an entire generation of federal investigators in the dark about past inquiries into insider trading, fraud and market manipulation against companies like Goldman Sachs, Deutsche Bank and AIG. With a few strokes of the keyboard, the evidence gathered during thousands of investigations – “18,000 … including Madoff,” as one high-ranking SEC official put it during a panicked meeting about the destruction – has apparently disappeared forever into the wormhole of history. 

It goes without saying that no ordinary law-enforcement agency would willingly destroy its own evidence. In fact, when it comes to garden-variety crooks, more and more police agencies are catching criminals with the aid of large and well-maintained databases.

Much has been made in recent months of the government's glaring failure to police Wall Street; to date, federal and state prosecutors have yet to put a single senior Wall Street executive behind bars for any of the many well-documented crimes related to the financial crisis. Indeed, Flynn's accusations dovetail with a recent series of damaging critiques of the SEC made by reporters, watchdog groups and members of Congress, all of which seem to indicate that top federal regulators spend more time lunching, schmoozing and job-interviewing with Wall Street crooks than they do catching them. As one former SEC staffer describes it, the agency is now filled with so many Wall Street hotshots from oft-investigated banks that it has been "infected with the Goldman mindset from within."

Anyone seen the latest Intrade odds on SEC head Mary Schapiro keeping her job?

Full Taibbi article here. 

Video: Our Political and Economic Problems Are Fundamentally a Crisis in Virtue

Marcus Aurelius

George Friedman of STRATFOR gets to the heart of the current political and economic malaise in a brief and succinct video interview here.

He's spot on about the point that all the new regulation in the form of Dodd-Frank, Basel III, etc. do zero good without enforcement.

And why aren't both existing and new regulations being enforced? In Dr. Friedman's view, it comes down to a lack of virtue among our current elite.

The good news is that this is not an insolvable problem for two reasons: First, virtue, in my opinion, is unlike height, raw intelligence, or good looks, in the sense that it is not something that one is by-and-large born with. Virtue is both learned and cultivated over time.

But how much attention do we currently place on the development of virtue? The classics in the western world on this topic include the works by Marcus Aurelius, Benjamin Franklin, Adam Smith, Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, among others. To perhaps unfairly single out two disciplines, what room is made for those works in our current economics and business curriculum? From my personal observations, zip.

The idea of a renaissance education has been steadily pushed aside through the years in favor of the poly-technical practicalness of the 1-minute manager MBA and quant-PhDs. Today's economic and political conundrum is arguably a by-product of this de-prioritization of the study and development of virtue.

The second reason I am optimistic we can solve this problem is that when our leaders first fail society in such an epic fashion, and then next fail a second time by not fixing the root-cause of the problem, then those of us in representative democracies often make change.

Here's to hoping we get the change right this time.

Playing it Safe, Losing it All

Two facts worth highlighting from Drew Westen's controversial NY Times piece titled 'What Happened to Obama':

1. Obama published nothing (except his autobiography) during his twelve years as a faculty member at the University of Chicago
2. Before joining the Senate he voted 'present' (instead of 'yea' or 'nay') 130 times

What is one to make of this?

I won't speculate on Obama's not publishing anything in an academic journal, but one thing presidential candidates are often attacked on is their voting record. During a heated political campaign a candidate's previous legislative votes are scrutinized and picked over for any possible controversy (see John Kerry). As an astute observer of political history and campaigns, Barrack Obama would be well aware of this.

Was his voting 'present' strategy all about playing it safe and as Westen puts it "dodging difficult issues"? Or is there another explanation all together?

From Westen:

Perhaps those of us who were so enthralled with the magnificent story he told in “Dreams From My Father” appended a chapter at the end that wasn’t there — the chapter in which he resolves his identity and comes to know who he is and what he believes in.

One of the hallmark qualities of Barrack Hussein Obama's rise to the presidency has been his exceptional risk aversion. That strategy worked well in the campaign but is not serving President Obama or the country well at a time when bold, visionary political leadership is needed.

Like many, I've been scratching my head trying to put my finger on what it is about Obama that just doesn't seem right. And then I remembered a comment made by fashion designer Karl Lagerfeld when he was asked to describe himself: "I don't want to be real in other people's minds. I want to be an apparition."

I completely agree with Westen that right now the U.S. desperately needs the gregarious optimism and energy of a Franklin Delano Roosevelt or Teddy Roosevelt type personality in the White House, and not the Lagerfeld-esque 'complete improvisation' we seem to have at present.

I will never wholly forgive and forget the missed opportunity in 2009 to conduct a perhaps once-in-a-century overhaul of the global financial system, along with Obama's decision to reappoint many of the same people who led us into the crisis - Larry Summers, Tim Geithner, and Greenspan protege Ben Bernanke.

With the way things are going at Bank of America and the Eurozone we may soon get a second bite at the financial system overhaul apple. Fighting to keep Timothy Geithner on as Secretary of the Treasury doesn't exactly instil in one a sense of optimism, but there is still time for President Obama to do what is necessary to restore American optimism.

The Root of All Sovereign-Debt Crises (and How to Prevent Them)

A good read and interesting suggestion from Professor Amar Bhidé and Nobel Prize Winner Edmund S. Phelps on how to put a permanent end to sovereign debt crises.

Why Bankrupt America Needs a Third Political Party

From Boston University Professor Laurence Kotlikoff:

The Republicans and Democrats have done a terrible job of managing our country and economy, transforming the American dream into a nightmare. They’ve squandered our youth and wealth in endless wars we couldn’t win, and spent six decades running an intergenerational Ponzi scheme, racking up huge official and unofficial debts for our children to pay. 

By some measures, the U.S. is now in worse fiscal shape than Greece. True, our official debt is a much smaller percentage of economic output. But our unofficial debt is much larger. The unofficial debt includes primarily the obligation to pay 78 million baby boomers roughly $40,000 a head each year of their very long retirements in Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid benefits. To get our overall fiscal gap under control, the U.S. must cut spending or raise tax revenue by $20 trillion over the next decade, far more than either the president wants or the House Republicans seek.

Full must read op-ed at Bloomberg.

How to Fix Our Optimism Deficit

Europeans, Japanese, and even rose-colored glasses wearing Americans are suffering from what has been described as an 'optimism deficit'. This rather unthreatening sounding phrase should not be mistaken for an insignificant economic problem.

Optimism fuels all sort of important economic activities, such as entrepreneurship, saving for the future, and social cohesion. It may in fact be the most fundamental immediate challenge facing the developed world today. But with pre-election political gridlock setting in, our leaders are big on rhetoric and short on concrete actionable ideas which can restore confidence.

There is one idea, however, that I believe could make a significant impact on restoring optimism, but before getting to that a brief personal backstory.

Blowing Bubbles

I lived in San Francisco and worked in tech during Dot Com bubble and bust a decade ago, and it taught me a lot of lessons. But perhaps the most important one didn't come until several years afterwards.

Having been away from California for a few years since the burst, I moved back (this time to Southern California) in 2003. To my disbelief I began noticing similarities between the still nascent housing bubble and the one which I had just recently had a front-row vantage. The tech bubble seemed still too fresh in my mind for the kind of speculation on housing that was taking place. While the assets were different (tech stocks vs. real estate), the underlying psychology was eerily familiar.

I did not have the foresight of Michael Burry, Steve Eisman, and the founders of garage startup hedge fund Cornwall Capital to cash-in on this observation. Instead I simply ignored peer pressure and pesky real estate salespeople who warned me that if I didn't purchase a home now I would be "priced out of the market forever". Another memorable ribbing from that era was the "you're throwing your money down the drain" by renting year-after-year. When the 2008 financial crisis hit it made the Tech Bubble look like a small financial radar blip.

Forget-Me-Nots

Witnessing two significant financial crashes in such close proximity to each other left an indelible lesson, which was to never underestimate how quickly a large number of people can forget a traumatic financial event.

This month marks the four-year anniversary from what was arguably the canary in the coal mine moment, the July 2007 collapse of two Bear Stearns hedge funds, both of which were heavily invested in mortgage securities. Bear Stearns itself blew-up approximately nine months later, and it would take until September 2008 for the crisis to reach its nadir with the simultaneous implosion of Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, and a bevy of other financial firms.

The case of Citigroup bears special mention. Its collapse and bailout marked the third time in last quarter-century that the firm needed to be rescued by the government (the other two instances being the 1982 Latin America debt crisis and the late 1980s bust in commercial real estate which sparked the S&L crisis). Yes, that's right, about once every 8 years on average Citibank blows-up and needs a taxpayer funded bailout. If an inglorious banking prize equivalent to baseball's golden sombrero doesn't already exist then one should be created and promptly awarded to Citi!

While Rogoff and Reinhart caution against the following type of thinking, I do suspect that this time is different from 2003-2004. I don't believe as many people have forgotten the financial crisis as did the dot com bust, and not just because the 2008 crisis was much more spectacular in its magnitude. There are two big differences between then and now:

1. Protracted high unemployment, which in the U.S. is at 9.2%, and in places like Spain is over 20%.

2. The sovereign debt crisis that is hitting not just European countries such as Greece, but is also hammering away at confidence in the U.S. with daily headlines about nearing the debt ceiling.

A sense of widespread and growing economic unease can be seen in recent polling data:

A New York Times/CBS News poll finds that 39 percent of respondents believe “the current economic downturn is part of a long-term permanent decline and the economy will never fully recover.” (in October, only 28 percent of people believed the U.S. economy was in permanent decline -- marking an 11-point increase between now and then) 

The survey is only one of a recent spate indicating widespread distress over the state of the economy. On June 8, a CNN poll found that 48 percent of Americans believe another Great Depression is either very likely or somewhat likely.

The 2008 financial crisis was a severe blow to economic confidence and optimism, by far the biggest since the Great Depression. The most important and personal asset for the vast majority is housing, which lost one-third of its value from the peak and recently began a double dip. This combined with high unemployment and the suffocation of too much debt is at the heart of the current economic unease.

What Did Taxpayers Receive in Exchange for Bailing-out Banks?

The fundamental instability of the financial system was laid bare for all to see during the 2008 crisis. The public also got a glimpse of just how dangerous Too Big to Fail financial institutions are as governments around the world rushed to bailout megabanks and firms like AIG with taxpayer money. What did taxpayers get in exchange? As much as Paul Volcker, Adair Turner, Sheila Bair, and other well meaning and respected technocrats would like us to believe that Dodd-Frank, Basel III, etc. repaired the foundational cracks, the ongoing sovereign debt crisis casts serious doubts on these claims.

Today, people aren't wondering whether the next proverbial shoe will drop. People are instead bracing for when the next economic tsunami will make landfall. Will it be this week with Greece, end of this month with the U.S. debt ceiling, or sometime around the next major elections, when historically (and peculiarly) financial crisis seem to appear? The exact timing is uncertain, but there is broad understanding that another major financial crisis will strike, and perhaps soon.

This sense of pending chaos has left many people in a state of economic paralysis and dealt a collective blow to confidence and optimism. As Austin Powers would put it, we've lost our economic mojo.

A Key to Fixing Our Optimism Deficit

A big key to restoring economic optimism is the establishment of a sturdy foundation for the financial system.

Our current financial system is opaque and not well understood by the general public or many experts, such as macro economists, almost all of which failed to see the crisis coming. Apocalyptic terms are often employed when discussing it, and a fear that it may come crashing down at any moment feeds existential worry and creates a drag on productive economic activity. For example, concern of another crash inhibits lending and investment, reduces entrepreneurial risk taking, and may be responsible for the stockpiling of cash we're seeing at many large corporations, like Apple which is sitting on approximately $60 billion.

How best to provide the financial system with a rock solid foundation? Is simply restoring Glass-Steagall enough? I don't think so.

The most far-reaching, comprehensive and achievable plan is the one outlined by Professor Laurence Kotlikoff, which he calls Limited-Purpose Banking. I believe that title may in fact do a disservice to his well thought through ideas, which go far beyond banking and include insurance and other areas of the financial system (e.g., regulatory consolidation of the 120 government agencies currently charged with supervising various elements of the financial system).

Professor Kotlikoff has written a book on his ideas, which you can find in the Good Books and Films section of the right-side column of this blog, titled Jimmy Stewart is Dead: Ending the World's Ongoing Financial Plague with Limited Purpose Banking (the Stewart reference is to the thespian's role as the likeable community banker, George Bailey, in It's a Wonderful Life). You can listen to an excellent talk he gave at the London School of Economics here. His proposal has generated bi-partisan political, regulatory and intellectual support around the world. Mervyn King of the Bank of England has been one of its foremost champions.

Without going into all the technical details, Limited-Purpose Banking basically removes leverage from the financial system and makes the entire system more like mutual funds, which did not collapse or suffer from fraud during the recent financial crisis.

Here are some of the promises of Limited-Purpose Banking:

• We’ll never have another financial collapse.
• We’ll never see a run on banks ever again. 
• We’ll never see insurance companies insuring the uninsurable. 
• We’ll get rid of all the con jobs underlying the current financial system. 
• There will be no more insider rating deals, liar loans, director sweetheart deals, bonuses which amount to corporate theft, bribing of Congress. 

In short, we’ll have a financial system that’s honest and that we can trust. The financial plague will be cured, once and for all.

Interview with Larry Kotlikoff Author of "Jimmy Stewart Is Dead" from Daniela Guernica on Vimeo.

To bring back economic optimism we must build a new, more stable foundation for economic activity. This foundation can be created with a new financial system like the one proposed by Professor Kotlikoff, who is quite optimistic about the likelihood that his ideas will ultimately be implemented. It may take one more financial crisis and bailout of the banks to get the public and politicians on board with this type of reform, but I agree with Professor Kotlikoff that something along the lines of the reforms he's outlined will happen eventually.

FDIC's Bair: "They Should Have Let Bear Stearns Fail"

Today's must-read interview is with just-departed FDIC Chairwoman Sheila Bair, who sets the record straight on:

• where Paulson, Bernanke, and Geithner went wrong (e.g., bailing out Bear Stearns)
• the disconnect between President Obama's 'heart' and the people he chose for his economic team 
• what the future holds for Too Big (or more accurately 'Too Bigger') to Fail

Bair's argument on letting Bear fail is that it would have sent a strong signal to the larger, more systemically integrated firms, like Lehman, that they should raise capital because the government was not going to bail out everyone. Whether Lehman could have in fact raised sufficient capital in the wake of Bear being allowed to fail is a great counterfactual question. 

One has the impression from reading Sorkin's Too Big to Fail that Dick Fuld and Co. either expected Paulson to bail Lehman out, or that the storm would pass soon enough for the prices of Lehman's assets to recover. Paulson purportedly appealed directly to Fuld to raise capital on numerous occassions in 2008. However, given the Federal Reserve's bailout of Bear, Fuld's skepticism that the systemically more important Lehman would be allowed to go under is understandable. If Bear had been allowed to fail Fuld likely would have come away with an entirely different interpretation of how things might play out should his back get pushed up against the wall, as it did during that fateful September of almost three years ago.

The interview also makes reference to former CFTC head Brooksley Born. For anyone who hasn't watched it already I highly recommend Frontline's profile of her battle with Greenspan, Rubin and Summers on the regulation of derivatives, a Wall Street product which Warren Buffet has called "financial weapons of mass destruction".

Investment Implications of Prolonged Financial Repression

Interesting read from Joe Roseman, former head of Moore Capital PM and Head of Macro Research, on the investment implications of 'prolonged financial repression'. Some highlights:

One of the issues that appears to have really confused economists is why corporates have steadfastly refused to participate in a new capital investment cycle? Why has new hiring been virtually non-existent? 

Standard econometric equations get this wrong because equations can’t think. Econometrics will look for the last time that interest rates were this low, looking at what worked before. 

I would argue that such equations do not have the requisite history built into them to recognise a period when three out of four cylinders in the engine of growth have been impaired. Econometric equations can’t think, but Sir Martin Sorrell of WPP certainly can. 

To quote Sorrell; “Most importantly, post-Lehman and the several corporate crises, we have seen a concern, or even fear, amongst Chairmen and CEOs and in the boardroom about making mistakes and a consequent emphasis on cost containment and unwillingness to add to fixed expenses and capacity.” 

Sorrell goes on to say that “Western-based multi-nationals are said to have over $2tr in cash on their balance sheets, but unemployment remains at stubbornly high levels, with only increases in temporary employment and limited expansion in fixed capacity in Western markets. Hence, a willingness to invest in the brand and maintaining or increasing market share, rather than increasing capacity and fixed expenses.” 

Governments don’t have the cash so print it. Households don’t have the cash so borrow it when they can. Banks don’t have the cash so skim it from savers. Corporates have the cash and just hoard it.

And the possible investment implications?

Not everywhere in the world has the same macro-impairment as the major Western economies, thereby allowing many corporates to develop growth strategies based outside of the G7. Having a cheap(er) currency certainly helps those companies. 

The market seemingly does not value cash sitting on the balance sheet highly. I wonder if that is a mistake. Cash, it is argued, offers optionality to the holder to take advantage of falling (asset) prices should they occur. On the same basis it may also be being undervalued on balance sheets.

I wonder if standard tests of “value” are missing the true value of the cash sitting on balance sheets? In a world where black swans are as common as starlings, having high net cash balances is a major plus. I also wonder whether that same optionality to use cash to buy cheap assets should also be valued higher.

In closing, he wondering whether the M&A department of foreign corporates would view weak currencies, like the pound or U.S. dollar, as an opportunity to acquire cash-rich businesses in the UK or U.S., respectively.

Full writeup here.

What's the Difference Between 'Financial Repression' and 'Macroprudential Regulation'?

Axel Weber and German Chancellor Angela Merkel

The most striking remarks made by former Bundesbank Chief and ECB frontrunner Axel Weber in a recent WSJ interview were his comments on the possibility of using financial repression to solve the Greek and wider European debt crisis:

“Ultimately, there will be a debate about financial repression. Take what we had in Germany — the Zwangsanleihe [compulsory loans introduced after World War I to help make reparation payments]. If voluntary contributions don’t add up, then the one tool that is still on the shelf is financial repression.”

To my knowledge, this is the first time a major senior policymaker (albeit one who recently stepped down) has publicly used the term 'financial repression'. As economist Carmen Reinhart and others have noted, the policies associated with financial repression are typically couched under the more benign, positive sounding 'macroprudential regulation'.

Update: News today emerged that Weber will become Chairman of Swiss megabank UBS, which perhaps explains the reasoning behind his choice of words.

Economic Newspeak

The term 'financial repression' was first coined in 1973 by two Stanford economists, and the word choice was intended to disparage developing economies which enacted what were deemed to be anti-competitive (and hence anti-growth) policies. In other words, the term 'financial repression' was invented with negative connotations in mind.

Can the contrast between 'financial repression' and 'macroprudential regulation' be viewed along the same lines as the difference between 'quantitative easing' and 'printing money'? The two monetary terms can mean approximately the same thing, although those who oppose Fed policies, like QE2, tend to embrace the use of the latter, which is arguably both more provocative and transparent to a broader audience.

This blog has in the past been highly critical of other examples of opaque, economic 'newspeak', such as Yale Professor Robert Shiller's argument that terms like 'bailout' should be replaced with ‘orderly resolution’ so that the voting public 'gets it'.

Financial Repression Redux

The latest from Carmen Reinhart and Co. on the return of financial repression has been published on the IMF's website here. If you're a little turned off by academic papers then you'll find this latest short, magazine-style piece much more appealing.

For more thoughts on financial repression, including how to protect oneself from it, see here.