Showing posts with label Carmen Reinhart. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Carmen Reinhart. Show all posts

Tuesday, January 3

Naked Capitalism Uses a Single Data Point to Disprove Financial Repression

A post over at Naked Capitalism titled 'Why Is The Term “Financial Repression” Being Sold?' by the Roosevelt Institute's Matt Stoler purports to "fact check" a statement about the negative effects of financial repression.

That sounds useful, for as Stoler points out financial repression is much in the news these days. However, there's just one big problem: Stoler's fact checking consists of looking at just one country, the U.S.

Never mind that the Reinhart and Sbrancia paper about financial repression which Stoler references includes a 10-country data sample (and information about dozens of other countries), or that other studies on the effects of financial repression have looked at data from 20 or more countries. And Stoler clearly couldn't be bothered with checking to see that most of the research on financial repression has in fact focussed on its impact on economic growth in developing countries, and not advanced economies like the U.S.

Following Stoler's breathtakingly brief analysis of the single U.S. data point he concludes:
"So we see that the financial repression meme is at heart an aristocratic concept."
Sorry, Matt, but it's not quite that simple.

Who exactly are financial repression's winners and losers? As some of the commenters on Stoler's post note the not insignificant dose of inflation which accompanies financial repression hits everyone who saves money. Also, the large rentier may have additional means at his/her disposal to mitigate the effects of financial repression. However, the small rentier (aka 401K holders, pensioners, retirees on fixed incomes) may not easily be able to, for example, shift assets to Lichtenstein.

But there may be a more simple answer to this question of winners and losers. To work as intended financial repression depends on government rules and regulation. In short, this means that under a system of financial repression those who follow the law are the ones who are punished by the law. Sound like a place you'd like to live?

Monday, October 10

Default Myth Busting: Sorry Simon and James, the U.S. is not a Default Virgin

Professor Simon Johnson and James Kwak of The Baseline Scenario have an article at Vanity Fair about the geopolitical importance of credit in late-18th century France, Great Britain, and (especially) the United States. Their article, however, fails to mention an important detail which also happens to contradict their claim that "the (U.S.) federal government would always honor its debt".

The consolidation/conversion of U.S. revolutionary state debt into federal debt, which took place in the early 1790s, and which the authors refer to in the paragraph prior to the above quote, represented a U.S. sovereign default. (For more on this event see Reinhart and Rogoff (click on the U.S. tab) or Sylla, et al, which describes the 'haircut' bondholders received (6% to 4%).)

The notion that the U.S. has never defaulted has unfortunately been repeated often enough that, like the incorrect claim that TARP was "profitable", otherwise well-informed people have come to believe it.

In terms of other U.S. defaults, Reinhart and Rogoff also count Franklin Roosevelt's 1933 prohibition on owning gold and the subsequent devaluation of the U.S. dollar vs. gold as a default.

It's not very surprising to see Vice President Biden promoting the myth that the U.S. has never defaulted (in his case following a visit to the U.S.'s largest creditor, China). Professor Johnson, however, should know better.

Thursday, July 14

Reinhart and Rogoff on Why Heavily Indebted Economies Can't Grow

Coinciding with Moody's placing the U.S. debt rating on negative review, Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogofff remind us that country's will high debt levels often struggle to grow (attention Paul Krugman, they're talking to you!):
Our empirical research on the history of financial crises and the relationship between growth and public liabilities supports the view that current debt trajectories are a risk to long-term growth and stability, with many advanced economies already reaching or exceeding the important marker of 90 percent of GDP. Nevertheless, many prominent public intellectuals continue to argue that debt phobia is wildly overblown. Countries such as the U.S., Japan and the U.K. aren’t like Greece, nor does the market treat them as such. 
Indeed, there is a growing perception that today’s low interest rates for the debt of advanced economies offer a compelling reason to begin another round of massive fiscal stimulus. If Asian nations are spinning off huge excess savings partly as a byproduct of measures that effectively force low- income savers to put their money in bank accounts with low government-imposed interest-rate ceilings -- why not take advantage of the cheap money? 
Although we agree that governments must exercise caution in gradually reducing crisis-response spending, we think it would be folly to take comfort in today’s low borrowing costs, much less to interpret them as an “all clear” signal for a further explosion of debt. 
Several studies of financial crises show that interest rates seldom indicate problems long in advance. In fact, we should probably be particularly concerned today because a growing share of advanced country debt is held by official creditors whose current willingness to forego short-term returns doesn’t guarantee there will be a captive audience for debt in perpetuity. 
Those who would point to low servicing costs should remember that market interest rates can change like the weather. Debt levels, by contrast, can’t be brought down quickly. Even though politicians everywhere like to argue that their country will expand its way out of debt, our historical research suggests that growth alone is rarely enough to achieve that with the debt levels we are experiencing today. 
The full Reinhart and Rogoff article can be found here.

Friday, July 1

What's the Difference Between 'Financial Repression' and 'Macroprudential Regulation'?

Axel Weber and German Chancellor Angela Merkel
The most striking remarks made by former Bundesbank Chief and ECB frontrunner Axel Weber in a recent WSJ interview were his comments on the possibility of using financial repression to solve the Greek and wider European debt crisis:
“Ultimately, there will be a debate about financial repression. Take what we had in Germany — the Zwangsanleihe [compulsory loans introduced after World War I to help make reparation payments]. If voluntary contributions don’t add up, then the one tool that is still on the shelf is financial repression.”
To my knowledge, this is the first time a major senior policymaker (albeit one who recently stepped down) has publicly used the term 'financial repression'. As economist Carmen Reinhart and others have noted, the policies associated with financial repression are typically couched under the more benign, positive sounding 'macroprudential regulation'.

Update: News today emerged that Weber will become Chairman of Swiss megabank UBS, which perhaps explains the reasoning behind his choice of words.

Economic Newspeak

The term 'financial repression' was first coined in 1973 by two Stanford economists, and the word choice was intended to disparage developing economies which enacted what were deemed to be anti-competitive (and hence anti-growth) policies. In other words, the term 'financial repression' was invented with negative connotations in mind.

Can the contrast between 'financial repression' and 'macroprudential regulation' be viewed along the same lines as the difference between 'quantitative easing' and 'printing money'? The two monetary terms can mean approximately the same thing, although those who oppose Fed policies, like QE2, tend to embrace the use of the latter, which is arguably both more provocative and transparent to a broader audience.

This blog has in the past been highly critical of other examples of opaque, economic 'newspeak', such as Yale Professor Robert Shiller's argument that terms like 'bailout' should be replaced with ‘orderly resolution’ so that the voting public 'gets it'.

Monday, June 13

Financial Repression Redux

The latest from Carmen Reinhart and Co. on the return of financial repression has been published on the IMF's website here. If you're a little turned off by academic papers then you'll find this latest short, magazine-style piece much more appealing.

For more thoughts on financial repression, including how to protect oneself from it, see here.

Saturday, May 21

Econ Myth Busting: Sorry John Carney, the U.S. is Not a Default Virgin

I'm a big fan of American Public Media's Marketplace radio show, but Friday's show featured CNBC's John Carney and Fortune's Leigh Gallagher discussing the U.S. debt situation.

Both John and Leigh stated the oft-repeated myth that the U.S. has *never* defaulted.

If only that were true.



The above summary is from Carmen Reinhart's and Ken Rogoff's research in their superb book This Time is Different, which is available in the Good Books and Films section on the far right column of this blog.

As you can see from their research not only has the U.S. defaulted, but the U.S. has defaulted or 'restructured' (a partial-default) at least once every century since the founding of the republic. Details on each episode can be found in the book and at Carmen's website.

As Reinhart and Rogoff put it, the U.S. is definitely not a "default virgin".

Tuesday, May 10

What is Financial Repression and How Investors Can Protect Themselves



Carmen Reinhart
Financial repression, a subject last widely studied in development economics circles in the 1970s-80s, appears to be making a comeback. Bill Gross dedicated his May investment letter to financial repression, and an article by the FT's Gillian Tett describes how both policymakers and investors are having to refamiliarze themselves with its tenets.

Just what exactly is the ominous sounding 'financial repression'? Below is an abridged definition from Reinhart & Rogoff's This Time is Different:
Banks are vehicles that allow governments to squeeze more indirect tax revenue from citizens by monopolizing the entire savings and payment system. Governments force local residents to save in banks by giving them few, if any, other options. 
They then stuff debt into the banks via reserve requirements and other devices. This allows the government to finance a part of its debt at a very low interest rate; financial repression thus constitutes a form oftaxation. Governments frequently can and do make the financial repression tax even larger by maintaining interest rate caps while creating inflation.
The 'Era of Financial Repression'

Carmen Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia recently published a paper which analyses the extent of financial repression among advanced economies in the post-World War II period. Here's Reinhart's and Sbrancia's updated definition of financial repression, which now includes pension funds along with banks in their list of domestic captives:
A subtle type of debt restructuring takes the form of “financial repression.” Financial repression includes directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross-border capital movements, and (generally) a tighter connection between government and banks.
They studied the post-WWII period:
In the heavily regulated financial markets of the Bretton Woods system, several restrictions facilitated a sharp and rapid reduction in public debt/GDP ratios from the late 1940s to the 1970s. Low nominal interest rates help reduce debt servicing costs while a high incidence of negative real interest rates liquidates or erodes the real value of government debt. 
And their key finding which has PIMCO's Bond King in a tizzy:

Continue reading the full article at SeekingAlpha here.