What Happened to Cyprus's Deposit Insurance Scheme?

So much for all quiet on the Eurozone front, a quiet which barring election rumblings from Italy has largely been enjoyed since Drahgi's LTRO blitz.

While it's unclear whether this weekend's 'bailing in' of Cyrpiot depositors will prove the trigger point for the final Eurozone reckoning, what is clear is that all the 'crazies' who have been stashing their money under their mattresses perhaps weren't so crazy after all.

One thing I'm curious about, which I haven't seen discussed in any detail anywhere else, are the mechanics behind what happened to Cyprus's deposit insurance scheme.

For example, is the insurance scheme, like the entire Cypriot banking system, insolvent? If yes, by how much? Could it be recapitalized through a tax? Etc.

The high level details of Cyprus's deposit insurance program, which goes by the name Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS), are discussed on the Central Bank of Cyprus's webpage here. As has been widely reported, depositors in Cypriot banks are supposed to be fully insured for €100.000 "per depositor, per bank".

Some reports state that if Cyprus's banks were allowed to fail then the small, fully insured depositors would be made whole. So do depositors who have €100.000 or less of insurable deposits have recourse for legal action in Cyprus?

One thing is clear: if I were a Cypriot depositor I would much rather have cash right now than shares in an insolvent bank.

Why Italy Isn't In Such Bad Shape, But the U.S. and UK Are

Bill Gross runs PIMCO's huge flagship bond fund which, having engaged in an untimely shorting of U.S. Treasuries, has hit a bit of a rough patch in recent times. Some have suggested that the 69-year old might be a few years past the recommended portfolio manager retirement age and that it's no longer as useful as it once was to read his monthly investment newsletters.

Think again.

While Gross's timing on shorting U.S. treasuries has been poor, and his revealing in this month's column of memory issues is a little unnerving, his analysis of the fundamentals and medium to long-term sovereign fiscal picture remains sound.

Take his updated 'Ring of Fire II' chart, the first version of which he first published a few years back. The chart (below) plots countries by both their annual public sector deficit (y-axis), which is the difference between government spending and taxes, and what is termed a 'fiscal gap' (x-axis). The fiscal gap takes into account future expenditures, which in the U.S.'s case include entitlements such as Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid.

As you can see from the chart Italy appears to be in better fiscal shape than several 'Ring of Fire' members like the U.S., Japan and the UK.  How is this possible? Italy has been experiencing what economists refer to as a 'speculative attack' from the sovereign bond market, while the three Ring of Fire countries are currently enjoying record low yields on their government debt. 

Continue reading the full article here.

On The Problem With Postponing the Inevitable

Today's Eurogeddon must read.

Lagarde Sacrifices Herself to Help Greece's Pro-Bailout New Democracy Party?

The Eurogeddon chess game is getting desperate so don't be surprised to see a few political/PR curveballs over the next few weeks in front of the 17 June Greek election runoff.

Case in point is this weekend's snarky comment from the typically ladylike Madame Lagarde. But before we get to that, some background:

The single worst thing than can happen from the perspective of the Troika (the IMF, EU, and ECB) and Greek elites right now is for Syriza and its 37-year old leader, 'Sexy Alexis', as he's now being called, to do well in the 17 June Greek election runoff.

In the most recent May elections Greek voters turned away from the two pro-bailout/austerity parties, PASOK and New Democracy, as they were seen as tools of the Troika. This rejection by voters sent a shiver up the Troika's spine as they know that should Syriza and Alexis Tsipras prevail he will likely walk away from the terms of the bailout and thereby call the Troika's bluff to either a) cut off Greece's banking system from further ECB funding or b) terminate any further bailout money to Greece's government. Either one of these moves will likely trigger a financial panic and spoil everyone's summer vacation plans.

So the Troika are now desperate to see PASOK and or New Democracy do better in the 17 June election. So how can they help them?

Agent Provocateur: Christine Lagarde, IMF Chief

Angry Greek voters are looking for someone to blame, and as long as PASOK and New Democracy are seen as part of the problem it's unlikely that voters will put them back into power. So one strategy is to try and reshift the political blame onto the external Troika, which would have the effect of diverting negative feelings away from PASOK and New Democracy. This would help the two pro-bailout Greek parties reposition themselves as domestic victims rather than as co-conspirators with the hated foreigners.

And now you understand why the typically politie Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF, probably deliberately roiled the Aegean kettle this weekend with a comment about how it's 'payback time', and Greeks need to pay their taxes.

Queue the Greek firestorm.

And lo and behold, New Democracy, who of course along with PASOK quickly denounced Lagarde's rhetoric, is again rising in the polls.

Nice move, Troika.

And, by the way, Lagarde doesn't pay any taxes on her $551,700 in annual compensation.

Greece Just Publicly Threatened Its Trump Card

Greece just decided to start 2012 off by significantly upping the ante:

"The bailout agreement needs to be signed otherwise we will be out of the markets, out of the euro," spokesman Pantelis Kapsis told Skai TV.

 Here's my previous piece explaining why in the European sovereign debt crisis Greece holds all the cards.

Believe the Hype? Eurozone Collapse Fear-mongering Kicks Into Overdrive

Munchau gives the Eurozone at most 10 days to fix its problems before it implodes.

DeLong argues that "the Federal Reserve needs to buy up every single European bond owned by every single American financial institution for cash”.

But Johnson and Boone say such measures are basically pointless and have declared "The End of the Euro".

All of the above are respected thinkers with loads of experience and credibility, so clearly we are on the precipice of financial apocalypse.

But are we?

The Icy Silence

One country has taken a completely different path to the government and central bank financed bailouts urged by many of the Econoratti as the only way to save the Eurozone (and global economy) from economic catastrophe. That country is Iceland.

Iceland committed financial heresy when it decided to let its three formerly pygmy-sized banks, which rang up a remarkable $100 billion+ in losses, go bankrupt.

And how have things turned out for Iceland? So far, not too shabby.

Sound intergalactic advice

Iceland, an approximately $12 billion GDP economy, is small and none of its banks were Too Big to Fail. So it's an open question whether the example set by Iceland can be repeated by a larger country with a much more important banking system (i.e., Spain or Italy).

Having said that, one of the remarkable things about the current crisis debate is the near complete lack of contemplation of that very question. Instead an almost unanimous call is being made for the Germans to unleash the ECB money printing 'bazooka'. But that is just one of several different options.

As we contemplate Eurogeddon let's keep Iceland in mind. Contrary to what financial scaremongers would have us believe economic life does not come to an end when banks are allowed to fail and countries are allowed to go bust.

Eurozone Debt Crisis is the IMF's Responsibility, Not the ECB's

Marc Chandler hits the nail on the head.

The IMF, which is funded by other sovereign countries, was invented precisely for dealing with problems like the current Eurozone debt debacle. The IMF is the proper lender of last resort to sovereign countries, not the central bank.

Central bank lending to sovereigns often ends in debt monetization and hyperinflation. There are sound reasons behind German stubbornness against turning the ECB into a 'bazooka'.

More on this topic, including why the 'experts' with near unanimity are calling on the ECB rather than the IMF, here.

Clarifying What Is Meant By 'Lender of Last Resort'

As the European debt crisis continues to worsen there are growing calls for the European Central Bank to purchase ever greater quantities of Italian and other troubled sovereign debt. Berkeley Professor Brad DeLong recently wrote a widely discussed piece arguing that the ECB is failing in its central banking duty as 'Lender of last resort'. But is it?

Professor DeLong makes some good points, particularly about the importance of establishing credibility with the market. However, he fails to differentiate between a central bank serving as a lender of last resort to the banking system versus a lender of last resort to sovereign countries. So far as I know (central bank operations are often murky by design) the ECB has continued to serve as the former but has resisted becoming the latter. There is a big difference between the two so this is an important omission by Professor DeLong.

With respect to the European banks, the ECB has opened and accessed U.S. dollar swap lines with the New York Federal Reserve Bank while also providing certain "unlimited" lending facilities to European banks. In short, the ECB is in fact playing the role of 'Lender of last resort' to Europe's banks. However, as DeLong notes, the ECB has only purchased European sovereign debt in limited quantities. How come?

The Germans get blamed for the ECB's spendthrift ways, with the not-so-distant memories of the Weimar hyperinflation still weighing on Teutonic minds (or so the usual armchair-Freudian analysis goes). But there is some prima facie evidence for this hypothesis: even though the ECB has (so far) not chosen to crank up the printing press full-bore two German ECB board members have resigned in the past year. The most recent, Juergen Stark, publicly stated that his reason for quitting was the ECB's resumption of Italian and Spanish sovereign debt purchases.

While the ECB may continue to hold back for now I suspect that if things get extremely ugly it will in fact print a much greater quantity of money than it has to date to bail the Eurozone out of its debt problem. If this happens euro bulls beware.

The other alternative is for the proper lender of last resort to sovereign countries -- the IMF -- to step in. The IMF was in fact created precisely for situations like the current Eurozone debt crisis. Given this you might be wondering why the experts, in near unanimity, are instead pointing towards the ECB? The answer, in short, is because the ECB has a printing press and the IMF (for now) does not.

Other countries, such as China, do have the funds to bolster the IMF to bailout Europe. But they'll want something in return, such as a greater voting share on the IMF's Board. This is an unappealing prospect to the U.S. and (in particular) Europe, which has since the IMF's inception held a perennial lock on the top job at the Fund. And so in the minds of many that leaves only the ECB.

Video: Kyle Bass on the Worldwide Problem of Too Much Debt

Link to Kyle's video presentation here.

Kyle, btw, is the protagonist in Michael Lewis' latest book, Boomerang. Zerohedge has posted some of the highlights about Kyle from the book here. 

Interactive Global Debt Clock

Courtesy of The Economist

The clock is ticking. Every second, it seems, someone in the world takes on more debt. The idea of a debt clock for an individual nation is familiar to anyone who has been to Times Square in New York, where the American public shortfall is revealed. Our clock shows the global figure for all (or almost all) government debts in dollar terms. 

Does it matter? After all, world governments owe the money to their own citizens, not to the Martians. But the rising total is important for two reasons. First, when debt rises faster than economic output (as it has been doing in recent years), higher government debt implies more state interference in the economy and higher taxes in the future. Second, debt must be rolled over at regular intervals. This creates a recurring popularity test for individual governments, rather as reality TV show contestants face a public phone vote every week. Fail that vote, as the Greek government did in early 2010, and the country can be plunged into imminent crisis. So the higher the global government debt total, the greater the risk of fiscal crisis, and the bigger the economic impact such crises will have.

h/t zerohedge

AEP on Euro Endgame: "Sorry Deutschland. History has conspired against you, again."

Evans-Pritchard on the Eurozone's Debt Endgame:

The Geithner Plan must be accompanied a monetary blitz, since the fiscal card is largely exhausted and Germany refuses to lower its savings rate to rebalance the EMU system. The only plausible option is for the ECB to let rip with unsterilized bond purchases on a mass scale, with a treaty change in the bank's mandate to target jobs and growth. 

This would weaken the euro, giving a lifeline to southern manufacturers competing with China. It would engineer an inflationary mini-boom in Germany, forcing up relative German costs within EMU. That would be the beginning of a solution, albeit a bad one. 

Sorry Deutschland. History has conspired against you, again. You must sign away €2 trillion, and debauch your central bank, and accept 5pc inflation, or be blamed for Götterdämmerung. It is not fair but that is what monetary union always meant. Didn't they tell you?

Full article here. 

Graphic: Who Holds Sovereign Debt? 70% of U.S. Debt Held by Government Entities

Courtesy of Global Macro Monitor:

Here’s a great chart just released by the International Monetary Fund. Note that almost half — 47 percent – of the US$14.7 trillion U.S. federal government debt is held by the Federal Reserve and the government itself, such as the Social Security trust fund. Add to that the 22 percent foreign official holdings (mainly central banks) and almost 70 percent of the debt of the U.S. government is held by non-market/non-profit oriented public sector entities. Stunning! 

It’s also interesting to hear Europeans quote the $14.7 trillion (apx. 100% of GDP) figure while U.S. officials like to refer to marketable or debt held by the public, which totals US$10.1 trillion (apx. 75% of GDP).

(click to enlarge)

Barry Eichengreen on What Could Replace the U.S. Dollar

Professor Eichengreen explains the current state of the world's reserve currencies and makes the argument for GDP-indexed bonds here.

Video: Barry Eichengreen on Why Economics Needs History

Berkeley Professor Barry Eichengreen discusses the importance of history to the study of economics and other topics in the below video.

A summary of Professor Eichengreen's recent book, Exorbitant Privilege, can be found here; a video lecture he gave on this book can be viewed here. 

So far Germany's current generation of leaders seem to be as committed to supporting the current Eurozone project as Professor Eichengreen has suggested they would . However, it's less than clear to me whether Germany has the appetite or capacity to support countries such as Spain and Italy should a full blown debt crisis ignite in these two large countries. Perhaps Germany would prefer a smaller Eurozone, comprised primarily of more economically homogeneous northern European countries instead of the current version which includes slow growing Club Med countries?

Updated: Greece to Engage in 'Selective' or 'Restricted' Default

Eurogroup head Jean-Claude Juncker

The undeniable fact that a Greek credit event was imminent was prognosticated here in late May. The situation on the ground in Greece, the lack of political will in the Eurozone, and the simple arithmetic all made kicking the Greek debt can much further down the road simply improbable.

Now, at last, we have all but final confirmation from the horse's mouth of what many since last year have known all along: Greece will default.

What happens next?

This is much more difficult to predict and will depend on just how exposed fragile financial institutions are to the ripple effects of default, and how credible the new package which accompanies Greece's default. If contagion spreads uncontrollably to Italy and/or Spain, look out below!

Update: On the newly announced Eurozone bailout program, economist Willem Buiter has a nice quote: “The EFSF has gone from being a single-barreled gun to a Gatling gun, but with the same amount of ammo. It needs to be increased in size urgently.” 

The failure of Europe's leaders to increase the size of the bailout fund speaks to the lack of political appetite in Germany and other northern European countries to support further bailouts, as well as a failure to understand just how big Europe's debt problem is.

Any predictions on the half-life of the latest can-kicking measure before there's blood in the water again?

Photo: Greek PM Papandreou IMF 'Employee of the Year' Banner

As seen outside the Greek parliament, some protesters roasting Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou, the Minnesota-born 'socialist convert to spartan economics'.

Bloomberg has a great history of the Eurozone debt fiasco.

Top Holders of Greek Government Debt

European Debt Mexican Standoff: Why Greece Holds All the Cards

A no-win scenario?

Markets are signalling that tonight's vote of confidence for the government of Greek Socialist leader George Papandreou will pass.

If that happens (I don't take anything for granted in the Eurozone kabuki theatre these days) then the next step in this Greek tragedy will come next week when a package of austerity measures is put to a vote before the Greek parliament.

The new austerity measures include spending cuts, tax increases and the sale of government assets. If the Greeks don't pass these measures then the EU and IMF have threatened to not release new funds to Greece (whether they would carry through on this threat is an open question). Without these new funds Greece will run out of cash next month and default.

The Greek Bargaining Position

While a Greek default would perhaps be bad in the short-run for Greece, it would be far, far worse for the Eurozone and rest of the world. Given the risks of financial contagion and a pan-European, if not global, banking crisis that a Greek default could trigger, the Greeks find themselves in a relatively strong negotiating position. And the Greeks, the EU, the ECB, and IMF all know this.

Continue reading at Seeking Alpha here.

Financial Repression Redux

The latest from Carmen Reinhart and Co. on the return of financial repression has been published on the IMF's website here. If you're a little turned off by academic papers then you'll find this latest short, magazine-style piece much more appealing.

For more thoughts on financial repression, including how to protect oneself from it, see here.

Why Greece Will Default Soon, and What Happens Next

As the haze and rhetoric surrounding the Greek debt crisis begins to lift we can now paint a pretty good picture of what's in store over the next few weeks for Europe's seemingly never-ending debt saga.

The June 29 Deadline

The FT describes the latest details and deadline in the Greek debt endgame:

...pressure is building to have a deal done within three weeks because of an IMF threat to withhold its portion of June’s €12bn bail-out payment unless Athens can show it can meet all its financing requirements for the next 12 months. 

Officials think Greece will be unable to return to the financial markets to raise money on its own in March – as originally planned in the current €110bn package – meaning that the IMF is now forbidden from distributing any additional cash. Without the IMF funds, eurozone governments would either be forced to fill the gap or Athens could default. 

To bring the IMF back in, the new deal must be reached by a scheduled meeting of EU finance ministers on June 20.

The hard deadline may in fact be June 29, when a 12 billion euro ($17bn; £10bn) payment is due to be made to Greece, of which 3.3 billion euros would come from the IMF.

Driving the IMF's credible tough stance are hard lessons learned (and apparently not forgotten) in Latin America a decade ago.


Remembering Argentina

Paul Blustein has written two very insightful and accessible books on recent sovereign defaults and IMF bailouts. His first, titled The Chastening, details the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis. His follow-up focussed on the financial crisis which struck Argentina's shortly thereafter, and is titled And the Money Kept Rolling In (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankrupting of Argentina. Both books are available in in the Good Books and Films section on the right side of this blog.

Continue reading the full article at SeekingAlpha here.