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Showing posts with label WWII. Show all posts
Showing posts with label WWII. Show all posts
Wednesday, September 28
Wednesday, August 17
Michael Lewis on Germany & the Eurozone
The latest and final instalment in a series of what author Michael Lewis has described as 'Euopean financial disaster tourism' articles he's penning for Vanity Fair can be found here. This latest article focuses on Germany (the previous two covered Greece and Ireland - google them or click on 'Michael Lewis' tag below to get the link).
The Germany articles also features an accompanying interview with Lewis, where 'Europe's least welcome tourist' discusses the problems with the broader Eurozone:
The Germany articles also features an accompanying interview with Lewis, where 'Europe's least welcome tourist' discusses the problems with the broader Eurozone:
VF Daily: Where did the euro go wrong?
Lewis: At its conception. They glued together a bunch of countries and cultures that didn’t really belong together in the same currency. So if you put Germany together with Greece in a single currency, it’s a little like watching an Olympic sprinter and a fat old man running a three-legged race. The Greeks will never be as productive as the Germans, and the Germans will never be as unproductive as the Greeks. So if they’re in the same currency—unless the Greeks simply up and move to Germany to work for the Germans—it implies a lifetime of transfers from Germany to Greece.
VF Daily: Greece was allowed a partial default this week, to the tune of $157 billion, despite the E.C.B.’s disapproval. This measure seems like a Band-Aid, though. Can we expect something much larger to happen, or do presidents and prime ministers just enjoy getting together to argue every six months?
Lewis: The Germans are basically calling the shots here, because they’re the only ones who can afford to pay the bill. My impression is that the German people do not want to pay it, but the German leadership does not want to be labeled as the people who destroyed the euro. So the way Angela Merkel is playing it is to tell the German people what they want to hear until the moment another crisis occurs, and then she goes into parliament and says, “I need this little check to get us through this rough patch, or you will be responsible for the disintegration of Europe.” What she doesn’t ever come away with, however, is a commitment for fiscal union. She doesn’t get Germany agreeing to underwrite euro bonds—to take all the debt of the southern countries.
VF Daily: Well, it would be political suicide, right?
Lewis: She may have already committed political suicide. German people are increasingly unhappy with how she has handled the crisis. I don’t think that the German people are going to go all-in. The step that they would need to take is much more dramatic than this Band-Aid.
Sunday, July 31
Evil on Display: Anders Brievik and Insane Acts Committed by Sane People
Perhaps it would be easier to understand the horrific Norwegian killings if they were committed by someone with a history of mental illness and/or violence.
Or perhaps we could more quickly file away this tragedy into a tidy, little mental compartment if the killing was conducted by someone with far less skill and fewer economic advantages.
And perhaps over time more details will emerge to reveal a picture of someone with a history of hate or unsound mind.
But early portraits painted by people who knew him suggest a rather disturbing alternative, which is that Anders Brievik was a seemingly 'normal' Norwegian.
From one of his classmate friends of four years:
If in fact he is a sane, even likeable person as some suggest, who also can kill without concern for those he slaughters, what are we to make of Anders Brievik?
Any student of history is well aware of the unfortunate reality that people like Brievik are nothing new. Many, particularly here in Europe, had hoped the ideologies which fuel Brievik-like personalities, capable of inflicting immense harm to a great number of people not personally known, had been buried decades ago. But the carefully orchestrated supernova of violence conducted by Brievik reminds us that this flame has not in fact gone out yet.
In the wretched corner of history occupied by the Brieviks of the world resides Nazism, which, for better or for worse, has received the lion's share of attention. I say for better or worse because the Nazi-like crimes committed under Stalin, Mao, and others often do not receive the same level of emphasis as those committed under Hitler.
Some who studied the Nazi leadership on trial at Nuremberg stated that the single most important personal quality which contributed to the ability of these humans to try and exterminate Jews (and others) was a lack of empathy. In place of a sense of caring about individuals and collective humanity, which exists in varying degrees in the vast majority of us, instead resided a bottomless black hole devoid of the ability to feel what others feel.
Harm-justifying venom can be easily poured into such minds. Rather than rejecting ideas which you and I would find unconscionable, harming others can seem logical. Seemingly sophisticated moral philosophies, justifications, and ends-means rationalizations enable such people to shoot kids "not just once, but twice, to be sure".
The Anti-Change
Brievik's bomb and gun shots were basically an attack on change. Put simply, Brievik didn't like the way things were going in Norway and decided to effectively sacrifice his freedom of movement for at least 20+ years-to-life (Norway doesn't have the death penalty) to let the world know about it.
For those who don't have the time or inclination to read his 1,000+ page 'manifesto', the change he lashed out against goes by the name of globalization. Brievik would probably prefer that we refer to it as multiculturalism, but globalization and multiculturalism are inextricably linked. Reductionist arguments which try and isolate multiculturalism from globalization are idiosyncratic and counter-productive.
The purpose of this post is not to debate the merits of globalization, but it was interesting to note the stark contrast between Brievik's hate for Norway's immigrants with a recent talk on the contribution of immigrants to Britain's intellectual history. One quarter of Britain's Nobel prize winners were born abroad, as were a large number of America's. Is freedom of movement what the Brieviks of the world would have end, or are they ok with allowing just the Albert Einsteins in?
What is Evil?
Norwegians are hurting badly from this heinous crime and asking how one of their own could commit such an act. Some would like to see the whole episode go away and also deny Brievik the publicity and attention he seeks. From the lack of headlines of late on the BBC and other respectable news agencies it would seem that some clearly understand the essential role of the media to his carefully calculated plan. Hats off to media leaders who recognize this and have taken appropriate action. But what about those who are still trying to gain more information and understand why this happened?
Outside of the religious world people often scoff at whether the imprecise, black-and-white concept of 'evil' is useful. But what other word comes close to giving this its proper name?
Leave it to the shrinks to classify and rationalize empathy-devoid personality types. For the rest of us 'normal' people the word evil will suffice.
Or perhaps we could more quickly file away this tragedy into a tidy, little mental compartment if the killing was conducted by someone with far less skill and fewer economic advantages.
And perhaps over time more details will emerge to reveal a picture of someone with a history of hate or unsound mind.
But early portraits painted by people who knew him suggest a rather disturbing alternative, which is that Anders Brievik was a seemingly 'normal' Norwegian.
From one of his classmate friends of four years:
I do not know what drove Anders. But, unfortunately, I do not think he is crazy. It would have created a comfortable distance between us if I thought he was. Nothing I know about him from our school days or what I have read in his so-called manifesto suggests that. Rather, he is cold, intelligent and calculating. The Anders I knew was not a monster.
And as the saying goes, he was not an island. He was product of our society. He was one of us.Sadly, There is Nothing New Here
If in fact he is a sane, even likeable person as some suggest, who also can kill without concern for those he slaughters, what are we to make of Anders Brievik?
Any student of history is well aware of the unfortunate reality that people like Brievik are nothing new. Many, particularly here in Europe, had hoped the ideologies which fuel Brievik-like personalities, capable of inflicting immense harm to a great number of people not personally known, had been buried decades ago. But the carefully orchestrated supernova of violence conducted by Brievik reminds us that this flame has not in fact gone out yet.
In the wretched corner of history occupied by the Brieviks of the world resides Nazism, which, for better or for worse, has received the lion's share of attention. I say for better or worse because the Nazi-like crimes committed under Stalin, Mao, and others often do not receive the same level of emphasis as those committed under Hitler.
Some who studied the Nazi leadership on trial at Nuremberg stated that the single most important personal quality which contributed to the ability of these humans to try and exterminate Jews (and others) was a lack of empathy. In place of a sense of caring about individuals and collective humanity, which exists in varying degrees in the vast majority of us, instead resided a bottomless black hole devoid of the ability to feel what others feel.
Harm-justifying venom can be easily poured into such minds. Rather than rejecting ideas which you and I would find unconscionable, harming others can seem logical. Seemingly sophisticated moral philosophies, justifications, and ends-means rationalizations enable such people to shoot kids "not just once, but twice, to be sure".
The Anti-Change
Brievik's bomb and gun shots were basically an attack on change. Put simply, Brievik didn't like the way things were going in Norway and decided to effectively sacrifice his freedom of movement for at least 20+ years-to-life (Norway doesn't have the death penalty) to let the world know about it.
For those who don't have the time or inclination to read his 1,000+ page 'manifesto', the change he lashed out against goes by the name of globalization. Brievik would probably prefer that we refer to it as multiculturalism, but globalization and multiculturalism are inextricably linked. Reductionist arguments which try and isolate multiculturalism from globalization are idiosyncratic and counter-productive.
The purpose of this post is not to debate the merits of globalization, but it was interesting to note the stark contrast between Brievik's hate for Norway's immigrants with a recent talk on the contribution of immigrants to Britain's intellectual history. One quarter of Britain's Nobel prize winners were born abroad, as were a large number of America's. Is freedom of movement what the Brieviks of the world would have end, or are they ok with allowing just the Albert Einsteins in?
What is Evil?
Norwegians are hurting badly from this heinous crime and asking how one of their own could commit such an act. Some would like to see the whole episode go away and also deny Brievik the publicity and attention he seeks. From the lack of headlines of late on the BBC and other respectable news agencies it would seem that some clearly understand the essential role of the media to his carefully calculated plan. Hats off to media leaders who recognize this and have taken appropriate action. But what about those who are still trying to gain more information and understand why this happened?
Outside of the religious world people often scoff at whether the imprecise, black-and-white concept of 'evil' is useful. But what other word comes close to giving this its proper name?
Leave it to the shrinks to classify and rationalize empathy-devoid personality types. For the rest of us 'normal' people the word evil will suffice.
Tuesday, May 10
What is Financial Repression and How Investors Can Protect Themselves
 |
| Carmen Reinhart |
Financial repression, a subject last widely studied in development economics circles in the 1970s-80s, appears to be making a comeback. Bill Gross dedicated his May investment letter to financial repression, and an article by the FT's Gillian Tett describes how both policymakers and investors are having to refamiliarze themselves with its tenets.
Just what exactly is the ominous sounding 'financial repression'? Below is an abridged definition from Reinhart & Rogoff's This Time is Different:
Carmen Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia recently published a paper which analyses the extent of financial repression among advanced economies in the post-World War II period. Here's Reinhart's and Sbrancia's updated definition of financial repression, which now includes pension funds along with banks in their list of domestic captives:
Continue reading the full article at SeekingAlpha here.
Just what exactly is the ominous sounding 'financial repression'? Below is an abridged definition from Reinhart & Rogoff's This Time is Different:
Banks are vehicles that allow governments to squeeze more indirect tax revenue from citizens by monopolizing the entire savings and payment system. Governments force local residents to save in banks by giving them few, if any, other options.
They then stuff debt into the banks via reserve requirements and other devices. This allows the government to finance a part of its debt at a very low interest rate; financial repression thus constitutes a form oftaxation. Governments frequently can and do make the financial repression tax even larger by maintaining interest rate caps while creating inflation.The 'Era of Financial Repression'
Carmen Reinhart and M. Belen Sbrancia recently published a paper which analyses the extent of financial repression among advanced economies in the post-World War II period. Here's Reinhart's and Sbrancia's updated definition of financial repression, which now includes pension funds along with banks in their list of domestic captives:
A subtle type of debt restructuring takes the form of “financial repression.” Financial repression includes directed lending to government by captive domestic audiences (such as pension funds), explicit or implicit caps on interest rates, regulation of cross-border capital movements, and (generally) a tighter connection between government and banks.They studied the post-WWII period:
In the heavily regulated financial markets of the Bretton Woods system, several restrictions facilitated a sharp and rapid reduction in public debt/GDP ratios from the late 1940s to the 1970s. Low nominal interest rates help reduce debt servicing costs while a high incidence of negative real interest rates liquidates or erodes the real value of government debt.And their key finding which has PIMCO's Bond King in a tizzy:
Continue reading the full article at SeekingAlpha here.
Thursday, December 2
The Biggest Loser (Besides the Irish) in Ireland's Ongoing Debt Crisis
Noted economic historian Barry Eichengreen has written perhaps the most scathing damnation of this week's Irish bailout. I strongly encourage reading the full piece.
Professor Eichengreen takes aim at Germany in particular. In the below passage he compares the Irish bailout to Germany's own hopelessly burdensome WWI war reparations, which played a key role in the rise of the Nazis and perhaps the Great Depression:
Irish Bailout Rejection Fallout
European sovereign bailouts may wind up becoming a lot like Department of Defense contracts in that the only thing contract signing signifies is the beginning (rather than the end) of negotiations. For example, if the new Irish government rejects its bailout as expected there may be an attempt to stem the ensuing crisis by negotiating down the hopelessly high bailout interest rate of 5.8% (or 7.25% depending on how it's calculated). And Ireland's controversial low corporate tax rate of 12.5%, rumored during the height of the drama to be on the table for european 'harmonization', may also be revisited.
Any such renegotiations should be viewed as window dressing aimed at delaying the final reckoning. The fundamental problem is that Ireland is insolvent. No amount of additional liquidity or tax rate bargaining alters this inescapable fact. Faced with this prospect, Europe's current leaders are struggling to determine who will take the biggest hit from Ireland's inevitable default.
Who Will Be the Biggest Loser?
Arguably the key issue to keep an eye on is whether senior Irish bank debt holders will be forced to take losses. If in fact Eichengreen's suggestion of 100% haircuts on insolvent Irish bank debt is adopted the ramifications for Europe's banking system would be difficult to overstate.
The below chart is helpful to understanding the implications of an Irish bailout rejection/and or default.
The U.K. is Ireland's largest creditor with approximately $220 billion in exposure, so any Irish bailout rejection and/or default will weigh heaviest on Britain. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB, which were previously placed on government life support, are particularly threatened.
An Irish rejection of the bailout will put substantial pressure on the still fragile British banking system, which post-bailout consolidation is now home to three of the world's five largest banks (including #1 RBS).
In spite of the current austerity push in the U.K., the government participated in the Irish bailout and pledged approximately $10M to "a friend in need". An Irish Times editorial, reflecting the long and conflicted relationship between these two nations, greeted British 'kindness' with a degree of skepticism.
It's would appear that the U.K. (an EU member which never adopted the euro currency) helped bailout Ireland because rescuing a neighbor is politically more palatable than what would have been necessary if Ireland's debt situation had further deteriorated: recapitalizing the British banking sector (again).
A Lonely Lady
But if at some point an Irish default is inevitable, and the Eurozone nations align to protect their euro based banking system, Britain may well find itself the odd man out. And since further bank bailouts by parliament are politically DOA, Mervyn King and the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street may be left to step into the breach to recapitalize British banks. Any such Bank of England support would be coming on top of calls from the Cameron government for further quantitative easing to reduce the effects of government budget cuts and nagging inflation. In other words, sterling would be forced to do even more at a time when the currency is already stretched thin.
It is worth briefly reviewing the history of pound sterling in the 20th century. In the 1920s one pound fetched almost $5. The country was forced off the gold standard during the September 1931 Sterling Crisis, resulting in a sharp devaluation. Following the massive accumulation of debt during WWII, the pound was devalued again in 1948. This was followed by a further 15% devaluation in 1967. Following a severe recession in the early 1980s, the pound has traded as low as $1.03 in March 1985. Overall, there is well established history of devaluation when the going gets tricky.
While the recent plunge in the euro has provided a relative respite in what had been a steady weakening trend in the pound, Britain will bear the foreign brunt of any Irish bailout rejection and/or default. Further compounding this problem is China's curious financial support to Europe's 'Club Med' nations, but not Ireland, and Britain's total debt position which stands at a whopping 5x GDP (the world's largest total debt/GDP ratio). Based on these and other factors one can make a very good argument that over the medium-to-longer term the pound will continue its long drift downwards. Several ETFs are available to hedge against this risk.
Professor Eichengreen takes aim at Germany in particular. In the below passage he compares the Irish bailout to Germany's own hopelessly burdensome WWI war reparations, which played a key role in the rise of the Nazis and perhaps the Great Depression:
"Ireland will be transferring nearly 10 per cent of its national income as reparations to the bondholders, year after painful year.This is not politically sustainable, as anyone who remembers Germany’s own experience with World War I reparations should know. A populist backlash is inevitable. The Commission, the ECB and the German Government have set the stage for a situation where Ireland’s new government, once formed early next year, rejects the budget negotiated by its predecessor. Do Mr. Trichet and Mrs. Merkel have a contingency plan for this?"The short answer to Barry's question is, of course, no.
Irish Bailout Rejection Fallout
European sovereign bailouts may wind up becoming a lot like Department of Defense contracts in that the only thing contract signing signifies is the beginning (rather than the end) of negotiations. For example, if the new Irish government rejects its bailout as expected there may be an attempt to stem the ensuing crisis by negotiating down the hopelessly high bailout interest rate of 5.8% (or 7.25% depending on how it's calculated). And Ireland's controversial low corporate tax rate of 12.5%, rumored during the height of the drama to be on the table for european 'harmonization', may also be revisited.
Any such renegotiations should be viewed as window dressing aimed at delaying the final reckoning. The fundamental problem is that Ireland is insolvent. No amount of additional liquidity or tax rate bargaining alters this inescapable fact. Faced with this prospect, Europe's current leaders are struggling to determine who will take the biggest hit from Ireland's inevitable default.
Who Will Be the Biggest Loser?
Arguably the key issue to keep an eye on is whether senior Irish bank debt holders will be forced to take losses. If in fact Eichengreen's suggestion of 100% haircuts on insolvent Irish bank debt is adopted the ramifications for Europe's banking system would be difficult to overstate.
The below chart is helpful to understanding the implications of an Irish bailout rejection/and or default.
 |
| (click to enlarge) |
The U.K. is Ireland's largest creditor with approximately $220 billion in exposure, so any Irish bailout rejection and/or default will weigh heaviest on Britain. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB, which were previously placed on government life support, are particularly threatened.
An Irish rejection of the bailout will put substantial pressure on the still fragile British banking system, which post-bailout consolidation is now home to three of the world's five largest banks (including #1 RBS).
 |
| (click to enlarge) |
In spite of the current austerity push in the U.K., the government participated in the Irish bailout and pledged approximately $10M to "a friend in need". An Irish Times editorial, reflecting the long and conflicted relationship between these two nations, greeted British 'kindness' with a degree of skepticism.
It's would appear that the U.K. (an EU member which never adopted the euro currency) helped bailout Ireland because rescuing a neighbor is politically more palatable than what would have been necessary if Ireland's debt situation had further deteriorated: recapitalizing the British banking sector (again).
A Lonely Lady
But if at some point an Irish default is inevitable, and the Eurozone nations align to protect their euro based banking system, Britain may well find itself the odd man out. And since further bank bailouts by parliament are politically DOA, Mervyn King and the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street may be left to step into the breach to recapitalize British banks. Any such Bank of England support would be coming on top of calls from the Cameron government for further quantitative easing to reduce the effects of government budget cuts and nagging inflation. In other words, sterling would be forced to do even more at a time when the currency is already stretched thin.
It is worth briefly reviewing the history of pound sterling in the 20th century. In the 1920s one pound fetched almost $5. The country was forced off the gold standard during the September 1931 Sterling Crisis, resulting in a sharp devaluation. Following the massive accumulation of debt during WWII, the pound was devalued again in 1948. This was followed by a further 15% devaluation in 1967. Following a severe recession in the early 1980s, the pound has traded as low as $1.03 in March 1985. Overall, there is well established history of devaluation when the going gets tricky.
While the recent plunge in the euro has provided a relative respite in what had been a steady weakening trend in the pound, Britain will bear the foreign brunt of any Irish bailout rejection and/or default. Further compounding this problem is China's curious financial support to Europe's 'Club Med' nations, but not Ireland, and Britain's total debt position which stands at a whopping 5x GDP (the world's largest total debt/GDP ratio). Based on these and other factors one can make a very good argument that over the medium-to-longer term the pound will continue its long drift downwards. Several ETFs are available to hedge against this risk.
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