Showing posts with label Hyperinflation. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Hyperinflation. Show all posts

Wednesday, May 30

On the Topic of Financial Collapse Fear Mongering

"Ireland is in a death spiral" -FT

"After the November President election the U.S. is facing a fiscal cliff" -Federal Reserve staff

"Eurogeddon!" -The PolyCapitalist

On and on go the warnings of cataclysm and pending financial doom. Technical jargon and existential risks are bandied about in frightening fashion, leaving the general, less-economically literate with very little ability to understand what's actually happening or just how bad things could really get if say Greece leaves the Eurozone, or another country defaults, or something like this occurs.

This blog is not entirely innocent of this criticism, and this post is a brief attempt to quickly address the question of whether our global financial system is on the precipice of a financial collapse if say something 'really bad' happens in Europe?

The short answer is no.

Now before I expand on that answer I would like to clarify something very important: this post is about financial collapse and not about the extremely high levels of unemployment, which have reached approximately 50% for young people in countries such as Greece and Spain. The youth and general unemployment problems today are serious and something to be very concerned about. But this post is not about that but instead about whether another Lehman-style event could occur where the world's financial system risks implosion if say a country like Greece pulls out of the euro, the current 'bank jog' in Spain accelerates, etc.

So why isn't the risk of financial collapse as bad as some would have use believe?

For starters, we have to keep in mind that our financial world is a virtual world. Today, money is largely a set of numbers on a computer. This means that even in the most extreme scenario of financial disorder, where policymakers completely blow it and the ATMs stopped working and the stock market tanked, that everything that is real and tangible - the houses, the food that is farmed, the physical assets - none of this goes away and will all be here the next day when you wake up in the morning.

Now having said that, a financial implosion would definitely have a major impact on our lives, particularly for those with fewer resources or who are unprepared. But life will go on for nearly everyone and could actually rebound quite quickly given other historical cases. For example, Argentina began recovering within months following its utterly complete financial meltdown in 2001 even though the country achieved the relatively rare trifecta of a currency collapse, a banking crisis, and a sovereign default all at once. Iceland has had a relatively quick turnaround following its 2008 financial implosion. And other Asian countries in the late-90s also turned the corner pretty quickly following major financial crises.

In the case of Argentina, dozens of people died in Dec. 2001 riots, so I don't want to minimize the very real suffering and dislocation which comes with a financial collapse. But Argentina's experience is a far cry from the level of suffering of say a war or severe natural disaster. In short, a 'cataclysm', it was not.

A further point needs to be made about the above examples, which is that they were all relatively isolated, contained crises that did not threaten a systemic collapse in arguably the same way as the current crisis. But this leads me to point number two, which is that a systemic collapse is extremely unlikely, particularly given two facts:
  1. what was learned from the recent Lehman-experience in 2008 by the current crop of policymakers.
  2. the world's central banks, especially the Federal Reserve, still have loads of financial ammunition.
Regarding the first point, current policymakers got a first-hand glimpse of just how interconnected the world's financial system is and how the failure of a seemingly small cog in the wheel could threaten to topple the whole system. So while yes, Greece's financial implosion could lead to a chain reaction that threatens the entire global financial system, it is utterly inconceivable in the wake of the Lehman crisis that policymakers would sit back and let that happen given what they learned and how they responded in 2008-2009.

So I hear you asking whether all our problems are solved then because central banks like the Federal Reserve are all powerful, financially speaking, and able to contain any crisis which comes its way? Over the long-term, I would say no, they are not all powerful financially. But in the short-term, meaning right now and over the next few months at least, they are all powerful financially, and here's why.

Central banks like the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan, and Bank of England which operate fiat currencies have an extraordinary power, which is that they can create an unlimited amount of money.

'Unlimited', meaning a truly infinite amount of money? Yes

What this means is that even if, for example, all the depositors in Spain and Greece withdrew every last euro from their local banks the ECB can supply all the notes that citizens want to hide under their bed mattresses. In short, the ATMs should never, ever run out of money in a fiat money system which is being managed by competent professionals.

But earlier I alluded to the fact that even though central banks can print an unlimited amount of money that they were not in fact financially omnipotent over the long-term, so what did I mean by that?

With the magic that is the computer a central bank could literally go and create and infinite amount of money. But there are side effects with central banks creating a lot of money, namely inflation. Without getting technical, simply put inflation is a rise in prices. Hyperinflation is a very large, sudden rise in prices.

But here is the crucial point to remember: rising inflation acts as a brake on a central bank's ability to create money. In other words, a rise in inflation is perhaps the key to understanding when central banks would be constrained in any effort to bail out the financial system.

Today, most of the world's advanced economies (North America, Europe) have relatively modest inflation, meaning low single digit annual percentage increases in official measures of core inflation. And even though they would say otherwise, the central banks in these advanced countries would be more than willing to trade an increase in inflation to stem the risk of a systemic financial collapse.

So how much more inflation would central banks be willing to tolerate as a tradeoff for not risking financial collapse? As the Bank of England has demonstrated in the past couple years, inflation creeping up towards 5% is not enough of a concern to prompt a significant deviation in policy. So my guess (it is a guess) is that at the extreme central banks like the Fed could tolerate up to 10% if they perceived the risks of collapse to be great enough before they would think twice about pulling another post-Lehman style bailout of the world's financial system. And since we're still in low single digit inflation this gives the Fed a decent amount of runway to maneuver.

This room to maneuver is what is meant when it is said that the Fed, which controls the world's most important reserve currency, and other central banks still have lots of ammunition.

The existence of this ammunition is likely a factor behind why given all the current distress in Europe that the stock markets haven't fallen further. In other words, the markets expect central banks to step in and flood the financial system with money if Greece leaves the euro or a banking run accelerates. Even the supposedly hemmed in by the Germans/hard-money crowd ECB. After LTRO and all the sovereign bond debt purchases, anyone who still thinks the ECB won't step in to save the system if things go completely pear shaped by creating a lot money is living in a fantasy. And this flood of central bank money would likely be very bullish for stocks in the short-term.

Should inflation increase significantly, then the ability of central banks to rush in and save the day could be diminished. But for now, they have the power to act, and that's why (for now) a general financial collapse is not on the immediate horizon.

So in sum, if you want to understand when it might be time to get worried, keep an eye on official measures of core inflation, particularly if it starts creeping up near the 5% level as that is about the time a proper central banker will begin to twitch over fears of runaway inflation.

Now, in terms of how you want to position your investment portfolio given the above, the very first post on this blog just over two years ago argued for allocating some of your portfolio into gold, which is arguably the best hedge against excessive central bank money printing. Even though the price of gold has gone up significantly in the last two years this blog still stands by that recommendation for long-term investors.

Tuesday, November 22

Eurozone Debt Crisis is the IMF's Responsibility, Not the ECB's

Marc Chandler hits the nail on the head.

The IMF, which is funded by other sovereign countries, was invented precisely for dealing with problems like the current Eurozone debt debacle. The IMF is the proper lender of last resort to sovereign countries, not the central bank.

Central bank lending to sovereigns often ends in debt monetization and hyperinflation. There are sound reasons behind German stubbornness against turning the ECB into a 'bazooka'.

More on this topic, including why the 'experts' with near unanimity are calling on the ECB rather than the IMF, here.

Wednesday, November 9

Clarifying What Is Meant By 'Lender of Last Resort'

As the European debt crisis continues to worsen there are growing calls for the European Central Bank to purchase ever greater quantities of Italian and other troubled sovereign debt. Berkeley Professor Brad DeLong recently wrote a widely discussed piece arguing that the ECB is failing in its central banking duty as 'Lender of last resort'. But is it?

Professor DeLong makes some good points, particularly about the importance of establishing credibility with the market. However, he fails to differentiate between a central bank serving as a lender of last resort to the banking system versus a lender of last resort to sovereign countries. So far as I know (central bank operations are often murky by design) the ECB has continued to serve as the former but has resisted becoming the latter. There is a big difference between the two so this is an important omission by Professor DeLong.

With respect to the European banks, the ECB has opened and accessed U.S. dollar swap lines with the New York Federal Reserve Bank while also providing certain "unlimited" lending facilities to European banks. In short, the ECB is in fact playing the role of 'Lender of last resort' to Europe's banks. However, as DeLong notes, the ECB has only purchased European sovereign debt in limited quantities. How come?

The Germans get blamed for the ECB's spendthrift ways, with the not-so-distant memories of the Weimar hyperinflation still weighing on Teutonic minds (or so the usual armchair-Freudian analysis goes). But there is some prima facie evidence for this hypothesis: even though the ECB has (so far) not chosen to crank up the printing press full-bore two German ECB board members have resigned in the past year. The most recent, Juergen Stark, publicly stated that his reason for quitting was the ECB's resumption of Italian and Spanish sovereign debt purchases.

While the ECB may continue to hold back for now I suspect that if things get extremely ugly it will in fact print a much greater quantity of money than it has to date to bail the Eurozone out of its debt problem. If this happens euro bulls beware.

The other alternative is for the proper lender of last resort to sovereign countries -- the IMF -- to step in. The IMF was in fact created precisely for situations like the current Eurozone debt crisis. Given this you might be wondering why the experts, in near unanimity, are instead pointing towards the ECB? The answer, in short, is because the ECB has a printing press and the IMF (for now) does not.

Other countries, such as China, do have the funds to bolster the IMF to bailout Europe. But they'll want something in return, such as a greater voting share on the IMF's Board. This is an unappealing prospect to the U.S. and (in particular) Europe, which has since the IMF's inception held a perennial lock on the top job at the Fund. And so in the minds of many that leaves only the ECB.

Thursday, January 13

Video: Niall Ferguson -- Empires on the Edge of Chaos

Featured on FORA.tv, broken out in subject chapters in the links below. Be sure to check out the Q&A.


01.    Introduction    09 min 09 sec
02.    Niall Ferguson Opening Remarks    01 min 40 sec
03.    Historical Cycles of Empire Decline    07 min 07 sec
04.    Complexity Theory    08 min 20 sec
05.    Implications for the United States    06 min 22 sec
06.    Interest Payments as a Share of US Revenue    01 min 56 sec
07.    Failure of Perception    02 min 43 sec
08.    Debt Payment Overtaking Defense Spending    06 min 58 sec
09.    Q1: Healthcare Reform    04 min 10 sec
10.    Q2: China's Military Sustainability    02 min 38 sec
11.    Q3: Gold Investing    01 min 24 sec
12.    Q4: Political Stability of China    02 min 42 sec
13.    Q5: Children Teaching You About Debt / Radical Islam    03 min 57 sec
14.    Q6: Advice to Obama    02 min 40 sec
15.    Q7: Limits of Keynesian Stimulus    03 min 46 sec
16.    Q8: Better Leadership in the West    03 min 27 sec
17.    Q9: Fear of Hyperinflation    05 min 09 sec