Greece Just Publicly Threatened Its Trump Card

Greece just decided to start 2012 off by significantly upping the ante:

"The bailout agreement needs to be signed otherwise we will be out of the markets, out of the euro," spokesman Pantelis Kapsis told Skai TV.

 Here's my previous piece explaining why in the European sovereign debt crisis Greece holds all the cards.

Greece Has Its Own Banknote Printing Facility; Ireland Mulls Boosting Its

From the WSJ:

Most euro-zone central banks maintain at least limited capacities to print bank notes. While the European Central Bank is responsible for determining the euro zone's supply of bank notes, it doesn't actually print them. The ECB outsources the work to central banks of euro-zone countries. Each year, groups of countries are assigned the task of printing millions of bank notes in specific denominations. 

The countries have different arrangements for printing their shares of the notes. Some, like Greece and Ireland, own their printing presses. Others outsource to private companies. 

The assignments vary from year to year. Last year, Ireland printed 127.5 million €10 notes, and nothing else, according to its annual report. This year, it was among 11 countries assigned to print a total of 1.71 billion €5 notes.

Full story here.

Clarifying What Is Meant By 'Lender of Last Resort'

As the European debt crisis continues to worsen there are growing calls for the European Central Bank to purchase ever greater quantities of Italian and other troubled sovereign debt. Berkeley Professor Brad DeLong recently wrote a widely discussed piece arguing that the ECB is failing in its central banking duty as 'Lender of last resort'. But is it?

Professor DeLong makes some good points, particularly about the importance of establishing credibility with the market. However, he fails to differentiate between a central bank serving as a lender of last resort to the banking system versus a lender of last resort to sovereign countries. So far as I know (central bank operations are often murky by design) the ECB has continued to serve as the former but has resisted becoming the latter. There is a big difference between the two so this is an important omission by Professor DeLong.

With respect to the European banks, the ECB has opened and accessed U.S. dollar swap lines with the New York Federal Reserve Bank while also providing certain "unlimited" lending facilities to European banks. In short, the ECB is in fact playing the role of 'Lender of last resort' to Europe's banks. However, as DeLong notes, the ECB has only purchased European sovereign debt in limited quantities. How come?

The Germans get blamed for the ECB's spendthrift ways, with the not-so-distant memories of the Weimar hyperinflation still weighing on Teutonic minds (or so the usual armchair-Freudian analysis goes). But there is some prima facie evidence for this hypothesis: even though the ECB has (so far) not chosen to crank up the printing press full-bore two German ECB board members have resigned in the past year. The most recent, Juergen Stark, publicly stated that his reason for quitting was the ECB's resumption of Italian and Spanish sovereign debt purchases.

While the ECB may continue to hold back for now I suspect that if things get extremely ugly it will in fact print a much greater quantity of money than it has to date to bail the Eurozone out of its debt problem. If this happens euro bulls beware.

The other alternative is for the proper lender of last resort to sovereign countries -- the IMF -- to step in. The IMF was in fact created precisely for situations like the current Eurozone debt crisis. Given this you might be wondering why the experts, in near unanimity, are instead pointing towards the ECB? The answer, in short, is because the ECB has a printing press and the IMF (for now) does not.

Other countries, such as China, do have the funds to bolster the IMF to bailout Europe. But they'll want something in return, such as a greater voting share on the IMF's Board. This is an unappealing prospect to the U.S. and (in particular) Europe, which has since the IMF's inception held a perennial lock on the top job at the Fund. And so in the minds of many that leaves only the ECB.

Photo of the Day: Angela Merkel Sizes Up the Eurozone Bailout

(click to enlarge)

h/t Barry

The Italian Job: An 'Explosion in Slow Motion'

While much of the damage control attention in the rapidly escalating Italian crisis has fallen on the ECB's purchases of Italian debt, German Profressor Hans-Werner Sinn points out how the Bundesbank (and other European central banks) have been conscripted into lending a neighborly hand:

The ECB directed the central banks of all Eurozone members to buy huge quantities of Italian government bonds during the crisis. While the national central banks have not revealed how much they bought, the aggregate stock of all government bonds purchased rose from €74 billion ($102 billion) on August 4, to €165 billion this month. Most of this increase was probably used to purchase Italian government bonds. 

The German Bundesbank, which was forced to buy most of the bonds, strongly opposed the program, but was unable to stop it. In response, ECB Chief Economist Jürgen Stark resigned. He followed Bundesbank President Axel Weber, who had resigned in February because of the earlier bond repurchases. Meanwhile, the new Bundesbank president, Jens Weidmann, openly objects to the program, while German President Christian Wulff has publicly accused the ECB of circumventing the Maastricht Treaty.

Not to be outdone the Banca d’Italia has started printing money:

But the bond purchases are just the tip of the iceberg. Equally important, but largely unknown, is the fact that the Banca d’Italia has resorted to the printing press to cover Italy’s gigantic balance of payments deficit. The extra money printing and lending, as measured by the so-called Target deficit, effectively means drawing a credit from the ECB. 

This credit replaces the private capital imports that had hitherto financed the country’s net purchases of foreign goods, but which dried up because of the crisis, and it finances a capital flight, i.e. the purchase of foreign assets. The ECB in turn draws the Target credit from the respective national central bank to which the money is flowing and which therefore has to accept a reduction in its scope for issuing refinancing credit. 

Until July, only Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain had drawn Target credit, for a combined total of €330 billion. Italy was stable and did not seem to need the printing press to solve its financial problems. No longer. 

In August alone, Italy’s central bank drew €40 billion in Target credit, and it probably drew roughly another €50 billion in September, when the Bundesbank’s Target loans to the ECB system increased by €59 billion (after a €47-billion hike in August). This is the highest Target loan ever drawn from the Bundesbank in a single month, and in all likelihood it went primarily to Italy.

Full commentary here. 

Graphic: European Sovereign Debt Crisis - It's All Connected

This is a BIG graphic. The original NY Times version, which is easier to view, can be found here, with the interactive version here.

(click to enlarge)

Links to Chapters in Michael Lewis' New Book 'Boomerang'

Besides a new preface, which Zerohedge has done a nice job highlighting here, Michael Lewis' new book Boomerang is a collection of his previously written stories about the financial problems of various European countries and one U.S. state (California).

Below are links to each of those stories in the order of their publication. They're all worthwhile and still very relevant.

 1. Wall St. on the Tundra (Iceland)

2. Beware of Greeks Bearing Bonds (Greece)

3. When Irish Eyes Are Crying (Ireland)

4. It’s the Economy, Dummkopf! (Germany)

5. California and Bust (California)

Video: Michael Lewis on the New Third World

Review Roundup for Michael Lewis' New Book - Boomerang: Travels in the New Third World

Below are a list of reviews published so far. And here are links to all the chapters in the book, which were previously published in Vanity Fair (except the book's preface on Kyle Bass).

NY Times

Telegraph

Forbes

Washington Post

Amazon customers

Video: Carmen Reinhart on a Decade of Debt

Here is a link to audio only versions of Carmen's presentation and the Q&A.

AEP on Euro Endgame: "Sorry Deutschland. History has conspired against you, again."

Evans-Pritchard on the Eurozone's Debt Endgame:

The Geithner Plan must be accompanied a monetary blitz, since the fiscal card is largely exhausted and Germany refuses to lower its savings rate to rebalance the EMU system. The only plausible option is for the ECB to let rip with unsterilized bond purchases on a mass scale, with a treaty change in the bank's mandate to target jobs and growth. 

This would weaken the euro, giving a lifeline to southern manufacturers competing with China. It would engineer an inflationary mini-boom in Germany, forcing up relative German costs within EMU. That would be the beginning of a solution, albeit a bad one. 

Sorry Deutschland. History has conspired against you, again. You must sign away €2 trillion, and debauch your central bank, and accept 5pc inflation, or be blamed for Götterdämmerung. It is not fair but that is what monetary union always meant. Didn't they tell you?

Full article here. 

Video: Soros (Best Case Scenario) 2-3 European Countries Default/Leave Euro

And oh btw, the U.S. has probably already entered a double-dip recession.

But the good news, according to Soros, is that government authorities have learned from Lehman and will bail out Too Big to Fail firms when the system collapses again. In other words, the so-called 'Bernanke put' is not kaput.

Graphic: Who Holds Sovereign Debt? 70% of U.S. Debt Held by Government Entities

Courtesy of Global Macro Monitor:

Here’s a great chart just released by the International Monetary Fund. Note that almost half — 47 percent – of the US$14.7 trillion U.S. federal government debt is held by the Federal Reserve and the government itself, such as the Social Security trust fund. Add to that the 22 percent foreign official holdings (mainly central banks) and almost 70 percent of the debt of the U.S. government is held by non-market/non-profit oriented public sector entities. Stunning! 

It’s also interesting to hear Europeans quote the $14.7 trillion (apx. 100% of GDP) figure while U.S. officials like to refer to marketable or debt held by the public, which totals US$10.1 trillion (apx. 75% of GDP).

(click to enlarge)

How many euro area finance ministers does it take to change a light bulb?

None – there is nothing wrong with the light bulb.

From the Irish Times.

Greek Referendum on Leaving the Euro

Update: a rumor no longer. Latest polling shows 60% of Greeks oppose last week's bailout deal, while 70% want to keep the euro. The vote will supposedly take place sometime early next year. I stand by my earlier prediction that this vote will never take place for the reasons described below. The prospect of a Greek vote on not just the bailout but Eurozone membership, hanging over the financial system like a Sword of Damocles, cannot possibly be tolerated for the next three months.

The latest rumor:

As pressure from Greece’s foreign creditors and austerity-weary citizens mounts on the government, Prime Minister George Papandreou is considering calling for a referendum on whether Greece should continue to tackle its debt crisis within the eurozone or by exiting the single currency. 

According to sources, Papandreou hopes that the outcome of such a vote would constitute a fresh mandate for his Socialist government to continue with an austerity drive backed by Greece’s international lenders -- the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

A bill submitted in Parliament, paving the way for a referendum to be carried out, is to be discussed in coming days.

Here's the source.

Will Greeks be allowed to vote on whether or not they want to remain in the Eurozone? Extremely unlikely, IMO.

The Eurozone is like the Eagles' Hotel California: countries which have been invited can check in any time they like, but they can never leave. A formal legal process for leaving the Eurozone was intentionally left out of Maastricht.

The situation on the ground in Greece is already incendiary enough as it is. Putting the euro to a Greek vote, while democratic, would trigger far too much chaos. And if the majority voted in favor of leaving the euro and returning to the drachma there would be an immediate, full run on Greek banks (if it hadn't already been completed in anticipation of the voting result).

If Greece decides to leave the Euro, which looks increasingly likely, it won't be done through a popular vote.

Why oh why on Earth is anyone still keeping their euros in a Greek bank? Or to put it another way, why aren't the Greeks behaving more like the Irish?

Irish Banks Have Lost 40% Of Deposits, Why Have Greek Banks Only Lost 19%?

Irish banks have lost 40% of their deposits over the past 18 months, whereas Greek banks have lost 19%. (Without thinking I almost inserted a 'just' in front of the Greek figure, but 19% is still a significant number!)

Right now the risk is much greater for Greece than Ireland of either leaving or getting kicked out of the euro, followed by:

1. Declaring a bank holiday
2. Enacting capital controls
3. Restricting Shengen and imposing limitations on travel, reducing the amount of money which can be taken out of the country per visit, or both
4. And then devaluing the new currency by approximately 50%

Naturally, one would expect deposit withdrawals to be much higher in Greece than Ireland, but according to official statistics the opposite is the case.

From Bloomberg:

Deposits by financial institutions in Greek banks, which make up 21 percent of the total, have fallen by one-third since the beginning of 2010, while those by non-financial firms and residents dropped 9 percent, according to Bank of Greece data. 

People “are now afraid of the possibility of returning to the drachma,” said Giannoulis, referring to the Greek currency in circulation before the country adopted the euro in 2001. “Just a headline is enough to spook depositors.” 

Something doesn't smell right here. If Greek depositors were really afraid of returning to the drachma then they'd be pulling euros out en masse and stashing them under the mattress or opening bank accounts in other countries.

Greece has reported wildly inaccurate economic figures since the crisis began so one possibility here is that the 19% in withdrawals is another fraudulent Greek figure and massively understated. Recently Greece quietly activated the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) program in what was described as 'last stand' for Greek banks:

The ELA was designed under European rules to allow national central banks to provide liquidity for their own lenders when they run out of collateral of a quality that can be used to trade with the ECB. It is an obscure tool that is supposed to be temporary and one of the last resorts for indebted banks. So far it has only be used in Ireland. 

By accepting a lower level of collateral the debt in the ELA is, in theory, supposed to be the responsibility of Greece. However, since the Greek state is surviving on eurozone bailouts and Greek banks are reliant on ECB funding, in practice the loans are backed by the eurozone. The terms of lending and other details are not disclosed publicly. 

Mr Ruparel said: "Though the ELA is meant to be a temporary emergency solution, we know from Ireland, where the programme has been running for almost a year, that once banks get hooked on ELA they rarely get off it."

More about the slow motion European bank run here.

Michael Lewis on Germany & the Eurozone

The latest and final instalment in a series of what author Michael Lewis has described as 'Euopean financial disaster tourism' articles he's penning for Vanity Fair can be found here. This latest article focuses on Germany (the previous two covered Greece and Ireland - google them or click on 'Michael Lewis' tag below to get the link).

The Germany articles also features an accompanying interview with Lewis, where 'Europe's least welcome tourist' discusses the problems with the broader Eurozone:

VF Daily: Where did the euro go wrong? 

Lewis: At its conception. They glued together a bunch of countries and cultures that didn’t really belong together in the same currency. So if you put Germany together with Greece in a single currency, it’s a little like watching an Olympic sprinter and a fat old man running a three-legged race. The Greeks will never be as productive as the Germans, and the Germans will never be as unproductive as the Greeks. So if they’re in the same currency—unless the Greeks simply up and move to Germany to work for the Germans—it implies a lifetime of transfers from Germany to Greece. 

VF Daily: Greece was allowed a partial default this week, to the tune of $157 billion, despite the E.C.B.’s disapproval. This measure seems like a Band-Aid, though. Can we expect something much larger to happen, or do presidents and prime ministers just enjoy getting together to argue every six months? 

Lewis: The Germans are basically calling the shots here, because they’re the only ones who can afford to pay the bill. My impression is that the German people do not want to pay it, but the German leadership does not want to be labeled as the people who destroyed the euro. So the way Angela Merkel is playing it is to tell the German people what they want to hear until the moment another crisis occurs, and then she goes into parliament and says, “I need this little check to get us through this rough patch, or you will be responsible for the disintegration of Europe.” What she doesn’t ever come away with, however, is a commitment for fiscal union. She doesn’t get Germany agreeing to underwrite euro bonds—to take all the debt of the southern countries. 

VF Daily: Well, it would be political suicide, right? 

Lewis: She may have already committed political suicide. German people are increasingly unhappy with how she has handled the crisis. I don’t think that the German people are going to go all-in. The step that they would need to take is much more dramatic than this Band-Aid.

Chart of the Day: Generation U

Perhaps its time to rename Gen Y as Gen U, as in Generation Unemployed.

Not surprisingly, the PIIGS occupy five of the top seven spots in this primarily European country sample. Chronically unemployed young males are often a key ingredient in social unrest and revolution.

Source: The Economist

Roubini on the Eurozone: 'Messy marriages lead to messy divorces'

Nouriel Roubini

Some of the other choice quotes:

• 'when Greece folds like a wet gyro, and it will...'
• 'the politicians at these meetings will not be the same ones at a similar meeting in two years'
• 'but if the marriage doesn’t work, even the threat of a messy divorce cannot keep couples together that are not a long-term match'
• 'Let me suggest to my fellow US citizens that you really pay attention to this. If you think that we can somehow avoid making difficult choices by kicking the can down the road, watch the European theater. And coming to a theater near you in a few years will be a real Japanese monster movie. Godzilla on steroids.'

Roubini's full analysis on why Greece and other PIIGS will ultimately be left with no choice but to exit the euro and return to their respective currencies (e.g., the Greek drachma) here.

What Iceland and Latvia Can Teach Greece (and Portugal and Ireland)

Not sure whether the below chart, like a picture, is worth 1,000 words, but it says a lot about how quickly Latvia and Iceland have turned around their respective positions in international capital markets by taking swift action.

From The Economist:

Latvia and Iceland successfully issued sovereign bonds at yields approaching Spain's last week. There are rumours that Dubai may follow suit. That the countries which started the sovereign debt crisis are returning to the market while peripheral euro-zone sovereigns continue to struggle has led to crowing from those who see austerity as a misguided strategy for Greece, Ireland and Portugal.

The lessons appear to be clear: devalue the currency and wallop foreign creditors to banks, state-owned enterprises and private citizens, honouring only the sovereign’s own obligations. Your reward will be an inversion in credit-default swaps:

More here.