Showing posts with label Eurogeddon. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Eurogeddon. Show all posts

Friday, March 22

The PolyCapitalist's New Bitcoin Price Target Is...

As regular TPC readers will know I'm rather fond of alternative currencies like Bitcoin, the Little Virtual Currency that Could.

And so too now is the U.S. Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, or FinCen.

As the above linked-to WSJ article notes the exchange rate for Bitcoin has been on a tear of late, with the currency trading up 57% during this week alone.

The recent runup in Bitcoin's price has apparently been driven by events in the Eurozone, as well as the additional credibility conferred on the currency now that FinCin has officially acknowledged its interest in virtual currencies like Bitcoin and outlined its criminal enforcement plans. If you're long Bitcoin getting the Fed's attention is apparently a good thing (at least in the short-term).

Now, naturally, readers of blogs like this one have one big question on their minds: where is the price of Bitcoin heading next? 

For the answer to that question I'll turn this post over to the brand new PolyCapitalist Research Department (PCRD), which is my crack team of ambitious research quants. All male 20-somethings straight out of the best schools. Take it away, PCRD!

PCRD: Thank you, TPC. We are very pleased to announce that we are initiating research coverage of Bitcoin with an opening price target of....

TPC: Now, now wait just a minute, hold on there PCRD. As the head of this blog I feel we have a responsibility to our readers. So before you guys go out and announce a price target maybe we should first discuss how you went about valuing Bitcoin?

PCRD: We're so glad you asked us that, TPC, as we put a lot of work into this. First, we developed a rich quantitative data set. For example, we researched what a Bitcoin can buy in the real world and what those items cost in traditional currencies such as U.S. dollars. We also looked at what if any exchange rate conversion expenses exist. And so on.

TPC: That sounds like an excellent start. What else did you do to determine the proper price of a Bitcoin?

PCRD: We next built a rather detailed MS Excel model which factored in other data, such as price trends, liquidity analysis, and other temporal factors.

TPC: Excellent. Did you perform any further analysis?

PCRD: Yes we did. We also stress tested our model by running several different scenarios based around Black Swan type events. For example, we ran a Monte Carlo simulation on the impact to Bitcoin's exchange rate with the euro if Cyprus left the Eurozone.

TPC: Or a Black Swan 'outlier' like another Bitcoin market crash?

Pin-up found in the PCRD cubicles
PCRD: Uh, right!

TPC: Ok, great. So I'm dying to know what price target you guys came up with for Bitcoin?

PCRD: Well, as robust as our modeling was we decided to scrap what the spreadsheet told us and just use the price target set by the guys over at bitcointalk.org. They seem have a better feel for Bitcoin's momentum and how this market is going to play out. They also seem like real stand-up fellas, and they even refer to their "Bitcoin exit strategies".

TPC: Got it. Yeah. Um. Guys, I really appreciate all the work you have been doing but I think we're going hold off on setting a Bitcoin price target for now. Better yet, I think we're just going to close down the entire PCRD.


Sunday, March 17

What Happened to Cyprus's Deposit Insurance Scheme?

So much for all quiet on the Eurozone front, a quiet which barring election rumblings from Italy has largely been enjoyed since Drahgi's LTRO blitz.

While it's unclear whether this weekend's 'bailing in' of Cyrpiot depositors will prove the trigger point for the final Eurozone reckoning, what is clear is that all the 'crazies' who have been stashing their money under their mattresses perhaps weren't so crazy after all.

One thing I'm curious about, which I haven't seen discussed in any detail anywhere else, are the mechanics behind what happened to Cyprus's deposit insurance scheme.

For example, is the insurance scheme, like the entire Cypriot banking system, insolvent? If yes, by how much? Could it be recapitalized through a tax? Etc.

The high level details of Cyprus's deposit insurance program, which goes by the name Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS), are discussed on the Central Bank of Cyprus's webpage here. As has been widely reported, depositors in Cypriot banks are supposed to be fully insured for €100.000 "per depositor, per bank".

Some reports state that if Cyprus's banks were allowed to fail then the small, fully insured depositors would be made whole. So do depositors who have €100.000 or less of insurable deposits have recourse for legal action in Cyprus?

One thing is clear: if I were a Cypriot depositor I would much rather have cash right now than shares in an insolvent bank.

Tuesday, September 25

Lies, damned lies, and statistics: Spanish and Greek youth unemployment much lower than reported

One of the most commonly cited Eurozone crisis statistics over the past several years has been youth unemployment, which in hard hit countries such as Spain and Greece has been reported to be as high as 50%.



In a recent post over at Project Syndicate Steven Hill dissects Eurostat's unemployment rate methodology and comes up with markedly different figures:
Unemployment estimates also are surprisingly misleading – a serious problem, considering that, together with GDP indicators, unemployment drives so much economic-policy debate. Outrageously high youth unemployment – supposedly near 50% in Spain and Greece, and more than 20% in the eurozone as a whole – makes headlines daily. But these numbers result from flawed methodology, making the situation appear far worse than it is. 
The problem stems from how unemployment is measured: The adult unemployment rate is calculated by dividing the number of unemployed individuals by all individuals in the labor force. So if the labor force comprises 200 workers, and 20 are unemployed, the unemployment rate is 10%. 
But the millions of young people who attend university or vocational training programs are not considered part of the labor force, because they are neither working nor looking for a job. In calculating youth unemployment, therefore, the same number of unemployed individuals is divided by a much smaller number, to reflect the smaller labor force, which makes the unemployment rate look a lot higher.
So what we have here is a simple division problem: the unemployment numerator is accurate, but the labor force denominator has been fudged.

What are the real youth unemployment figures in countries like Spain and Greece?
The youth unemployment ratio – the number of unemployed youth relative to the total population aged 16-24 – is a far more meaningful indicator than the youth unemployment rate. Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical agency, calculates youth unemployment using both methodologies, but only the flawed indicator is widely reported, despite major discrepancies. For example, Spain’s 48.9% youth unemployment rate implies significantly worse conditions for young people than its 19% youth unemployment ratio. Likewise, Greece’s rate is 49.3%, but its ratio is only 13%. And the eurozone-wide rate of 20.8% far exceeds the 8.7% ratio.
Certainly these much lower youth unemployment figures are still a matter for serious concern. And as Hill notes later in his post it is likely that at least a significant portion of young people who are in school are there because they cannot find work.

There is, however, a substantive difference between the 50% shock headline figures and the real picture of youth unemployment, and this difference may explain why we have not seen a full-on revolution in countries like Greece or Spain (at least not yet).

The final question is why has the media only reported the much larger youth unemployment figures and not the arguably more meaningful, lower youth unemployment ratio? Certainly the larger figure is much more sensational and attention grabbing.

At the risk of sounding conspiratorial, another way of asking this question is who benefits by reporting the larger figure? Undoubtedly larger figures aid the narrative of the pro-bailout and pro-stimulus, anti-austerity contingent. 50% youth unemployment sounds pretty drastic, and drastic times call for drastic measures.

As they say, "never waste a good crisis".

Sunday, August 5

Video: The Great Euro Crisis (BBC)

A good series of interviews for understanding why many Greeks (and Germans) still prefer that Greece keep the euro rather than return to its previous currency, the drachma. 


Self-confessed Eurosceptic Michael Portillo visits debt-stricken Greece. He believes that the euro crisis must have shaken the Greeks' faith in Europe's single currency and wonders if there'll be a desire to revert to the free-floating drachma. In Athens he meets everyone from a destitute young family to the former finance minister and the outgoing Prime Minister, and is surprised by some of their answers. Meanwhile in Germany, Europe's economic powerhouse, Michael encounters the taxpayers who are paying most towards Greece's mammoth financial bailout while having to watch angry Athenians burning the German flag.

Wednesday, May 30

On the Topic of Financial Collapse Fear Mongering

"Ireland is in a death spiral" -FT

"After the November President election the U.S. is facing a fiscal cliff" -Federal Reserve staff

"Eurogeddon!" -The PolyCapitalist

On and on go the warnings of cataclysm and pending financial doom. Technical jargon and existential risks are bandied about in frightening fashion, leaving the general, less-economically literate with very little ability to understand what's actually happening or just how bad things could really get if say Greece leaves the Eurozone, or another country defaults, or something like this occurs.

This blog is not entirely innocent of this criticism, and this post is a brief attempt to quickly address the question of whether our global financial system is on the precipice of a financial collapse if say something 'really bad' happens in Europe?

The short answer is no.

Now before I expand on that answer I would like to clarify something very important: this post is about financial collapse and not about the extremely high levels of unemployment, which have reached approximately 50% for young people in countries such as Greece and Spain. The youth and general unemployment problems today are serious and something to be very concerned about. But this post is not about that but instead about whether another Lehman-style event could occur where the world's financial system risks implosion if say a country like Greece pulls out of the euro, the current 'bank jog' in Spain accelerates, etc.

So why isn't the risk of financial collapse as bad as some would have use believe?

For starters, we have to keep in mind that our financial world is a virtual world. Today, money is largely a set of numbers on a computer. This means that even in the most extreme scenario of financial disorder, where policymakers completely blow it and the ATMs stopped working and the stock market tanked, that everything that is real and tangible - the houses, the food that is farmed, the physical assets - none of this goes away and will all be here the next day when you wake up in the morning.

Now having said that, a financial implosion would definitely have a major impact on our lives, particularly for those with fewer resources or who are unprepared. But life will go on for nearly everyone and could actually rebound quite quickly given other historical cases. For example, Argentina began recovering within months following its utterly complete financial meltdown in 2001 even though the country achieved the relatively rare trifecta of a currency collapse, a banking crisis, and a sovereign default all at once. Iceland has had a relatively quick turnaround following its 2008 financial implosion. And other Asian countries in the late-90s also turned the corner pretty quickly following major financial crises.

In the case of Argentina, dozens of people died in Dec. 2001 riots, so I don't want to minimize the very real suffering and dislocation which comes with a financial collapse. But Argentina's experience is a far cry from the level of suffering of say a war or severe natural disaster. In short, a 'cataclysm', it was not.

A further point needs to be made about the above examples, which is that they were all relatively isolated, contained crises that did not threaten a systemic collapse in arguably the same way as the current crisis. But this leads me to point number two, which is that a systemic collapse is extremely unlikely, particularly given two facts:
  1. what was learned from the recent Lehman-experience in 2008 by the current crop of policymakers.
  2. the world's central banks, especially the Federal Reserve, still have loads of financial ammunition.
Regarding the first point, current policymakers got a first-hand glimpse of just how interconnected the world's financial system is and how the failure of a seemingly small cog in the wheel could threaten to topple the whole system. So while yes, Greece's financial implosion could lead to a chain reaction that threatens the entire global financial system, it is utterly inconceivable in the wake of the Lehman crisis that policymakers would sit back and let that happen given what they learned and how they responded in 2008-2009.

So I hear you asking whether all our problems are solved then because central banks like the Federal Reserve are all powerful, financially speaking, and able to contain any crisis which comes its way? Over the long-term, I would say no, they are not all powerful financially. But in the short-term, meaning right now and over the next few months at least, they are all powerful financially, and here's why.

Central banks like the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan, and Bank of England which operate fiat currencies have an extraordinary power, which is that they can create an unlimited amount of money.

'Unlimited', meaning a truly infinite amount of money? Yes

What this means is that even if, for example, all the depositors in Spain and Greece withdrew every last euro from their local banks the ECB can supply all the notes that citizens want to hide under their bed mattresses. In short, the ATMs should never, ever run out of money in a fiat money system which is being managed by competent professionals.

But earlier I alluded to the fact that even though central banks can print an unlimited amount of money that they were not in fact financially omnipotent over the long-term, so what did I mean by that?

With the magic that is the computer a central bank could literally go and create and infinite amount of money. But there are side effects with central banks creating a lot of money, namely inflation. Without getting technical, simply put inflation is a rise in prices. Hyperinflation is a very large, sudden rise in prices.

But here is the crucial point to remember: rising inflation acts as a brake on a central bank's ability to create money. In other words, a rise in inflation is perhaps the key to understanding when central banks would be constrained in any effort to bail out the financial system.

Today, most of the world's advanced economies (North America, Europe) have relatively modest inflation, meaning low single digit annual percentage increases in official measures of core inflation. And even though they would say otherwise, the central banks in these advanced countries would be more than willing to trade an increase in inflation to stem the risk of a systemic financial collapse.

So how much more inflation would central banks be willing to tolerate as a tradeoff for not risking financial collapse? As the Bank of England has demonstrated in the past couple years, inflation creeping up towards 5% is not enough of a concern to prompt a significant deviation in policy. So my guess (it is a guess) is that at the extreme central banks like the Fed could tolerate up to 10% if they perceived the risks of collapse to be great enough before they would think twice about pulling another post-Lehman style bailout of the world's financial system. And since we're still in low single digit inflation this gives the Fed a decent amount of runway to maneuver.

This room to maneuver is what is meant when it is said that the Fed, which controls the world's most important reserve currency, and other central banks still have lots of ammunition.

The existence of this ammunition is likely a factor behind why given all the current distress in Europe that the stock markets haven't fallen further. In other words, the markets expect central banks to step in and flood the financial system with money if Greece leaves the euro or a banking run accelerates. Even the supposedly hemmed in by the Germans/hard-money crowd ECB. After LTRO and all the sovereign bond debt purchases, anyone who still thinks the ECB won't step in to save the system if things go completely pear shaped by creating a lot money is living in a fantasy. And this flood of central bank money would likely be very bullish for stocks in the short-term.

Should inflation increase significantly, then the ability of central banks to rush in and save the day could be diminished. But for now, they have the power to act, and that's why (for now) a general financial collapse is not on the immediate horizon.

So in sum, if you want to understand when it might be time to get worried, keep an eye on official measures of core inflation, particularly if it starts creeping up near the 5% level as that is about the time a proper central banker will begin to twitch over fears of runaway inflation.

Now, in terms of how you want to position your investment portfolio given the above, the very first post on this blog just over two years ago argued for allocating some of your portfolio into gold, which is arguably the best hedge against excessive central bank money printing. Even though the price of gold has gone up significantly in the last two years this blog still stands by that recommendation for long-term investors.

Monday, May 28

Lagarde Sacrifices Herself to Help Greece's Pro-Bailout New Democracy Party?

The Eurogeddon chess game is getting desperate so don't be surprised to see a few political/PR curveballs over the next few weeks in front of the 17 June Greek election runoff.

Case in point is this weekend's snarky comment from the typically ladylike Madame Lagarde. But before we get to that, some background:

The single worst thing than can happen from the perspective of the Troika (the IMF, EU, and ECB) and Greek elites right now is for Syriza and its 37-year old leader, 'Sexy Alexis', as he's now being called, to do well in the 17 June Greek election runoff.

In the most recent May elections Greek voters turned away from the two pro-bailout/austerity parties, PASOK and New Democracy, as they were seen as tools of the Troika. This rejection by voters sent a shiver up the Troika's spine as they know that should Syriza and Alexis Tsipras prevail he will likely walk away from the terms of the bailout and thereby call the Troika's bluff to either a) cut off Greece's banking system from further ECB funding or b) terminate any further bailout money to Greece's government. Either one of these moves will likely trigger a financial panic and spoil everyone's summer vacation plans.

So the Troika are now desperate to see PASOK and or New Democracy do better in the 17 June election. So how can they help them?

Agent Provocateur: Christine Lagarde, IMF Chief

Angry Greek voters are looking for someone to blame, and as long as PASOK and New Democracy are seen as part of the problem it's unlikely that voters will put them back into power. So one strategy is to try and reshift the political blame onto the external Troika, which would have the effect of diverting negative feelings away from PASOK and New Democracy. This would help the two pro-bailout Greek parties reposition themselves as domestic victims rather than as co-conspirators with the hated foreigners.

And now you understand why the typically politie Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF, probably deliberately roiled the Aegean kettle this weekend with a comment about how it's 'payback time', and Greeks need to pay their taxes.

Queue the Greek firestorm.

And lo and behold, New Democracy, who of course along with PASOK quickly denounced Lagarde's rhetoric, is again rising in the polls.

Nice move, Troika.

And, by the way, Lagarde doesn't pay any taxes on her $551,700 in annual compensation.

Thursday, May 17

Greece Can Physically Print Its Own Euros In Spite Of ECB 'Choke' Efforts

Euro printing press
As the long ago predicted Greek 'bank jog' accelerates there is much talk in the econoblogosphere of the Greek banking system being 'choked off' by the ECB.

If this is in fact the Brussels/Frankfurt plan to force Greece out of the euro there is a perhaps not insignificant obstacle to this strategy: as noted in this post last year, Greece has its own euro printing press. 

The ECB does not print any euro banknotes but actually assigns this task to local member country central banks, with the ECB instructing the local central bank how much of which denominations to print.

So what does this mean?

In opinion polls Greeks want two things: a) to default on their sovereign debt less fiscal austerity and b) stay in the Eurozone. However, European elites (read: Germany) are saying to Greece that you can't have both. But is Germany correct?

An important point to keep in mind here is that there is no legal mechanism to force Greece to drop the euro and readopt the drachma. Hence the idea of choking off the Greek banking system and forcing the Greeks to renounce the euro versus organizing some type of formal action, such as a vote to eject Greece from the euro, which would not be allowed under current EU law.

But in the event of a full-fledged run on Greece's banking system, where Greek banks literally have no cash on hand to give to depositors, it would seem reasonable and (crucially) perhaps legal for the Greek central bank to start printing euro notes even if the ECB disavows this action.

If this were to take place is there anything the ECB could do to stop the Greek central bank from printing euros? Probably not.

It's hard to imagine the situation reaching a stage where the Greek central bank openly revolts against the ECB and starts printing euros. However, Greece need only hint at playing this card for it to have the desired effect, which is to force the ECB to continue accepting Greek bank collateral on reasonable terms. In other words, the fact the Greeks can print their own euros nullifies the ECB's ability to choke the Greek banking system into submission and force a 'voluntary' abandonment of the euro.

Your move, Angela.

Tuesday, February 7

2012 Prediction #4: Romney Will Not Win the U.S. Presidency

It's looking like Romney has the Republican nomination, but I am very doubtful that he can carry the country in 2012 for a whole variety of reasons:
  1. U.S. economic figures are showing signs of life, at just the right time.
  2. Like Eichengreen, Dalio, and others, I think the next leg down in the ongoing financial crisis won't make landfall until 2013 at the earliest.
  3. There is a decided lack of enthusiasm about Romney. He comes across as a Wall St. guy who, policy wise, isn't all that different from Obama. He also isn't well liked by the Republican base. In short, Romney seems positioned somewhere in political no-man's land.
  4. There is a reasonable chance for a third party candidate to be a factor, and should that happen it will work against Romney more than Obama.
  5. Even if Eurogeddon boils over the world's central banks have plenty of space to deploy more monetary artillery. Central banker hands won't begin to be tied until core inflation starts to increase significantly, and that's unlikely to happen over the next 10 months. Even though Bernanke was appointed originally by a Republican, he would probably prefer that Obama (who reappointed him) be reelected given Romney's and general Republican hostility towards the Fed.
  6. An Iranian conflict (perhaps the biggest X-factor in 2012) likely favors the incumbent as it would provide Obama with an opportunity to exercise leadership and look presidential.
What could upset this prediction is any material economic deterioration or a geopolitical flub by Obama.

Friday, January 27

Photo of the Day


Chancellor Merkel's likeness is used to advertise Portuguese spirit Beirao on a Lisbon billboard reading: 'Dear Angela, Portugal is giving its best. Seasons Greetings.'

h/t AEP

Tuesday, January 3

Greece Just Publicly Threatened Its Trump Card

Greece just decided to start 2012 off by significantly upping the ante:
"The bailout agreement needs to be signed otherwise we will be out of the markets, out of the euro," spokesman Pantelis Kapsis told Skai TV.
 Here's my previous piece explaining why in the European sovereign debt crisis Greece holds all the cards.

Prediction #1: U.S. Dollar Bears Will Remain On the Run in 2012

Since its March 2008 low the U.S. Dollar is up 13% against a basket of the world's most widely held currencies, including the yen, sterling, franc, loonie, krona, and of course the beleaguered euro.

How is this a problem for portfolio manager Axel Merk, the self described "Authority on Currencies"? After all, according to Merk's written after-the-fact letters he claims to have traded out of and back into the euro just in time to surf its wild gyrations.

Merk moved his fund management business to California a number of years ago, where he has been beating a steady 'demise of the U.S. dollar' drumbeat ever since. This past year Merk Funds even took to deploying amusing anti-Dollar cartoon propaganda while routinely touting the superiority of the euro over the U.S. dollar.

Continue reading the full article at Seeking Alpha here.

Eurozone QOTD: "You've got insolvent banks supporting insolvent sovereigns and insolvent sovereigns supporting insolvent banks"

Quote is from Bridgewater, which with an estimated $122 billion in assets under management is the world's largest hedge fund.

Previously Bridgewater founder Ray Dalio said he didn't expect the next major crisis to hit until 2013, but it appears his firm is positioned for a rocky 2012.

Wednesday, December 14

As the Euro Rolls Over, Why Hasn't Gold Rocketed?

In early May of this year, with the euro hovering in the $1.46-$1.48 range, I disagreed vehemently with euro bulls such as portfolio manager Axel Merk who argued that the common currency was no longer vulnerable to a sell-off (see Merk's May 11 FT article titled 'Dollar in graver danger than the euro' and my counter arguments here, here, and here). 

Merk's argument was basically that in 2010, when the euro sank to a low of $1.18, the currency served as a proxy for the sovereign debt crisis. Now, however, investors were shorting sovereign debt directly and, according to Merk, recognized that it is a lot harder for the ECB to print euros than it is for the Fed to print dollars.

For awhile, as you can see from the below chart, it appeared that Merk perhaps had made a good point. From May the euro has shown remarkable resilience; for the last six months one sovereign after another has white knuckled its way through uncertain debt auctions and ever higher interest expense. Meanwhile the ECB kept its 'bazooka' semi-holstered with purchases of sovereign debt apparently capped at €20 billion per week. While the euro did soften from mid-May onwards it was able to keep it's head above the $1.40 mark for the summer and a good chunk of autumn.

Click to enlarge

Continue reading the full article at Seeking Alpha here.