On The Problem With Postponing the Inevitable

Today's Eurogeddon must read.

Young People CAN and ARE Making a Difference in Europe

Getting more young people (and women) into positions of political power is a good thing.

Alexis Tsipras, leader of Syriza

Whether you agree or disagree with the politics of 37-year old Alexis Tsipras, the leader of a leftist-Greek coalition which surprised in the weekend election, he has demonstrated that not every member of the next generation is politically impotent.

While this blog probably would not be characterized as far left-wing, we do celebrate seeing someone under-40 years of age achieving political success.

Bravo, Alexis!

Video: Debt and Redemption Documentary

At the risk of sounding trite it's often helpful to put a face and voice behind the news.

This short documentary by VPRO, which does excellent work overall btw, has some good coverage of the fallout from the dealings by both small and large Italian municipalities in derivatives like interest rate swaps. And if terms like 'derivative' turn you off but you're still interested in learning more and trying to understand the financial crisis, then video is particularly recommended.

Interviews include the Rolling Stone's Matt Tabibbi, Brooklyn based investor-blogger Reggie Middleton, and former IMF Chief Economist and Professor Simon Johnson.

The most interesting fact from the documentary for me was learning how the City of Milan agreed to be on the hook financially to a bank in the event of a debt default by Italy (the nation state).

Are there any other municipalities which have contractually guaranteed the debt of a sovereign state?

Steve Keen on How He Saw "It" Coming and Why We're in a Depression

A must watch interview with Economist Steven Keen, the first part of which is embedded below (remaining parts can be found here).

Video: Barry Eichengreen on Europe's Never Ending Crisis

Recommended links & Photo of the Week

Coming soon to a Eurozone bank near you?

1. Beware of falling masonry (Economist) Good tactical overview of the eurozone crisis and some of the options being considered. See also 'Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro' (NYT)

2. Latvian bank Krajbanka set to be wound up (AFP) Above bank run image is of Krajbanka.

3. The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin (Wired) Contrary to the title I don't think this is the last we've heard of Bitcoin, or other virtual currencies, but an interesting and informative read nonetheless.

4. Prepare for riots in euro collapse, UK Foreign Office warns (Telegraph)

5. Why Not Break-Up Citigroup? (Simon Johnson) Citibank has blown-up and required a bailout three times in the last three decades, or once on average every ten years.

6. How could Reebok sell trainers for $1? (BBC) Contrary to popular believe it's not all glum news here at TPC. I was able to see the remarkable Nobel Peace Prize winner Professor Muhammad Yunus speak this week (video below). His bank, Grameen, is doing amazing things and gets a BHAG nod.

7. MF’s Missing Money Makes You Wonder About Goldman (Jonathan Weil)

Euro Reading Roundup - Who Will Be Getting Booted Out of the Eurozone?

Or perhaps the more important question is which country will be the first to experience a a more serious bank run than the slow motion runs which have been occurring in Greece, Ireland, and Italy?

1. Departures from the Eurozone are "inevitable" (Rodrik)

2. Europe's Darkness at Noon (Eichengreen)

3. Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Wolf)

4. 'In 31 years, I've never seen markets this crazy' (Jim Cramer)

5. Wall Street Ignoring Europe? (Tim Duy) Smells like 2007

Video: Niall Ferguson vs. Jeffrey Sachs

Transcript below:

Fareed Zakaria: Jeff, you were at Occupy Wall Street. You've in a sense lent it support. Why do you do that? What do you think is going on there?

Jeffrey Sachs: Well, I think they have a basically correct message that when they say "we are the 99 percent," that they're reflecting the fact that the top one percent not only ran away with the prize economically in the last 30 years, but also took the power, manipulated it, twisted it, broke the law. Brought the world economy to its knees actually, and it's time to correct things. And I think that that's what Occupy Wall Street is really about. The fact that every marquee firm on Wall Street broke the law in a major way, it's now paying a series of fines. Some people are going to jail. People are disgusted about this.

Fareed Zakaria: But isn't what has caused the one percent or five percent of the top to do well, these very broad forces of technology, the information revolution which have empowered global knowledge workers, which have empowered capital rather than labor? So if it's all these much bigger structural forces, is it going to be remedied by some kind of political solution like a Buffett tax?

Jeffrey Sachs: I don't think it is all that. I think that markets caused a widening of inequalities in just about every high-income country. But some governments did something constructive about it, where starting in 1981 the U.S. government amplified this in quite reckless ways.

Because when Ronald Reagan came to office, rather than saying we have globalization, we have competition, we now have to do something about our skills, our technology and so forth, he said that government is not the solution to our problems. Government is the problem. It was a fateful call. And this is the path that we've been on for 30 years of dismantling that part of our social institution which – institutions which could actually help with job training, help with education, help with science and technology in a more effective way.

But more than that, Wall Street didn't just gain from globalization, it has been completely reckless. They gamed the system. They packed toxic assets. They sold them to unwitting investors. They let the hedge funds bet against them. And the SEC is finally calling them to account.

But the public is disgusted because after that happened, lo and behold, the next thing is that they begged for bailouts; they got the bailouts. The moment they got the bailouts, they said, "Leave us alone", "deregulate", "free markets". So they're completely hypocritical in this behavior.

We want everything of ours until we need help, then we want your help, once we get your help, then we want everything again. And it's that kind of impunity that has brought people out around this country deeply angry.

Niall Ferguson: Well, first of all, I think it's important to avoid criminalizing one percent of the population which you just did, Jeff. I mean, there's no question that major financial institutions have been fined and rightly so. But to turn that into an indictment of three million people seems to me -

Seems to me actually rather reckless. And having watched what you said at Occupy Wall Street, I have to say I thought you overstepped the mark and ceased to be an academic and became a demagogue at that point.

Jeffrey Sachs: Whoa, Niall. You're the one who said that this -

Niall Ferguson: No, let me – no, let me finish, Jeff.

Jeffrey Sachs: The last time bankers came close to ruling America -

Niall Ferguson: Hang on, hang on. I let you have – I let you have your say.

Jeffrey Sachs: No, don't call me names like this.

Niall Ferguson: This is a demagoguic argument especially for somebody who knows that the principal driver of inequality has actually been globalization, not malpractice by Wall Street.

The second part of your argument is that banks misbehaved in Europe, too. I mean, those countries that did not go down the Reagan route have got banks that are insolvent, banks that were guilty of incompetence and malpractice.

So you argued that this was something specific to the United States. And the faults of – and the faults of Ronald Reagan.

Jeffrey Sachs: Of course it was.

Niall Ferguson: Just a second. The banks in Europe are in just as big a mess but they didn't go down the Reagan route. So it's not only bad economics, but it seems to me it's bad history and certainly bad politics.

Jeffrey Sachs: Let's talk what I said and what is important here. And what I've said is that in a society that is so unequal as ours and where the very top has abused the system repeatedly in the banks, the CEOs of this country taking home take-home pay hundreds of times their workers' pay, unlike any other part of the world, the hedge funds and the banks got unbelievable terms of the deal to get capital gains taxes, carried interest down to 15 percent tax rates. So outrageous compared to what the rest of America bears.

Niall Ferguson: You can't believe that this is the reason why the bottom quintile of the population is in poverty and has very limited social mobility. That's nothing to do with what happens on Wall Street, as you well know. The real problem that we have in this country, it seems to me, is declining social mobility, and not enough is said about that.

Jeffrey Sachs: Well, I write a great deal about it. And the big difference of social mobility -

Niall Ferguson: Right. And what is the principal of -

Jeffrey Sachs: The big difference of social mobility in this country is the lack of public financing for early childhood development, for daycare, for preschool, for early cognitive development, for nutrition programs, for decent schools, unlike all of the rest of the high-income world. We do not help the poor. And that's why our social mobility has come to the lowest level of any of the high-income countries.

And we are 10 or 15 percentage points lower in government revenues to help for that. And I'm asking in the book for just a few percentage points and some decency at the top that they start paying their taxes at a decent rate so that we can actually pay for preschool and pay for childcare. And that's what low social mobility is about, Niall.

Niall Ferguson: But when you look at the quality of public education in this country, you can't simply attribute its low quality to a lack of funding. And I think there's a legitimate argument that the biggest obstacle to social mobility in this country right now is not the fat cats of Wall Street, whom I do not rush to defend, but the teachers unions, who make it almost impossible to improve public school in cities like New York where we are today.

Fareed Zakaria: But would you comment on Jeff's basic point which is, you know, yes, it's not true that the gap has been produced entirely because of government policy, but that you could use government policy and government resources to help in various ways. Education may be one part of it, child nutrition would be another part of it. You know, and that that becomes impossible because you're taxing at 14 percent and spending at 23 percent?

Niall Ferguson: So a major problem here is that the projects of transforming the United States into something more like a European country does imply significant increase in taxation as well as in expenditure. And there are two obstacles to this. One, it's very clear that this would not be timely given the situation that the economy finds itself in. And two, most Americans don't believe that that is going to deliver the kind of improvement that they would like to see in education.

Look how the federal government fares and the programs that it does spend a lot of money on. Health care, social security, I mean, it's already insolvent with its provision through Medicare. This is one of the hugest unfunded liabilities in the world. And the answer that Jeff has to the U.S. problem is let's create an even bigger federal spending program on public education. I mean, it's just not credible, Jeff.

Jeffrey Sachs: Niall, you're confusing so many issues. My point is that if we are going to be decent and competitive, we have to invest in it. That's paying the price of civilization. That costs money. The fact that the United States collects in total revenues at all levels of government right now about 27 percent of national income compared with 35 percent and above in other countries is the gap of decency right now where -

Fareed Zakaria: But it's also the gap you're saying of competitiveness. Now, the path to competitiveness for you is a larger government that spends more, correct?

SACHS: If it invests properly, of course.

Niall Ferguson: You can understand why people might be skeptical about that.

Jeffrey Sachs: I'm talking about investment in education. I'm talking about investment in job skills. I'm talking about investment in science and technology. Talking about investment in 21st century infrastructure. And we've been for 30 years demonizing government. We've been demonizing taxation. We have neglected to understand that a proper economy runs on two pillars, a market and government. And until we come back to that basic level of understanding that we need a mixed economy, not just a market economy, we'll continue to fail.

Niall Ferguson: Well, I'm sure the Chinese are listening to this debate with glee thinking, well, there are still academics in the west who think that the route to salvation is to expand the role of the state because that's certainly not what is happening in China. It is not what is happening in India. It is not what is happening in Brazil. The most dynamic economies in the world today are the ones which are promoting market reforms and reining in the rule of the state, which in those countries grew hypertrophically in the 20th century and that is a big problem in Jeff Sachs' argument.

Jeffrey Sachs: Thank you for the lecture. But the catching up phenomenon is quite different from the problems that the United States or other high income societies face right now, and for us -

Niall Ferguson: The problem is the falling behind phenomenon.

Jeffrey Sachs: - and for us to be able to have high prosperity at the living standards we want, we need training, we need education, we need infrastructure, we need governments that can pay for that.

Niall Ferguson: But you forgot and we need higher progressive taxation on the private sector, because that's the most important part –

Jeffrey Sachs: And we need the rich to pay their way, absolutely. Because they've run away with the prize. And they've run away with the prize –

Niall Ferguson: There's a simplification.

Fareed Zakaria: Unfortunately -

Jeffrey Sachs: That's part of the solution, stop calling it just one thing, Niall.

Fareed Zakaria: All right. I don't think – I think this is one of the rare cases where I was superfluous as a moderator. Jeff Sachs, Niall Ferguson, thank you very much.

Links to Chapters in Michael Lewis' New Book 'Boomerang'

Besides a new preface, which Zerohedge has done a nice job highlighting here, Michael Lewis' new book Boomerang is a collection of his previously written stories about the financial problems of various European countries and one U.S. state (California).

Below are links to each of those stories in the order of their publication. They're all worthwhile and still very relevant.

 1. Wall St. on the Tundra (Iceland)

2. Beware of Greeks Bearing Bonds (Greece)

3. When Irish Eyes Are Crying (Ireland)

4. It’s the Economy, Dummkopf! (Germany)

5. California and Bust (California)

Michael Lewis on Germany & the Eurozone

The latest and final instalment in a series of what author Michael Lewis has described as 'Euopean financial disaster tourism' articles he's penning for Vanity Fair can be found here. This latest article focuses on Germany (the previous two covered Greece and Ireland - google them or click on 'Michael Lewis' tag below to get the link).

The Germany articles also features an accompanying interview with Lewis, where 'Europe's least welcome tourist' discusses the problems with the broader Eurozone:

VF Daily: Where did the euro go wrong? 

Lewis: At its conception. They glued together a bunch of countries and cultures that didn’t really belong together in the same currency. So if you put Germany together with Greece in a single currency, it’s a little like watching an Olympic sprinter and a fat old man running a three-legged race. The Greeks will never be as productive as the Germans, and the Germans will never be as unproductive as the Greeks. So if they’re in the same currency—unless the Greeks simply up and move to Germany to work for the Germans—it implies a lifetime of transfers from Germany to Greece. 

VF Daily: Greece was allowed a partial default this week, to the tune of $157 billion, despite the E.C.B.’s disapproval. This measure seems like a Band-Aid, though. Can we expect something much larger to happen, or do presidents and prime ministers just enjoy getting together to argue every six months? 

Lewis: The Germans are basically calling the shots here, because they’re the only ones who can afford to pay the bill. My impression is that the German people do not want to pay it, but the German leadership does not want to be labeled as the people who destroyed the euro. So the way Angela Merkel is playing it is to tell the German people what they want to hear until the moment another crisis occurs, and then she goes into parliament and says, “I need this little check to get us through this rough patch, or you will be responsible for the disintegration of Europe.” What she doesn’t ever come away with, however, is a commitment for fiscal union. She doesn’t get Germany agreeing to underwrite euro bonds—to take all the debt of the southern countries. 

VF Daily: Well, it would be political suicide, right? 

Lewis: She may have already committed political suicide. German people are increasingly unhappy with how she has handled the crisis. I don’t think that the German people are going to go all-in. The step that they would need to take is much more dramatic than this Band-Aid.

Evil on Display: Anders Brievik and Insane Acts Committed by Sane People

Perhaps it would be easier to understand the horrific Norwegian killings if they were committed by someone with a history of mental illness and/or violence.

Or perhaps we could more quickly file away this tragedy into a tidy, little mental compartment if the killing was conducted by someone with far less skill and fewer economic advantages.

And perhaps over time more details will emerge to reveal a picture of someone with a history of hate or unsound mind.

But early portraits painted by people who knew him suggest a rather disturbing alternative, which is that Anders Brievik was a seemingly 'normal' Norwegian.

From one of his classmate friends of four years:

I do not know what drove Anders. But, unfortunately, I do not think he is crazy. It would have created a comfortable distance between us if I thought he was. Nothing I know about him from our school days or what I have read in his so-called manifesto suggests that. Rather, he is cold, intelligent and calculating. The Anders I knew was not a monster. 

And as the saying goes, he was not an island. He was product of our society. He was one of us.

Sadly, There is Nothing New Here

If in fact he is a sane, even likeable person as some suggest, who also can kill without concern for those he slaughters, what are we to make of Anders Brievik?

Any student of history is well aware of the unfortunate reality that people like Brievik are nothing new. Many, particularly here in Europe, had hoped the ideologies which fuel Brievik-like personalities, capable of inflicting immense harm to a great number of people not personally known, had been buried decades ago. But the carefully orchestrated supernova of violence conducted by Brievik reminds us that this flame has not in fact gone out yet.

In the wretched corner of history occupied by the Brieviks of the world resides Nazism, which, for better or for worse, has received the lion's share of attention. I say for better or worse because the Nazi-like crimes committed under Stalin, Mao, and others often do not receive the same level of emphasis as those committed under Hitler.

Some who studied the Nazi leadership on trial at Nuremberg stated that the single most important personal quality which contributed to the ability of these humans to try and exterminate Jews (and others) was a lack of empathy. In place of a sense of caring about individuals and collective humanity, which exists in varying degrees in the vast majority of us, instead resided a bottomless black hole devoid of the ability to feel what others feel.

Harm-justifying venom can be easily poured into such minds. Rather than rejecting ideas which you and I would find unconscionable, harming others can seem logical. Seemingly sophisticated moral philosophies, justifications, and ends-means rationalizations enable such people to shoot kids "not just once, but twice, to be sure".

The Anti-Change

Brievik's bomb and gun shots were basically an attack on change. Put simply, Brievik didn't like the way things were going in Norway and decided to effectively sacrifice his freedom of movement for at least 20+ years-to-life (Norway doesn't have the death penalty) to let the world know about it.

For those who don't have the time or inclination to read his 1,000+ page 'manifesto', the change he lashed out against goes by the name of globalization. Brievik would probably prefer that we refer to it as multiculturalism, but globalization and multiculturalism are inextricably linked. Reductionist arguments which try and isolate multiculturalism from globalization are idiosyncratic and counter-productive.

The purpose of this post is not to debate the merits of globalization, but it was interesting to note the stark contrast between Brievik's hate for Norway's immigrants with a recent talk on the contribution of immigrants to Britain's intellectual history. One quarter of Britain's Nobel prize winners were born abroad, as were a large number of America's. Is freedom of movement what the Brieviks of the world would have end, or are they ok with allowing just the Albert Einsteins in?

What is Evil?

Norwegians are hurting badly from this heinous crime and asking how one of their own could commit such an act. Some would like to see the whole episode go away and also deny Brievik the publicity and attention he seeks. From the lack of headlines of late on the BBC and other respectable news agencies it would seem that some clearly understand the essential role of the media to his carefully calculated plan. Hats off to media leaders who recognize this and have taken appropriate action. But what about those who are still trying to gain more information and understand why this happened?

Outside of the religious world people often scoff at whether the imprecise, black-and-white concept of 'evil' is useful. But what other word comes close to giving this its proper name?

Leave it to the shrinks to classify and rationalize empathy-devoid personality types. For the rest of us 'normal' people the word evil will suffice.

Chart of the Day: Generation U

Perhaps its time to rename Gen Y as Gen U, as in Generation Unemployed.

Not surprisingly, the PIIGS occupy five of the top seven spots in this primarily European country sample. Chronically unemployed young males are often a key ingredient in social unrest and revolution.

Source: The Economist

European Debt Mexican Standoff: Why Greece Holds All the Cards

A no-win scenario?

Markets are signalling that tonight's vote of confidence for the government of Greek Socialist leader George Papandreou will pass.

If that happens (I don't take anything for granted in the Eurozone kabuki theatre these days) then the next step in this Greek tragedy will come next week when a package of austerity measures is put to a vote before the Greek parliament.

The new austerity measures include spending cuts, tax increases and the sale of government assets. If the Greeks don't pass these measures then the EU and IMF have threatened to not release new funds to Greece (whether they would carry through on this threat is an open question). Without these new funds Greece will run out of cash next month and default.

The Greek Bargaining Position

While a Greek default would perhaps be bad in the short-run for Greece, it would be far, far worse for the Eurozone and rest of the world. Given the risks of financial contagion and a pan-European, if not global, banking crisis that a Greek default could trigger, the Greeks find themselves in a relatively strong negotiating position. And the Greeks, the EU, the ECB, and IMF all know this.

Continue reading at Seeking Alpha here.

Roubini on the Eurozone: 'Messy marriages lead to messy divorces'

Nouriel Roubini

Some of the other choice quotes:

• 'when Greece folds like a wet gyro, and it will...'
• 'the politicians at these meetings will not be the same ones at a similar meeting in two years'
• 'but if the marriage doesn’t work, even the threat of a messy divorce cannot keep couples together that are not a long-term match'
• 'Let me suggest to my fellow US citizens that you really pay attention to this. If you think that we can somehow avoid making difficult choices by kicking the can down the road, watch the European theater. And coming to a theater near you in a few years will be a real Japanese monster movie. Godzilla on steroids.'

Roubini's full analysis on why Greece and other PIIGS will ultimately be left with no choice but to exit the euro and return to their respective currencies (e.g., the Greek drachma) here.

Video: Niall Ferguson on Trichet's Call for a Centralized Eurozone Finance Ministry

Trichet's latest move smacks of "desperation" and may hint at just how perilous the ECB's balance sheet is with respect to its European periphery (aka PIIGS) debt holdings.

 Full video here.

Video: Niall Ferguson on DSK, Europe's Debt Crisis

Video here.

Video: Dominique Strauss-Kahn (DSK) Saturday Night Live (SNL) Skit

For more great edutainment check out this video, which is from a year ago and still spot on as nothing has really changed with Europe's debt crisis in the past twelve months.

A Punctuation Mark in European History

By George Friedman, STRATFOR

With the Palestinians demonstrating and the International Monetary Fund in turmoil, it would seem odd to focus this week on something called the Visegrad Group. But this is not a frivolous choice. What the Visegrad Group decided to do last week will, I think, resonate for years, long after the alleged attempted rape by Dominique Strauss-Kahn is forgotten and long before the Israeli-Palestinian issue is resolved. The obscurity of the decision to most people outside the region should not be allowed to obscure its importance.

The region is Europe — more precisely, the states that had been dominated by the Soviet Union. The Visegrad Group, or V4, consists of four countries — Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary — and is named after two 14th century meetings held in Visegrad Castle in present-day Hungary of leaders of the medieval kingdoms of Poland, Hungary and Bohemia. The group was reconstituted in 1991 in post-Cold War Europe as the Visegrad Three (at that time, Slovakia and the Czech Republic were one). The goal was to create a regional framework after the fall of Communism. This week the group took an interesting new turn.

(click here to enlarge image)

On May 12, the Visegrad Group announced the formation of a “battle group” under the command of Poland. The battle group would be in place by 2016 as an independent force and would not be part of NATO command. In addition, starting in 2013, the four countries would begin military exercises together under the auspices of the NATO Response Force.

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the primary focus of all of the Visegrad nations had been membership in the European Union and NATO. Their evaluation of their strategic position was threefold. First, they felt that the Russian threat had declined if not dissipated following the fall of the Soviet Union. Second, they felt that their economic future was with the European Union. Third, they believed that membership in NATO, with strong U.S. involvement, would protect their strategic interests. Of late, their analysis has clearly been shifting.

First, Russia has changed dramatically since the Yeltsin years. It has increased its power in the former Soviet sphere of influence substantially, and in 2008 it carried out an effective campaign against Georgia. Since then it has also extended its influence in other former Soviet states. The Visegrad members’ underlying fear of Russia, built on powerful historical recollection, has become more intense. They are both the front line to the former Soviet Union and the countries that have the least confidence that the Cold War is simply an old memory.

Second, the infatuation with Europe, while not gone, has frayed. The ongoing economic crisis, now focused again on Greece, has raised two questions: whether Europe as an entity is viable and whether the reforms proposed to stabilize Europe represent a solution for them or primarily for the Germans. It is not, by any means, that they have given up the desire to be Europeans, nor that they have completely lost faith in the European Union as an institution and an idea. Nevertheless, it would be unreasonable to expect that these countries would not be uneasy about the direction that Europe was taking. If one wants evidence, look no further than the unease with which Warsaw and Prague are deflecting questions about the eventual date of their entry into the Eurozone. Both are the strongest economies in Central Europe, and neither is enthusiastic about the euro.

Finally, there are severe questions as to whether NATO provides a genuine umbrella of security to the region and its members. The NATO strategic concept, which was drawn up in November 2010, generated substantial concern on two scores. First, there was the question of the degree of American commitment to the region, considering that the document sought to expand the alliance’s role in non-European theaters of operation. For example, the Americans pledged a total of one brigade to the defense of Poland in the event of a conflict, far below what Poland thought necessary to protect the North European Plain. Second, the general weakness of European militaries meant that, willingness aside, the ability of the Europeans to participate in defending the region was questionable. Certainly, events in Libya, where NATO had neither a singular political will nor the military participation of most of its members, had to raise doubts. It was not so much the wisdom of going to war but the inability to create a coherent strategy and deploy adequate resources that raised questions of whether NATO would be any more effective in protecting the Visegrad nations.

There is another consideration. Germany’s commitment to both NATO and the EU has been fraying. The Germans and the French split on the Libya question, with Germany finally conceding politically but unwilling to send forces. Libya might well be remembered less for the fate of Moammar Gadhafi than for the fact that this was the first significant strategic break between Germany and France in decades. German national strategy has been to remain closely aligned with France in order to create European solidarity and to avoid Franco-German tensions that had roiled Europe since 1871. This had been a centerpiece of German foreign policy, and it was suspended, at least temporarily.

The Germans obviously are struggling to shore up the European Union and questioning precisely how far they are prepared to go in doing so. There are strong political forces in Germany questioning the value of the EU to Germany, and with every new wave of financial crises requiring German money, that sentiment becomes stronger. In the meantime, German relations with Russia have become more important to Germany. Apart from German dependence on Russian energy, Germany has investment opportunities in Russia. The relationship with Russia is becoming more attractive to Germany at the same time that the relationship to NATO and the EU has become more problematic.

For all of the Visegrad countries, any sense of a growing German alienation from Europe and of a growing German-Russian economic relationship generates warning bells. Before the  Belarusian elections there was hope in Poland that pro-Western elements would defeat the least unreformed regime in the former Soviet Union. This didn’t happen. Moreover, pro-Western elements have done nothing to solidify in Moldova or break the now pro-Russian government in Ukraine. Uncertainty about European institutions and NATO, coupled with uncertainty about Germany’s attention, has caused a strategic reconsideration — not to abandon NATO or the EU, of course, nor to confront the Russians, but to prepare for all eventualities.

It is in this context that the decision to form a Visegradian battle group must be viewed. Such an independent force, a concept generated by the European Union as a European defense plan, has not generated much enthusiasm or been widely implemented. The only truly robust example of an effective battle group is the Nordic Battle Group, but then that is not surprising. The Nordic countries share the same concerns as the Visegrad countries — the future course of Russian power, the cohesiveness of Europe and the commitment of the United States.

In the past, the Visegrad countries would have been loath to undertake anything that felt like a unilateral defense policy. Therefore, the decision to do this is significant in and of itself. It represents a sense of how these countries evaluate the status of NATO, the U.S. attention span, European coherence and Russian power. It is not the battle group itself that is significant but the strategic decision of these powers to form a sub-alliance, if you will, and begin taking responsibility for their own national security. It is not what they expected or wanted to do, but it is significant that they felt compelled to begin moving in this direction.

Just as significant is the willingness of Poland to lead this military formation and to take the lead in the grouping as a whole. Poland is the largest of these countries by far and in the least advantageous geographical position. The Poles are trapped between the Germans and the Russians. Historically, when Germany gets close to Russia, Poland tends to suffer. It is not at that extreme point yet, but the Poles do understand the possibilities. In July, the Poles will be assuming the EU presidency in one of the union’s six-month rotations. The Poles have made clear that one of their main priorities will be Europe’s military power. Obviously, little can happen in Europe in six months, but this clearly indicates where Poland’s focus is.

The militarization of the V4 runs counter to its original intent but is in keeping with the geopolitical trends in the region. Some will say this is over-reading on my part or an overreaction on the part of the V4, but it is neither. For the V4, the battle group is a modest response to emerging patterns in the region, which STRATFOR had outlined in its 2011 Annual Forecast. As for my reading, I regard the new patterns not as a minor diversion from the main pattern but as a definitive break in the patterns of the post-Cold War world. In my view, the post-Cold War world ended in 2008, with the financial crisis and the Russo-Georgian war. We are in a new era, as yet unnamed, and we are seeing the first breaks in the post-Cold War pattern.

I have argued in previous articles and books that there is a divergent interest between the European countries on the periphery of Russia and those farther west, particularly Germany. For the countries on the periphery, there is a perpetual sense of insecurity, generated not only by Russian power compared to their own but also by uncertainty as to whether the rest of Europe would be prepared to defend them in the event of Russian actions. The V4 and the other countries south of them are not as sanguine about Russian intentions as others farther away are. Perhaps they should be, but geopolitical realities drive consciousness and insecurity and distrust defines this region.

I had also argued that an alliance only of the four northernmost countries is insufficient. I used the concept “Intermarium,” which had first been raised after World War I by a Polish leader, Joseph Pilsudski, who understood that Germany and the Soviet Union would not be permanently weak and that Poland and the countries liberated from the Hapsburg Empire would have to be able to defend themselves and not have to rely on France or Britain.

Pilsudski proposed an alliance stretching from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea and encompassing the countries to the west of the Carpathians — Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. In some formulations, this would include Yugoslavia, Finland and the Baltics. The point was that Poland had to have allies, that no one could predict German and Soviet strength and intentions, and that the French and English were too far away to help. The only help Poland could have would be an alliance of geography — countries with no choice.

It follows from this that the logical evolution here is the extension of the Visegrad coalition. At the May 12 defense ministers’ meeting, there was discussion of inviting Ukraine to join in. Twenty or even 10 years ago, that would have been a viable option. Ukraine had room to maneuver. But the very thing that makes the V4 battle group necessary — Russian power — limits what Ukraine can do. The Russians are prepared to give Ukraine substantial freedom to maneuver, but that does not include a military alliance with the Visegrad countries.

An alliance with Ukraine would provide significant strategic depth. It is unlikely to happen. That means that the alliance must stretch south, to include Romania and Bulgaria. The low-level tension between Hungary and Romania over the status of Hungarians in Romania makes that difficult, but if the Hungarians can live with the Slovaks, they can live with the Romanians. Ultimately, the interesting question is whether Turkey can be persuaded to participate in this, but that is a question far removed from Turkish thinking now. History will have to evolve quite a bit for this to take place. For now, the question is Romania and Bulgaria.

But the decision of the V4 to even propose a battle group commanded by Poles is one of those small events that I think will be regarded as a significant turning point. However we might try to trivialize it and place it in a familiar context, it doesn’t fit. It represents a new level of concern over an evolving reality — the power of Russia, the weakness of Europe and the fragmentation of NATO. This is the last thing the Visegrad countries wanted to do, but they have now done the last thing they wanted to do. That is what is significant.

Events in the Middle East and Europe’s economy are significant and of immediate importance. However, sometimes it is necessary to recognize things that are not significant yet but will be in 10 years. I believe this is one of those events. It is a punctuation mark in European history.

Visegrad: A New European Military Force is republished with permission of STRATFOR.

How to Play the 'Reprofiling' of Greek Debt

Today comes the latest in a long list of euphemisms for a Greek debt default, this one courtesy of Eurogroup head and Luxembourg PM Jean-Claude Juncker:

“If all these conditions are fulfilled, we can discuss the question of reprofiling,” Juncker told reporters late yesterday after chairing a meeting of euro-area finance chiefs in Brussels. “It’s not reprofiling or nothing. It’s measures, measures and measures, and then maybe reprofiling.”

Source: Bloomberg

While it's unclear how many of Europe's leaders are in agreement with Juncker, at least some of the Eurozone's grownups have begun to publicly acknowledge what the market has been communicating for awhile, which is that maintaining the current Greek debt program is hopeless. John Mauldin spells out the inescapable arithmetic:

(Greek) GDP at -4.5% in 2010 and still likely to be -3.0% in 2011 (Source: IMF). If your economy slows down by 10%, then your debt-to-GDP ratio rises by 11% without any new debt. And Greece is being asked to further reduce its deficit by what is in effect 15% of GDP, while taking on no more debt. Within two years Greece will have a debt-to-GDP ratio of 160%.

No country save Britain...has ever recovered from a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 150% without a default. None. 

And the reason is simple arithmetic. Even a nominal interest rate of 6% means that it takes 10% of your national income just to pay the interest. Not 10% of tax revenues, mind you; 10% of your total domestic production. That is a huge burden on any country. It sucks up half your tax revenues (or more), leaving not enough to pay for ordinary government services like police, defense, education, pensions, health care, etc. 

Greece runs a massive trade deficit with the rest of Europe, which just makes the problems worse. Unemployment in Greece is now 15% and rising.

The details of Greece's default (aka 'reprofiling') appear to involve some type of maturity extension in exchange for an acceleration of Greek government cuts and 50 billion euros of privatization, which translates into selling about a fifth of the property that the Greek state owns.

The question now becomes how much appetite is there in Greece for any additional cuts and the selling off of state assets to pay back the foreign banks (primarily French and German) which lent Greece money? And are the Greeks really willing to put up 'collateral' (e.g, Mykonos?) in exchange for any additional financial assistance from Germany?

Continue reading the full article at SeekingAlpha here.

Video: Flashback to Recent Dominique Strauss-Kahn Interview on Charlie Rose

The IMF's Strauss-Kahn

Here is Charlie Rose's most recent interview with the IMF Managing Director, from December 2010. Strauss-Kahn has appeared on Charlie Rose six times in total.

Rose, who has a cozy relationship in general with financial elites, seems quite fond of Strauss-Kahn, especially when the topic of running against Sarkozy in France's presidential election comes up.

One can only wonder how Charlie Rose is reacting to yesterday's shocking allegations against Strauss-Kahn, which now apparently include sodomy in his $3,000-a-night taxpayer financed hotel suite.

It's unclear what implications this may have for the ongoing European Sovereign Debt crisis or political situation in general in Europe. It certainly comes at a sensitive time when the IMF may be called upon to lend support to a 'restructuring' of Greek debt, or help manage Greece's departure from the Eurozone.

Update: Here and here are the first post-scandal Charlie Rose discussions of the arrest.

Update 2: Here is DSK's mugshot.