The Greatest Trick Lenders Ever Pulled?

A pretty good candidate in my mind was substituting the term 'credit' for 'debt'.

Not all too long ago, 'debt' was clearly understood as something that, simply put, was bad.

But 'credit'? Oh boy, give me some of that!

There is a lot more to the credit/debt bubble than rebranding. But it's interesting to observe the different terms used for the same or like things, and the effect such differences can have on adoption and/or support. Some other examples:

• 'Orderly resolutions' vs. 'bailouts'
• 'Quantitative easing' vs. 'printing money'
• 'Macroprudential regulation' vs. 'financial repression'
• 'Department of Defense' vs. 'Department of War'

The observation on swapping 'debt' for 'credit' and other interesting thoughts from this talk and Q&A with novelist (and non-economist) John Lanchester.

What's the Difference Between 'Financial Repression' and 'Macroprudential Regulation'?

Axel Weber and German Chancellor Angela Merkel

The most striking remarks made by former Bundesbank Chief and ECB frontrunner Axel Weber in a recent WSJ interview were his comments on the possibility of using financial repression to solve the Greek and wider European debt crisis:

“Ultimately, there will be a debate about financial repression. Take what we had in Germany — the Zwangsanleihe [compulsory loans introduced after World War I to help make reparation payments]. If voluntary contributions don’t add up, then the one tool that is still on the shelf is financial repression.”

To my knowledge, this is the first time a major senior policymaker (albeit one who recently stepped down) has publicly used the term 'financial repression'. As economist Carmen Reinhart and others have noted, the policies associated with financial repression are typically couched under the more benign, positive sounding 'macroprudential regulation'.

Update: News today emerged that Weber will become Chairman of Swiss megabank UBS, which perhaps explains the reasoning behind his choice of words.

Economic Newspeak

The term 'financial repression' was first coined in 1973 by two Stanford economists, and the word choice was intended to disparage developing economies which enacted what were deemed to be anti-competitive (and hence anti-growth) policies. In other words, the term 'financial repression' was invented with negative connotations in mind.

Can the contrast between 'financial repression' and 'macroprudential regulation' be viewed along the same lines as the difference between 'quantitative easing' and 'printing money'? The two monetary terms can mean approximately the same thing, although those who oppose Fed policies, like QE2, tend to embrace the use of the latter, which is arguably both more provocative and transparent to a broader audience.

This blog has in the past been highly critical of other examples of opaque, economic 'newspeak', such as Yale Professor Robert Shiller's argument that terms like 'bailout' should be replaced with ‘orderly resolution’ so that the voting public 'gets it'.

How to Play the 'Reprofiling' of Greek Debt

Today comes the latest in a long list of euphemisms for a Greek debt default, this one courtesy of Eurogroup head and Luxembourg PM Jean-Claude Juncker:

“If all these conditions are fulfilled, we can discuss the question of reprofiling,” Juncker told reporters late yesterday after chairing a meeting of euro-area finance chiefs in Brussels. “It’s not reprofiling or nothing. It’s measures, measures and measures, and then maybe reprofiling.”

Source: Bloomberg

While it's unclear how many of Europe's leaders are in agreement with Juncker, at least some of the Eurozone's grownups have begun to publicly acknowledge what the market has been communicating for awhile, which is that maintaining the current Greek debt program is hopeless. John Mauldin spells out the inescapable arithmetic:

(Greek) GDP at -4.5% in 2010 and still likely to be -3.0% in 2011 (Source: IMF). If your economy slows down by 10%, then your debt-to-GDP ratio rises by 11% without any new debt. And Greece is being asked to further reduce its deficit by what is in effect 15% of GDP, while taking on no more debt. Within two years Greece will have a debt-to-GDP ratio of 160%.

No country save Britain...has ever recovered from a debt-to-GDP ratio of over 150% without a default. None. 

And the reason is simple arithmetic. Even a nominal interest rate of 6% means that it takes 10% of your national income just to pay the interest. Not 10% of tax revenues, mind you; 10% of your total domestic production. That is a huge burden on any country. It sucks up half your tax revenues (or more), leaving not enough to pay for ordinary government services like police, defense, education, pensions, health care, etc. 

Greece runs a massive trade deficit with the rest of Europe, which just makes the problems worse. Unemployment in Greece is now 15% and rising.

The details of Greece's default (aka 'reprofiling') appear to involve some type of maturity extension in exchange for an acceleration of Greek government cuts and 50 billion euros of privatization, which translates into selling about a fifth of the property that the Greek state owns.

The question now becomes how much appetite is there in Greece for any additional cuts and the selling off of state assets to pay back the foreign banks (primarily French and German) which lent Greece money? And are the Greeks really willing to put up 'collateral' (e.g, Mykonos?) in exchange for any additional financial assistance from Germany?

Continue reading the full article at SeekingAlpha here.

Economic Newspeak: Has Yale's Robert Shiller Seen the Light?

"To me...part of the process of pursuing the inexact aspects of economics is speaking honestly to the broader public, looking them in the eye...and then searching one’s soul to decide whether one’s favored theory is really close to the truth."

-Robert Shiller, Project Syndicate Op-ed January 20, 2011 

Yale Professor Robert Shiller

The above words come from the same Professor Shiller who just a few months ago brazenly argued that our government, when engaging the broader voting public on the "complexities" of 'necessary' bailouts, should employ economic propaganda.

Yves Smith over at Naked Capitalism also took exception when Shiller's November op-ed came out, characterizing the Yale Professor's argument as a justification for Orwellian newspeak.

Shiller previously argued that terms like 'bailout' should be recast as ‘orderly resolutions’ so as to make sure the voting public 'gets it'.

From Shiller's November piece:

When life is smooth, people tend to remain complacent, reflecting confidence in the economy. In times of crisis, such confidence is also vital, even if government can’t absolutely guarantee that it’s justified. 

...well-thought-out framing packages can work. They can help sell crucial intervention packages to people who don’t fully understand the financial system’s complexities.

As I noted in my response to Shiller:

In other words, Shiller is making the argument that it's not only ok, but advisable for the government to be less than frank with voters. During a financial crisis, Shiller argues, this lack of candor is actually in the public's own good.

Putting aside the subject of the ethical responsibilities of public officials for a moment, the first question is would Shiller's recommendation even work?

To help answer that question we can turn to a recent example from early 2008, prior to the apex of the financial crisis. On March 28, 2008, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, testifying before Congress about the housing market, made the now infamous false assurance that the subprime real estate crisis was "contained".

There are two possibilities here: either a) the Fed Chairman honestly believed that the Fed's actions had magically put the breaks on the real estate meltdown; or b) he was consciously using propaganda to reassure people, as Shiller advocates.

Regardless of which of these two possibilites is correct, what we do know is that his reassurances did absolutely nothing to prevent the financial crisis, which hit full force later that year in September. Perhaps Bernanke's comment postponed the crisis, but postponement may in fact have made it worse by allowing the problem to further fester under a blanket of false Fed confidence. 

What made Shiller's November words all the more disheartening is that they came from from one of America's most respected and credible academic economists. Professor Shiller hails from Yale University, and he is both a widely read author and creator of the influential Case-Shiller Home Price Index. While Shiller was not one of the academic economists skewered by Charles Ferguson in his excellent documentary film Inside Job, his November remarks certainly made him a deserving target of popular criticism.

Here's to hoping Shiller's more recent reflections indicate an about face in his thinking along with a commitment to speaking clearly and truthfully on economic matters, like taxpayer funded bailouts, with the general public.

Is Economic Propaganda Ethical?

Ever wondered why government officials use fancy sounding terms like 'quantitative easing' instead of the much easier to understand 'printing money' when they both effectively mean the same thing?

Yale Professor Rober Shiller, who correctly predicted the housing market crash, weighs in on this topic with a piece in this weekend's NY Times. In the article he describes how to handle the inevitable next financial crisis.

His rather surprising answer?  By using the right vocab.

In what so far as I can tell is a first by an esteemed member of the academic community, Schiller goes on public record rationalizing the use of propaganda by government officials.

Shiller states:

"in times of crisis...confidence (expressed by the government) is also vital, even if government can’t absolutely guarantee that it’s justified...for people who don’t fully understand the financial system’s complexities "

In other words, Shiller is making the argument that it's not only ok, but advisable for the government to be less than frank with voters. During a financial crisis, Shiller argues, this lack of candor is actually in the public's own good.

Putting aside the subject of the ethical responsibilities of public officials for a moment, the first question is would Shiller's recommendation even work?

To help answer that question we can turn to a recent example from early 2008, prior to the apex of the financial crisis. On March 28, 2008, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke, testifying before Congress about the housing market, made the now infamous false assurance that the subprime real estate crisis was "contained".

There are two possibilities here: either a) the Fed Chairman honestly believed that the Fed's actions had magically put the breaks on the real estate meltdown; or b) he was consciously using propaganda to reassure people, as Shiller advocates.

Regardless of which of these two possibilites is correct, what we do know is that his reassurances did absolutely nothing to prevent the financial crisis, which hit full force later that year in September. Perhaps Bernanke's comment postponed the crisis, but postponement may in fact have made it worse by allowing the problem to further fester under a blanket of false Fed confidence.

Are 'bailouts' and 'printing money' hopelessly beyond the general public's understanding, as Shiller believes? And instead of coming up with the proper vocab, shouldn't officials and financial experts be working on how to prevent the next financial crisis?