Krugman Perpetuates Myth of the Zero Lower Bound

Professor Paul Krugman

Professor Krugman just published a column where he deserves kudos for sticking his neck on the line and predicting that the Bernanke Fed is not creating a bubble in bonds, and "probably not" in stocks either.

While the argument on whether or not Bernanke is blowing bubbles is interesting and worthy of discussion (although only time will tell for sure), that's not what this post is about.

In the column Krugman makes a somewhat tangential comment about what economists often refer to as the 'zero lower bound problem' on where a central bank can set interest rates. Here's Krugman's quote:

"True, it (the Fed) can’t cut rates any further because they’re already near zero and can’t go lower. (Otherwise investors would just sit on cash.)"

Krugman's statement is problematic for several reasons:

First, it's misleading and patently false of Dr. K to say that the Fed "can’t cut rates any further" when in fact it can. There is no economic or natural law which prevents the Fed from setting nominal rates at exactly zero, or at a negative rate.

Whether they should be set at zero or negative is another question. In short, Dr. K needs to replace "can't" with something like "could but shouldn't because...".

Second, I suggest that it would be helpful if Dr. K was a little more precise so that people understand why the Fed "can't" (shouldn't) set zero or negative rates but Denmark's central bank can set a negative deposit rate, and now Drahgi at the ECB is openly discussing this as well.

To be clear, I'm not endorsing negative rates. I'm only saying that negative rates are possible and that some central banks are experimenting with negative rates as a policy tool.

And finally, yes, perhaps if the Fed were the only central bank to pursue a negative rate policy then investors may sit on cash, move their money elsewhere, etc. But if enough central banks around the world kept driving rates further and further into negative territory then it would be very surprising if this didn't help generate inflation, in which case people would probably not be sitting on cash as Dr. K suggests but rather spending it before money lost its purchasing power.

The long perpetuated myth of the zero lower bound is starting to be challenged more and more, and for a more detailed academic discussion of the zero lower bound myth see here. 

What Happened to Cyprus's Deposit Insurance Scheme?

So much for all quiet on the Eurozone front, a quiet which barring election rumblings from Italy has largely been enjoyed since Drahgi's LTRO blitz.

While it's unclear whether this weekend's 'bailing in' of Cyrpiot depositors will prove the trigger point for the final Eurozone reckoning, what is clear is that all the 'crazies' who have been stashing their money under their mattresses perhaps weren't so crazy after all.

One thing I'm curious about, which I haven't seen discussed in any detail anywhere else, are the mechanics behind what happened to Cyprus's deposit insurance scheme.

For example, is the insurance scheme, like the entire Cypriot banking system, insolvent? If yes, by how much? Could it be recapitalized through a tax? Etc.

The high level details of Cyprus's deposit insurance program, which goes by the name Deposit Protection Scheme (DPS), are discussed on the Central Bank of Cyprus's webpage here. As has been widely reported, depositors in Cypriot banks are supposed to be fully insured for €100.000 "per depositor, per bank".

Some reports state that if Cyprus's banks were allowed to fail then the small, fully insured depositors would be made whole. So do depositors who have €100.000 or less of insurable deposits have recourse for legal action in Cyprus?

One thing is clear: if I were a Cypriot depositor I would much rather have cash right now than shares in an insolvent bank.

"It's the asset prices, stupid"

In a good post titled 'Why Obama is Winning' Harold James points out that political strategist James Carville's famous "it's the economy, stupid" quip from the 1992 U.S. presidential election campaign has gained a new twist:

...the lesson about the economy’s electoral salience is being subtly reformulated. It is no longer the real state of the economy, but rather the perception of asset markets, that is crucial. And the perception can be far removed from reality, which means that the more the prevailing political wisdom assigns decisive electoral importance to the economy, the greater the temptation to view monetary policy’s impact on asset prices, and not on long-term growth, as crucial.

What James is basically saying is that people feel wealthier when asset prices - stocks, bonds, real estate, etc. - go up in value. This phenomenon -- the so called 'wealth effect' -- can make those who don't read The PolyCapitalist and the other recommended sites listed on the right side of this blog feel like the real, fundamental economy is doing better than it actually is. Or so the theory goes. 

Further, positive feelings about how the economy is trending due to rising asset prices can in turn drive higher consumer consumption and business investment, which in turn can increase GDP. At least in the short (and possibly) medium run.

For how long can this wealth effect ponzi-esque scheme go on? In other words, are programs like QE3 nothing more than an macroeconomic cheap trick?

No one knows for sure because, like much of modern macroeconomic theory, we are conducting a live, empirical test of the theory. And this test has arguably been running since at least 1987 (the year Alan Greenspan became Chairman of the Fed), if not 1971 (the year Nixon severed the U.S. Dollar's anchor to the price of gold).

What this means longer-term, according to James, is further politicization of the Federal Reserve and other central banks around the world:

Republicans will blame their defeat in November on the Fed’s monetary stimulus (if not on the ineffectiveness of Mitt Romney’s blunder-filled campaign). 

Meanwhile, in Europe, many national leaders, looking at Obama and the Fed, may conclude that they would do better with more direct control over the central bank. Given the difficulty of establishing such control over the European Central Bank, the euro’s next great challenge may be growing sentiment in favor of a return to national currencies.

In other words, expect central banks to remain in the politial bullseye following the 2012 U.S. and 2013 German elections, regardless of the their outcomes.

Will major reform be applied to central banks? For example, there has been open discussion of terms limits for the Federal Reserve Chairman.

Perhaps changes like term limits, greater Fed transparency, etc. are in the cards longer-term. But I am personally skeptical that any significant reforms will be enacted at the Federal Reserve prior to the end of the U.S. dollar's global hegemony.

Video: The Great Euro Crisis (BBC)

A good series of interviews for understanding why many Greeks (and Germans) still prefer that Greece keep the euro rather than return to its previous currency, the drachma. 

Self-confessed Eurosceptic Michael Portillo visits debt-stricken Greece. He believes that the euro crisis must have shaken the Greeks' faith in Europe's single currency and wonders if there'll be a desire to revert to the free-floating drachma. In Athens he meets everyone from a destitute young family to the former finance minister and the outgoing Prime Minister, and is surprised by some of their answers. Meanwhile in Germany, Europe's economic powerhouse, Michael encounters the taxpayers who are paying most towards Greece's mammoth financial bailout while having to watch angry Athenians burning the German flag.

On the Topic of Financial Collapse Fear Mongering

"Ireland is in a death spiral" -FT

"After the November President election the U.S. is facing a fiscal cliff" -Federal Reserve staff

"Eurogeddon!" -The PolyCapitalist

On and on go the warnings of cataclysm and pending financial doom. Technical jargon and existential risks are bandied about in frightening fashion, leaving the general, less-economically literate with very little ability to understand what's actually happening or just how bad things could really get if say Greece leaves the Eurozone, or another country defaults, or something like this occurs.

This blog is not entirely innocent of this criticism, and this post is a brief attempt to quickly address the question of whether our global financial system is on the precipice of a financial collapse if say something 'really bad' happens in Europe?

The short answer is no.

Now before I expand on that answer I would like to clarify something very important: this post is about financial collapse and not about the extremely high levels of unemployment, which have reached approximately 50% for young people in countries such as Greece and Spain. The youth and general unemployment problems today are serious and something to be very concerned about. But this post is not about that but instead about whether another Lehman-style event could occur where the world's financial system risks implosion if say a country like Greece pulls out of the euro, the current 'bank jog' in Spain accelerates, etc.

So why isn't the risk of financial collapse as bad as some would have use believe?

For starters, we have to keep in mind that our financial world is a virtual world. Today, money is largely a set of numbers on a computer. This means that even in the most extreme scenario of financial disorder, where policymakers completely blow it and the ATMs stopped working and the stock market tanked, that everything that is real and tangible - the houses, the food that is farmed, the physical assets - none of this goes away and will all be here the next day when you wake up in the morning.

Now having said that, a financial implosion would definitely have a major impact on our lives, particularly for those with fewer resources or who are unprepared. But life will go on for nearly everyone and could actually rebound quite quickly given other historical cases. For example, Argentina began recovering within months following its utterly complete financial meltdown in 2001 even though the country achieved the relatively rare trifecta of a currency collapse, a banking crisis, and a sovereign default all at once. Iceland has had a relatively quick turnaround following its 2008 financial implosion. And other Asian countries in the late-90s also turned the corner pretty quickly following major financial crises.

In the case of Argentina, dozens of people died in Dec. 2001 riots, so I don't want to minimize the very real suffering and dislocation which comes with a financial collapse. But Argentina's experience is a far cry from the level of suffering of say a war or severe natural disaster. In short, a 'cataclysm', it was not.

A further point needs to be made about the above examples, which is that they were all relatively isolated, contained crises that did not threaten a systemic collapse in arguably the same way as the current crisis. But this leads me to point number two, which is that a systemic collapse is extremely unlikely, particularly given two facts:

1. what was learned from the recent Lehman-experience in 2008 by the current crop of policymakers.
2. the world's central banks, especially the Federal Reserve, still have loads of financial ammunition.

Regarding the first point, current policymakers got a first-hand glimpse of just how interconnected the world's financial system is and how the failure of a seemingly small cog in the wheel could threaten to topple the whole system. So while yes, Greece's financial implosion could lead to a chain reaction that threatens the entire global financial system, it is utterly inconceivable in the wake of the Lehman crisis that policymakers would sit back and let that happen given what they learned and how they responded in 2008-2009.

So I hear you asking whether all our problems are solved then because central banks like the Federal Reserve are all powerful, financially speaking, and able to contain any crisis which comes its way? Over the long-term, I would say no, they are not all powerful financially. But in the short-term, meaning right now and over the next few months at least, they are all powerful financially, and here's why.

Central banks like the Fed, ECB, Bank of Japan, and Bank of England which operate fiat currencies have an extraordinary power, which is that they can create an unlimited amount of money.

'Unlimited', meaning a truly infinite amount of money? Yes

What this means is that even if, for example, all the depositors in Spain and Greece withdrew every last euro from their local banks the ECB can supply all the notes that citizens want to hide under their bed mattresses. In short, the ATMs should never, ever run out of money in a fiat money system which is being managed by competent professionals.

But earlier I alluded to the fact that even though central banks can print an unlimited amount of money that they were not in fact financially omnipotent over the long-term, so what did I mean by that?

With the magic that is the computer a central bank could literally go and create and infinite amount of money. But there are side effects with central banks creating a lot of money, namely inflation. Without getting technical, simply put inflation is a rise in prices. Hyperinflation is a very large, sudden rise in prices.

But here is the crucial point to remember: rising inflation acts as a brake on a central bank's ability to create money. In other words, a rise in inflation is perhaps the key to understanding when central banks would be constrained in any effort to bail out the financial system.

Today, most of the world's advanced economies (North America, Europe) have relatively modest inflation, meaning low single digit annual percentage increases in official measures of core inflation. And even though they would say otherwise, the central banks in these advanced countries would be more than willing to trade an increase in inflation to stem the risk of a systemic financial collapse.

So how much more inflation would central banks be willing to tolerate as a tradeoff for not risking financial collapse? As the Bank of England has demonstrated in the past couple years, inflation creeping up towards 5% is not enough of a concern to prompt a significant deviation in policy. So my guess (it is a guess) is that at the extreme central banks like the Fed could tolerate up to 10% if they perceived the risks of collapse to be great enough before they would think twice about pulling another post-Lehman style bailout of the world's financial system. And since we're still in low single digit inflation this gives the Fed a decent amount of runway to maneuver.

This room to maneuver is what is meant when it is said that the Fed, which controls the world's most important reserve currency, and other central banks still have lots of ammunition.

The existence of this ammunition is likely a factor behind why given all the current distress in Europe that the stock markets haven't fallen further. In other words, the markets expect central banks to step in and flood the financial system with money if Greece leaves the euro or a banking run accelerates. Even the supposedly hemmed in by the Germans/hard-money crowd ECB. After LTRO and all the sovereign bond debt purchases, anyone who still thinks the ECB won't step in to save the system if things go completely pear shaped by creating a lot money is living in a fantasy. And this flood of central bank money would likely be very bullish for stocks in the short-term.

Should inflation increase significantly, then the ability of central banks to rush in and save the day could be diminished. But for now, they have the power to act, and that's why (for now) a general financial collapse is not on the immediate horizon.

So in sum, if you want to understand when it might be time to get worried, keep an eye on official measures of core inflation, particularly if it starts creeping up near the 5% level as that is about the time a proper central banker will begin to twitch over fears of runaway inflation.

Now, in terms of how you want to position your investment portfolio given the above, the very first post on this blog just over two years ago argued for allocating some of your portfolio into gold, which is arguably the best hedge against excessive central bank money printing. Even though the price of gold has gone up significantly in the last two years this blog still stands by that recommendation for long-term investors.

On The Problem With Postponing the Inevitable

Today's Eurogeddon must read.

Lagarde Sacrifices Herself to Help Greece's Pro-Bailout New Democracy Party?

The Eurogeddon chess game is getting desperate so don't be surprised to see a few political/PR curveballs over the next few weeks in front of the 17 June Greek election runoff.

Case in point is this weekend's snarky comment from the typically ladylike Madame Lagarde. But before we get to that, some background:

The single worst thing than can happen from the perspective of the Troika (the IMF, EU, and ECB) and Greek elites right now is for Syriza and its 37-year old leader, 'Sexy Alexis', as he's now being called, to do well in the 17 June Greek election runoff.

In the most recent May elections Greek voters turned away from the two pro-bailout/austerity parties, PASOK and New Democracy, as they were seen as tools of the Troika. This rejection by voters sent a shiver up the Troika's spine as they know that should Syriza and Alexis Tsipras prevail he will likely walk away from the terms of the bailout and thereby call the Troika's bluff to either a) cut off Greece's banking system from further ECB funding or b) terminate any further bailout money to Greece's government. Either one of these moves will likely trigger a financial panic and spoil everyone's summer vacation plans.

So the Troika are now desperate to see PASOK and or New Democracy do better in the 17 June election. So how can they help them?

Agent Provocateur: Christine Lagarde, IMF Chief

Angry Greek voters are looking for someone to blame, and as long as PASOK and New Democracy are seen as part of the problem it's unlikely that voters will put them back into power. So one strategy is to try and reshift the political blame onto the external Troika, which would have the effect of diverting negative feelings away from PASOK and New Democracy. This would help the two pro-bailout Greek parties reposition themselves as domestic victims rather than as co-conspirators with the hated foreigners.

And now you understand why the typically politie Christine Lagarde, head of the IMF, probably deliberately roiled the Aegean kettle this weekend with a comment about how it's 'payback time', and Greeks need to pay their taxes.

Queue the Greek firestorm.

And lo and behold, New Democracy, who of course along with PASOK quickly denounced Lagarde's rhetoric, is again rising in the polls.

Nice move, Troika.

And, by the way, Lagarde doesn't pay any taxes on her $551,700 in annual compensation.

Greece QOTD: "Papadreou was clueless. Papademos was complicit. Where does blame really lie?"

Atta boy, AEP.

Greece Can Physically Print Its Own Euros In Spite Of ECB 'Choke' Efforts

Euro printing press

As the long ago predicted Greek 'bank jog' accelerates there is much talk in the econoblogosphere of the Greek banking system being 'choked off' by the ECB.

If this is in fact the Brussels/Frankfurt plan to force Greece out of the euro there is a perhaps not insignificant obstacle to this strategy: as noted in this post last year, Greece has its own euro printing press. 

The ECB does not print any euro banknotes but actually assigns this task to local member country central banks, with the ECB instructing the local central bank how much of which denominations to print.

So what does this mean?

In opinion polls Greeks want two things: a) to default on their sovereign debt less fiscal austerity and b) stay in the Eurozone. However, European elites (read: Germany) are saying to Greece that you can't have both. But is Germany correct?

An important point to keep in mind here is that there is no legal mechanism to force Greece to drop the euro and readopt the drachma. Hence the idea of choking off the Greek banking system and forcing the Greeks to renounce the euro versus organizing some type of formal action, such as a vote to eject Greece from the euro, which would not be allowed under current EU law.

But in the event of a full-fledged run on Greece's banking system, where Greek banks literally have no cash on hand to give to depositors, it would seem reasonable and (crucially) perhaps legal for the Greek central bank to start printing euro notes even if the ECB disavows this action.

If this were to take place is there anything the ECB could do to stop the Greek central bank from printing euros? Probably not.

It's hard to imagine the situation reaching a stage where the Greek central bank openly revolts against the ECB and starts printing euros. However, Greece need only hint at playing this card for it to have the desired effect, which is to force the ECB to continue accepting Greek bank collateral on reasonable terms. In other words, the fact the Greeks can print their own euros nullifies the ECB's ability to choke the Greek banking system into submission and force a 'voluntary' abandonment of the euro.

Your move, Angela.

Greece Just Publicly Threatened Its Trump Card

Greece just decided to start 2012 off by significantly upping the ante:

"The bailout agreement needs to be signed otherwise we will be out of the markets, out of the euro," spokesman Pantelis Kapsis told Skai TV.

 Here's my previous piece explaining why in the European sovereign debt crisis Greece holds all the cards.

Eurozone QOTD: "You've got insolvent banks supporting insolvent sovereigns and insolvent sovereigns supporting insolvent banks"

Quote is from Bridgewater, which with an estimated $122 billion in assets under management is the world's largest hedge fund.

Previously Bridgewater founder Ray Dalio said he didn't expect the next major crisis to hit until 2013, but it appears his firm is positioned for a rocky 2012.

As the Euro Rolls Over, Why Hasn't Gold Rocketed?

In early May of this year, with the euro hovering in the $1.46-$1.48 range, I disagreed vehemently with euro bulls such as portfolio manager Axel Merk who argued that the common currency was no longer vulnerable to a sell-off (see Merk's May 11 FT article titled 'Dollar in graver danger than the euro' and my counter arguments here, here, and here). 

Merk's argument was basically that in 2010, when the euro sank to a low of $1.18, the currency served as a proxy for the sovereign debt crisis. Now, however, investors were shorting sovereign debt directly and, according to Merk, recognized that it is a lot harder for the ECB to print euros than it is for the Fed to print dollars.

For awhile, as you can see from the below chart, it appeared that Merk perhaps had made a good point. From May the euro has shown remarkable resilience; for the last six months one sovereign after another has white knuckled its way through uncertain debt auctions and ever higher interest expense. Meanwhile the ECB kept its 'bazooka' semi-holstered with purchases of sovereign debt apparently capped at €20 billion per week. While the euro did soften from mid-May onwards it was able to keep it's head above the $1.40 mark for the summer and a good chunk of autumn.

Click to enlarge

Continue reading the full article at Seeking Alpha here.

Video: Barry Eichengreen on Europe's Never Ending Crisis

Believe the Hype? Eurozone Collapse Fear-mongering Kicks Into Overdrive

Munchau gives the Eurozone at most 10 days to fix its problems before it implodes.

DeLong argues that "the Federal Reserve needs to buy up every single European bond owned by every single American financial institution for cash”.

But Johnson and Boone say such measures are basically pointless and have declared "The End of the Euro".

All of the above are respected thinkers with loads of experience and credibility, so clearly we are on the precipice of financial apocalypse.

But are we?

The Icy Silence

One country has taken a completely different path to the government and central bank financed bailouts urged by many of the Econoratti as the only way to save the Eurozone (and global economy) from economic catastrophe. That country is Iceland.

Iceland committed financial heresy when it decided to let its three formerly pygmy-sized banks, which rang up a remarkable $100 billion+ in losses, go bankrupt.

And how have things turned out for Iceland? So far, not too shabby.

Sound intergalactic advice

Iceland, an approximately $12 billion GDP economy, is small and none of its banks were Too Big to Fail. So it's an open question whether the example set by Iceland can be repeated by a larger country with a much more important banking system (i.e., Spain or Italy).

Having said that, one of the remarkable things about the current crisis debate is the near complete lack of contemplation of that very question. Instead an almost unanimous call is being made for the Germans to unleash the ECB money printing 'bazooka'. But that is just one of several different options.

As we contemplate Eurogeddon let's keep Iceland in mind. Contrary to what financial scaremongers would have us believe economic life does not come to an end when banks are allowed to fail and countries are allowed to go bust.

Eurozone Debt Crisis is the IMF's Responsibility, Not the ECB's

Marc Chandler hits the nail on the head.

The IMF, which is funded by other sovereign countries, was invented precisely for dealing with problems like the current Eurozone debt debacle. The IMF is the proper lender of last resort to sovereign countries, not the central bank.

Central bank lending to sovereigns often ends in debt monetization and hyperinflation. There are sound reasons behind German stubbornness against turning the ECB into a 'bazooka'.

More on this topic, including why the 'experts' with near unanimity are calling on the ECB rather than the IMF, here.

Quote of the Day: On the Megabank-Government-Central Bank Axis

Portuguese President Anibal Cavaco Silva is calling for the ECB to go beyond just being a lender of last resort to banks and to become one for his and other European governments. Specifically, he's calling on the ECB to make "unlimited" purchases of EU sovereign debt. This may be the first time one of Europe's leaders has publicly asked the ECB to take this step.

Would such a move by the ECB be a sound one? From a recent editorial in the FT:

"If governments stand behind banks and banks stand behind governments and the central bank lends freely to both and also underwrites financial markets, then financial asset prices become completely detached from economic reality. In this “system”, the central bank implementing more quantitative easing is no different, in economic terms, from Bernie Madoff marking up his client accounts every month."

From 'Circular commitments lead to a Ponzi economy'.

More on the distinction between what is meant by being a lender of last resort to banks versus the governments here and why lender of last resort to sovereign countries is the proper role for the IMF.

Euro Reading Roundup - Who Will Be Getting Booted Out of the Eurozone?

Or perhaps the more important question is which country will be the first to experience a a more serious bank run than the slow motion runs which have been occurring in Greece, Ireland, and Italy?

1. Departures from the Eurozone are "inevitable" (Rodrik)

2. Europe's Darkness at Noon (Eichengreen)

3. Thinking Through the Unthinkable (Wolf)

4. 'In 31 years, I've never seen markets this crazy' (Jim Cramer)

5. Wall Street Ignoring Europe? (Tim Duy) Smells like 2007

Clarifying What Is Meant By 'Lender of Last Resort'

As the European debt crisis continues to worsen there are growing calls for the European Central Bank to purchase ever greater quantities of Italian and other troubled sovereign debt. Berkeley Professor Brad DeLong recently wrote a widely discussed piece arguing that the ECB is failing in its central banking duty as 'Lender of last resort'. But is it?

Professor DeLong makes some good points, particularly about the importance of establishing credibility with the market. However, he fails to differentiate between a central bank serving as a lender of last resort to the banking system versus a lender of last resort to sovereign countries. So far as I know (central bank operations are often murky by design) the ECB has continued to serve as the former but has resisted becoming the latter. There is a big difference between the two so this is an important omission by Professor DeLong.

With respect to the European banks, the ECB has opened and accessed U.S. dollar swap lines with the New York Federal Reserve Bank while also providing certain "unlimited" lending facilities to European banks. In short, the ECB is in fact playing the role of 'Lender of last resort' to Europe's banks. However, as DeLong notes, the ECB has only purchased European sovereign debt in limited quantities. How come?

The Germans get blamed for the ECB's spendthrift ways, with the not-so-distant memories of the Weimar hyperinflation still weighing on Teutonic minds (or so the usual armchair-Freudian analysis goes). But there is some prima facie evidence for this hypothesis: even though the ECB has (so far) not chosen to crank up the printing press full-bore two German ECB board members have resigned in the past year. The most recent, Juergen Stark, publicly stated that his reason for quitting was the ECB's resumption of Italian and Spanish sovereign debt purchases.

While the ECB may continue to hold back for now I suspect that if things get extremely ugly it will in fact print a much greater quantity of money than it has to date to bail the Eurozone out of its debt problem. If this happens euro bulls beware.

The other alternative is for the proper lender of last resort to sovereign countries -- the IMF -- to step in. The IMF was in fact created precisely for situations like the current Eurozone debt crisis. Given this you might be wondering why the experts, in near unanimity, are instead pointing towards the ECB? The answer, in short, is because the ECB has a printing press and the IMF (for now) does not.

Other countries, such as China, do have the funds to bolster the IMF to bailout Europe. But they'll want something in return, such as a greater voting share on the IMF's Board. This is an unappealing prospect to the U.S. and (in particular) Europe, which has since the IMF's inception held a perennial lock on the top job at the Fund. And so in the minds of many that leaves only the ECB.

Video: Niall Ferguson Says Financial Repression Preventing Full-Scale Italian Bank Run

Niall's latest comments on the Eurozone crisis after the jump:

The Italian Job: An 'Explosion in Slow Motion'

While much of the damage control attention in the rapidly escalating Italian crisis has fallen on the ECB's purchases of Italian debt, German Profressor Hans-Werner Sinn points out how the Bundesbank (and other European central banks) have been conscripted into lending a neighborly hand:

The ECB directed the central banks of all Eurozone members to buy huge quantities of Italian government bonds during the crisis. While the national central banks have not revealed how much they bought, the aggregate stock of all government bonds purchased rose from €74 billion ($102 billion) on August 4, to €165 billion this month. Most of this increase was probably used to purchase Italian government bonds. 

The German Bundesbank, which was forced to buy most of the bonds, strongly opposed the program, but was unable to stop it. In response, ECB Chief Economist Jürgen Stark resigned. He followed Bundesbank President Axel Weber, who had resigned in February because of the earlier bond repurchases. Meanwhile, the new Bundesbank president, Jens Weidmann, openly objects to the program, while German President Christian Wulff has publicly accused the ECB of circumventing the Maastricht Treaty.

Not to be outdone the Banca d’Italia has started printing money:

But the bond purchases are just the tip of the iceberg. Equally important, but largely unknown, is the fact that the Banca d’Italia has resorted to the printing press to cover Italy’s gigantic balance of payments deficit. The extra money printing and lending, as measured by the so-called Target deficit, effectively means drawing a credit from the ECB. 

This credit replaces the private capital imports that had hitherto financed the country’s net purchases of foreign goods, but which dried up because of the crisis, and it finances a capital flight, i.e. the purchase of foreign assets. The ECB in turn draws the Target credit from the respective national central bank to which the money is flowing and which therefore has to accept a reduction in its scope for issuing refinancing credit. 

Until July, only Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain had drawn Target credit, for a combined total of €330 billion. Italy was stable and did not seem to need the printing press to solve its financial problems. No longer. 

In August alone, Italy’s central bank drew €40 billion in Target credit, and it probably drew roughly another €50 billion in September, when the Bundesbank’s Target loans to the ECB system increased by €59 billion (after a €47-billion hike in August). This is the highest Target loan ever drawn from the Bundesbank in a single month, and in all likelihood it went primarily to Italy.

Full commentary here.