Showing posts with label Great Depression. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Great Depression. Show all posts
Tuesday, February 21
Saturday, December 24
Will the Next Decade Be Dominated by America?
'Tis the season for predictions and STRATFOR's George Friedman has come up with a whopper.
The first chapter of his new book has been posted here. The main provocative claims is that the American 'Empire' will continue to be dominant over the next decade.
Will it? Here are a couple comments on Friedman's chapter:
First, I would take some issue with simplifying the Great Depression down to having originated in Germany. The role of Germany in the Great Depression does actually deserve more popular credit than it receives, but the scholarly consensus would not agree with Friedman's assertion that its "roots" reside in Germany.
Second, on his main argument, the IMF is projecting that China's economy will surpass the U.S.'s (on a purchasing power parity basis) in just five years in 2016. The EU economy is already larger than the U.S.'s. and has blocked U.S. mergers (e.g., GE's attempted acquisition of Honeywell).
Yes Europe has problems, and yes China may be experiencing the Mother of All Bubbles. But for Friedman to argue that the U.S.'s relative power in the next decade will be anything like it has been over the past 20 years seems incredibly optimistic and naive. The U.S. would appear to be at a significant cyber-warfare disadvantage compared to China at present (Update: within a few hours of this post STRATFOR's website was hacked and private client data posted on the internet). The U.S. has also failed to demonstrate that it can keep the nuclear weapons genie in the bottle in potentially hostile parts of the world. China is developing its first world class navy in 600 years. In short, examples abound of the U.S.'s relative power weakening.
Friedman writes about the U.S.'s need for a regional strategy. One interesting and rarely discussed possible outcome of the fiscal crunch facing America is the potential for unprecedented regional infighting inside the United States. For example, how difficult is it to imagine Texans questioning whether their tax dollars should continue subsidizing Maine, Oregon and Vermont? Or Californians funding Sarah Palin's Alaska?
The first chapter of his new book has been posted here. The main provocative claims is that the American 'Empire' will continue to be dominant over the next decade.
Will it? Here are a couple comments on Friedman's chapter:
First, I would take some issue with simplifying the Great Depression down to having originated in Germany. The role of Germany in the Great Depression does actually deserve more popular credit than it receives, but the scholarly consensus would not agree with Friedman's assertion that its "roots" reside in Germany.
Second, on his main argument, the IMF is projecting that China's economy will surpass the U.S.'s (on a purchasing power parity basis) in just five years in 2016. The EU economy is already larger than the U.S.'s. and has blocked U.S. mergers (e.g., GE's attempted acquisition of Honeywell).
Yes Europe has problems, and yes China may be experiencing the Mother of All Bubbles. But for Friedman to argue that the U.S.'s relative power in the next decade will be anything like it has been over the past 20 years seems incredibly optimistic and naive. The U.S. would appear to be at a significant cyber-warfare disadvantage compared to China at present (Update: within a few hours of this post STRATFOR's website was hacked and private client data posted on the internet). The U.S. has also failed to demonstrate that it can keep the nuclear weapons genie in the bottle in potentially hostile parts of the world. China is developing its first world class navy in 600 years. In short, examples abound of the U.S.'s relative power weakening.
Friedman writes about the U.S.'s need for a regional strategy. One interesting and rarely discussed possible outcome of the fiscal crunch facing America is the potential for unprecedented regional infighting inside the United States. For example, how difficult is it to imagine Texans questioning whether their tax dollars should continue subsidizing Maine, Oregon and Vermont? Or Californians funding Sarah Palin's Alaska?
 |
| (click to enlarge) |
This is the exact argument which is taking place in Europe right now between Germany and Greece. Yes, there are large differences between American and European social cohesion. But I would not be surprised to see growing regionalization within the U.S. as a key emergent theme in the years to come. In the absence of existential external threats the justification for an extremely powerful and centralized U.S. federal state is more open to question.
Overall, Friedman's chapter is written from the perspective of an all-powerful emperor and not from one bearing witness to the paralysis which has gripped Congress in recent years. I'm also not sure he has a firm grasp on some of the social-demographic shifts which are emerging nor the current economic/financial situation.
In short, this chapter seems more a treatise on how Friedman would prefer to see the world than how it actually is.
In short, this chapter seems more a treatise on how Friedman would prefer to see the world than how it actually is.
Monday, December 5
Steve Keen on How He Saw "It" Coming and Why We're in a Depression
A must watch interview with Economist Steven Keen, the first part of which is embedded below (remaining parts can be found here).
Tuesday, October 25
Video: Niall Ferguson Says Financial Repression Preventing Full-Scale Italian Bank Run
Niall's latest comments on the Eurozone crisis after the jump:
Saturday, August 27
Video: Author Sylvia Nasar's 4-Minute Illustrated History of Economics
I'm a huge fan of Nasar's book A Beautiful Mind and am very much looking forward to her latest work, Grand Pursuit: The Story of Economic Genius.
Below is a video of a presentation on A Beautiful Mind Nasar gave at MIT on October 28, 2002, where at the end she makes a reference to her upcoming history of economic thought.
Saturday, June 11
Thursday, December 2
The Biggest Loser (Besides the Irish) in Ireland's Ongoing Debt Crisis
Noted economic historian Barry Eichengreen has written perhaps the most scathing damnation of this week's Irish bailout. I strongly encourage reading the full piece.
Professor Eichengreen takes aim at Germany in particular. In the below passage he compares the Irish bailout to Germany's own hopelessly burdensome WWI war reparations, which played a key role in the rise of the Nazis and perhaps the Great Depression:
Irish Bailout Rejection Fallout
European sovereign bailouts may wind up becoming a lot like Department of Defense contracts in that the only thing contract signing signifies is the beginning (rather than the end) of negotiations. For example, if the new Irish government rejects its bailout as expected there may be an attempt to stem the ensuing crisis by negotiating down the hopelessly high bailout interest rate of 5.8% (or 7.25% depending on how it's calculated). And Ireland's controversial low corporate tax rate of 12.5%, rumored during the height of the drama to be on the table for european 'harmonization', may also be revisited.
Any such renegotiations should be viewed as window dressing aimed at delaying the final reckoning. The fundamental problem is that Ireland is insolvent. No amount of additional liquidity or tax rate bargaining alters this inescapable fact. Faced with this prospect, Europe's current leaders are struggling to determine who will take the biggest hit from Ireland's inevitable default.
Who Will Be the Biggest Loser?
Arguably the key issue to keep an eye on is whether senior Irish bank debt holders will be forced to take losses. If in fact Eichengreen's suggestion of 100% haircuts on insolvent Irish bank debt is adopted the ramifications for Europe's banking system would be difficult to overstate.
The below chart is helpful to understanding the implications of an Irish bailout rejection/and or default.
The U.K. is Ireland's largest creditor with approximately $220 billion in exposure, so any Irish bailout rejection and/or default will weigh heaviest on Britain. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB, which were previously placed on government life support, are particularly threatened.
An Irish rejection of the bailout will put substantial pressure on the still fragile British banking system, which post-bailout consolidation is now home to three of the world's five largest banks (including #1 RBS).
In spite of the current austerity push in the U.K., the government participated in the Irish bailout and pledged approximately $10M to "a friend in need". An Irish Times editorial, reflecting the long and conflicted relationship between these two nations, greeted British 'kindness' with a degree of skepticism.
It's would appear that the U.K. (an EU member which never adopted the euro currency) helped bailout Ireland because rescuing a neighbor is politically more palatable than what would have been necessary if Ireland's debt situation had further deteriorated: recapitalizing the British banking sector (again).
A Lonely Lady
But if at some point an Irish default is inevitable, and the Eurozone nations align to protect their euro based banking system, Britain may well find itself the odd man out. And since further bank bailouts by parliament are politically DOA, Mervyn King and the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street may be left to step into the breach to recapitalize British banks. Any such Bank of England support would be coming on top of calls from the Cameron government for further quantitative easing to reduce the effects of government budget cuts and nagging inflation. In other words, sterling would be forced to do even more at a time when the currency is already stretched thin.
It is worth briefly reviewing the history of pound sterling in the 20th century. In the 1920s one pound fetched almost $5. The country was forced off the gold standard during the September 1931 Sterling Crisis, resulting in a sharp devaluation. Following the massive accumulation of debt during WWII, the pound was devalued again in 1948. This was followed by a further 15% devaluation in 1967. Following a severe recession in the early 1980s, the pound has traded as low as $1.03 in March 1985. Overall, there is well established history of devaluation when the going gets tricky.
While the recent plunge in the euro has provided a relative respite in what had been a steady weakening trend in the pound, Britain will bear the foreign brunt of any Irish bailout rejection and/or default. Further compounding this problem is China's curious financial support to Europe's 'Club Med' nations, but not Ireland, and Britain's total debt position which stands at a whopping 5x GDP (the world's largest total debt/GDP ratio). Based on these and other factors one can make a very good argument that over the medium-to-longer term the pound will continue its long drift downwards. Several ETFs are available to hedge against this risk.
Professor Eichengreen takes aim at Germany in particular. In the below passage he compares the Irish bailout to Germany's own hopelessly burdensome WWI war reparations, which played a key role in the rise of the Nazis and perhaps the Great Depression:
"Ireland will be transferring nearly 10 per cent of its national income as reparations to the bondholders, year after painful year.This is not politically sustainable, as anyone who remembers Germany’s own experience with World War I reparations should know. A populist backlash is inevitable. The Commission, the ECB and the German Government have set the stage for a situation where Ireland’s new government, once formed early next year, rejects the budget negotiated by its predecessor. Do Mr. Trichet and Mrs. Merkel have a contingency plan for this?"The short answer to Barry's question is, of course, no.
Irish Bailout Rejection Fallout
European sovereign bailouts may wind up becoming a lot like Department of Defense contracts in that the only thing contract signing signifies is the beginning (rather than the end) of negotiations. For example, if the new Irish government rejects its bailout as expected there may be an attempt to stem the ensuing crisis by negotiating down the hopelessly high bailout interest rate of 5.8% (or 7.25% depending on how it's calculated). And Ireland's controversial low corporate tax rate of 12.5%, rumored during the height of the drama to be on the table for european 'harmonization', may also be revisited.
Any such renegotiations should be viewed as window dressing aimed at delaying the final reckoning. The fundamental problem is that Ireland is insolvent. No amount of additional liquidity or tax rate bargaining alters this inescapable fact. Faced with this prospect, Europe's current leaders are struggling to determine who will take the biggest hit from Ireland's inevitable default.
Who Will Be the Biggest Loser?
Arguably the key issue to keep an eye on is whether senior Irish bank debt holders will be forced to take losses. If in fact Eichengreen's suggestion of 100% haircuts on insolvent Irish bank debt is adopted the ramifications for Europe's banking system would be difficult to overstate.
The below chart is helpful to understanding the implications of an Irish bailout rejection/and or default.
 |
| (click to enlarge) |
The U.K. is Ireland's largest creditor with approximately $220 billion in exposure, so any Irish bailout rejection and/or default will weigh heaviest on Britain. Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds TSB, which were previously placed on government life support, are particularly threatened.
An Irish rejection of the bailout will put substantial pressure on the still fragile British banking system, which post-bailout consolidation is now home to three of the world's five largest banks (including #1 RBS).
 |
| (click to enlarge) |
In spite of the current austerity push in the U.K., the government participated in the Irish bailout and pledged approximately $10M to "a friend in need". An Irish Times editorial, reflecting the long and conflicted relationship between these two nations, greeted British 'kindness' with a degree of skepticism.
It's would appear that the U.K. (an EU member which never adopted the euro currency) helped bailout Ireland because rescuing a neighbor is politically more palatable than what would have been necessary if Ireland's debt situation had further deteriorated: recapitalizing the British banking sector (again).
A Lonely Lady
But if at some point an Irish default is inevitable, and the Eurozone nations align to protect their euro based banking system, Britain may well find itself the odd man out. And since further bank bailouts by parliament are politically DOA, Mervyn King and the Old Lady of Threadneedle Street may be left to step into the breach to recapitalize British banks. Any such Bank of England support would be coming on top of calls from the Cameron government for further quantitative easing to reduce the effects of government budget cuts and nagging inflation. In other words, sterling would be forced to do even more at a time when the currency is already stretched thin.
It is worth briefly reviewing the history of pound sterling in the 20th century. In the 1920s one pound fetched almost $5. The country was forced off the gold standard during the September 1931 Sterling Crisis, resulting in a sharp devaluation. Following the massive accumulation of debt during WWII, the pound was devalued again in 1948. This was followed by a further 15% devaluation in 1967. Following a severe recession in the early 1980s, the pound has traded as low as $1.03 in March 1985. Overall, there is well established history of devaluation when the going gets tricky.
While the recent plunge in the euro has provided a relative respite in what had been a steady weakening trend in the pound, Britain will bear the foreign brunt of any Irish bailout rejection and/or default. Further compounding this problem is China's curious financial support to Europe's 'Club Med' nations, but not Ireland, and Britain's total debt position which stands at a whopping 5x GDP (the world's largest total debt/GDP ratio). Based on these and other factors one can make a very good argument that over the medium-to-longer term the pound will continue its long drift downwards. Several ETFs are available to hedge against this risk.
Tuesday, November 9
Common Ground in Krugman vs. Ferguson
 |
| Paul Krugman & Niall Ferguson |
Equally shocking, perhaps, is that prior to the 1980s the U.S. financial system really didn't experience a major financial crisis for the previous half century. This also was an era of significant economic progress for America as a whole.
For several months now Professors Paul Krugman and Niall Ferguson have been squaring off on camera and in print over whether the U.S. needs a second government stimulus to kickstart the economy. You can check out videos of their their respective arguments on CNN here and here.
While there is a large gap on where they stand in the fiscal debate, there is a topic where they appear to share common ground, and that is the need to fix banking.
Monday, November 8
Post Dodd-Frank: The Future of U.S. Banking and Financial Regulatory Reform
Interesting article over at Seeking Alpha from David Warsh on this topic. You can read it here, and below are my thoughts:
David,
Great article and I completely agree with you that Dodd-Frank doesn't go far enough in putting our banking regulation back on sound footing. Also, great to see SA Editors putting this topic in the Editor's Choice spotlight.
And if Soss is the next Volcker, then it would be wonderful if his name was put forward. But if he is what you say then I imagine the political timing won't work, especially given the dithering over Elizabeth Warren that we've seen of late. The Republicans might be willing to accept a Volcker-inflation slaying clone, but only if Warren (and perhaps the new Consumer Protection bureau) were sacrificed in exchange. Would that be a good trade?
David,
Great article and I completely agree with you that Dodd-Frank doesn't go far enough in putting our banking regulation back on sound footing. Also, great to see SA Editors putting this topic in the Editor's Choice spotlight.
And if Soss is the next Volcker, then it would be wonderful if his name was put forward. But if he is what you say then I imagine the political timing won't work, especially given the dithering over Elizabeth Warren that we've seen of late. The Republicans might be willing to accept a Volcker-inflation slaying clone, but only if Warren (and perhaps the new Consumer Protection bureau) were sacrificed in exchange. Would that be a good trade?
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