Can any of Europe's politicians -- or anyone at all -- definitively state at which country's doorstep the rolling European debt crisis will ultimately stop? The short answer is no.
Europe's Two Big Challenges
The Economist has a comprehensive summary of the latest developments in this sad saga; the violence, which first turned deadly in Greece this spring, unfortunately shows no sign of abating in Ireland. From the article:
"[Germany's] Mrs Merkel and Mr Schäuble are continuing to insist on two proposals.
One is that the EU treaties must be amended to give permanent status to the European Financial Stability Facility. Without this, they say, the rescue fund will expire in 2013. But investors know from experience that treaty amendment is neither simple nor quick (it took years to push through the Lisbon treaty). Insistence on treaty change makes them nervous.
So, even more, does the second German demand: that future bail-outs must include debt-restructuring provisions to impose some losses (“haircuts”) on investors."With respect to challenge #1, it is quite clear that Eurozone popularity is waning in certain quarters. Any treaty change could prove problematic, particularly in Ireland where such changes must be put to a referendum vote.
Europe's Web of Debt |
Germany is the biggest checkbook in the EU and, quite understandably, is insisting that the private sector share in the cost of any future sovereign debt defaults. Otherwise what is the point of distinguishing between the debt of different countries?
But can Europe's delicately interwoven debt and banking market cope with haircuts, particularly to senior debt? The current Irish crisis was sparked by discussion of losses on subordinated debt (80% in the case of Allied Irish Bank). Tellingly, Irish debt costs have continued rising even after its bailout was confirmed. This is in part due to rumors that senior debt holders may also be forced to take losses.
As former chief IMF economist Simon Johnson and LSE's Peter Boone recently wrote "market participants are good at thinking backwards: if they can see where a Ponzi-type scheme ends, everything unravels". In other words, the market for troubled sovereign debt depends on the ability of countries like Ireland and Spain to 'roll over' their borrowings until their economies begin growing again. (Ireland's economy began shrinking again earlier this year, and Spain's is projected to shrink for 2010.) Without economic growth the odds that troubled sovereign debts will ever be repaid in full (without outside help) is almost certainly nil.
In the months since the spring Greek crisis, the quasi-explicit bailout guarantee by the "troika" (EU, IMF, and ECB) has been the Eurozone debt market's linchpin. Now the bond market is calculating that Germany's insistence on private sector loss sharing by 2013 means than holders of certainly Greek, Irish, Portuguese debt, and perhaps the debt of other nations, will be forced to incur losses. Instead of waiting around to find out the precise haircut percentage, investors are exiting risky pan-european sovereign debt positions post-haste.
China to the Rescue?
Ultimately, the answer to the question of where the Euro-debt unmerry-go-round stops depends on how far the ECB, IMF and German taxpayers are willing to go.
Simon Johnson thinks the ECB and Germans neither can or will, respectively, step up to the plate. He also questions whether the IMF has enough resources to bailout a country the size of Spain, let alone Italy or France. He goes on to speculate that if one of the large Eurozone nations needs a bailout that China, with its $2.6 trillion in reserves, may be asked to recapitalize the IMF. The attraction for China: increased global standing and leverage on contentious issues, such as its policy of maintaining an artificially low currency.
I believe that China may expand its existing role in Europe's debt crisis. However, European and U.S. officials will be reluctant to surrender center stage to China and will minimize Beijing's participation. While the exact form of the ultimate resolution is unclear, it will be a European-U.S. led solution.
Looking Ahead
The question of whether membership in the euro currency union is a good idea has taken root. Iceland's President has recently been talking up his country's relatively quick bounce back from bankruptcy abyss. Part of Iceland's rebound can be explained by the fact that it was able to devalue its own currency, which helped its export sector. In contrast to Ireland, Iceland also chose not to bail out its insolvent banks. The Czech Republic, slated to become part of the currency bloc, recently demurred on whether it would follow Sweden's path of never adopting the euro.
On the subject of whether any countries will abandon the euro currency all together, the consensus view popularized by Professor Barry Eichengreen was that joining the euro was irreversible due to the risk of sparking a bank run. But as NY Times columnist Paul Krugman states, this incentive to keep the euro vanishes when a bank run (like the one currently underway in Ireland) has already taken place.
Many questions remain, but one thing is certain: even with Ireland's bailout (the specifics are expected to be announced on Sunday before Asian markets open) the Eurzone crisis is far from over. Investors looking to insulate themselves from events may want to consider hedging currency risk through various inverse Euro ETFs, or by investing in precious metals.
When you gamble and lose, you have to pay up.
ReplyDeleteInsuring the losses of gamblers for their bad bets is not a sensible fiscal policy and will doom Ireland for decades.
I beleive Ireland should default and hit restart. Perhaps I am naive, but I think Ireland would benefit more, and faster, from that action.
"I beleive Ireland should default and hit restart"
ReplyDeleteGiven how quickly Iceland has turned things around, a good argument can be made to do just that. However, Iceland had two things going for it: a) its own currency and b) debts were relatively smaller compared to Ireland's.
I understand the currency problem(well, sort of), but I do not see how defaulting on a larger amount of debt than Iceland's is that important to Ireland as that amount of loss belongs to the investors.
ReplyDeleteAm I wrong in thinking that a restart would soon result in investors returning to an debt free Ireland?
As in GM. Or as in a person going through bankruptcy being a great credit risk after a period of time?
Most of this comes down to how badly Ireland wants to keep the Euro as its currency.
ReplyDeleteIreland's creditors cannot absorb an Irish default as easily as Iceland's. Those creditors (eg, Germany) have a lot of pull with the "troika", which Ireland still needs even if it decided to follow Iceland and not bail out its banks because the country is running a core budget deficit.
Basically, if Ireland wants to keep the euro and avoid further tax hikes and/or cuts to government spending they've got to play ball. Whether Ireland should stay the debt repayment course or walk is the big question.
Well,
ReplyDeleteAt least I have Krugman on my side on this issue. And to quote Brad Delong there are two rules of economics:
1. Remember that Paul Krugman is right.
2. If your analysis leads you to conclude that Paul Krugman is wrong, refer to rule #1.
When Bankers Met Their Waterloo
Napoleon Bonaparte, in response to a request for a bailout of Banque Recamier:
I am not the lover of Madame Recamier, not I, and I am not going to come to the help of negociants who keep up a house costing 600,000 francs a year.
Where are the Corsican corporals when we need them?
From Alistair Horne, Seven Ages of Paris.
Curiously enough, I find my investment portfolio largely based on the support of the banking system by the US government.
ReplyDeleteI spent the years from the mid 90's until 2005 wholesaling sub prime auto contracts to banks. Brutally hard for the first five or six years, I suddenly found myself besieged by bankers trying to buy my D paper(being kind) at rates where there was absolutely no profit(and a lot of loss) to be had from the deals.
After cashing my incredibly large paychecks for awhile, I suddenly stopped to think about why banks that would not talk to me about buying my paper at 18% one year, were suddenly buying it at 12%, a number at which the deal was a stone cold loser. The answer was soon found when I saw various friends buying investment properties in amounts that far exceeded their financial abilities.
Not a chance these banks were holding these deals, and the last guy holding them would be able to recite Richard Fuld of Lehman's immortal line, "So I'm the schmuck".
Figuring this kind of game had to end sooner and not later, I retreated totally into gold in 2003. Then when it became apparent that the US was going to bail out the banks, I went to the two most conservative banks I knew(JP Morgan and Wells) with most of my portfolio.
Now I am in position where I depend(besides by stop loss orders) on the backing of the US government while thinking Ireland is crazy to back their banks.
Ehh, maybe I will raise my stop loss level.....