Investment Implications of Prolonged Financial Repression

Interesting read from Joe Roseman, former head of Moore Capital PM and Head of Macro Research, on the investment implications of 'prolonged financial repression'. Some highlights:

One of the issues that appears to have really confused economists is why corporates have steadfastly refused to participate in a new capital investment cycle? Why has new hiring been virtually non-existent? 

Standard econometric equations get this wrong because equations can’t think. Econometrics will look for the last time that interest rates were this low, looking at what worked before. 

I would argue that such equations do not have the requisite history built into them to recognise a period when three out of four cylinders in the engine of growth have been impaired. Econometric equations can’t think, but Sir Martin Sorrell of WPP certainly can. 

To quote Sorrell; “Most importantly, post-Lehman and the several corporate crises, we have seen a concern, or even fear, amongst Chairmen and CEOs and in the boardroom about making mistakes and a consequent emphasis on cost containment and unwillingness to add to fixed expenses and capacity.” 

Sorrell goes on to say that “Western-based multi-nationals are said to have over $2tr in cash on their balance sheets, but unemployment remains at stubbornly high levels, with only increases in temporary employment and limited expansion in fixed capacity in Western markets. Hence, a willingness to invest in the brand and maintaining or increasing market share, rather than increasing capacity and fixed expenses.” 

Governments don’t have the cash so print it. Households don’t have the cash so borrow it when they can. Banks don’t have the cash so skim it from savers. Corporates have the cash and just hoard it.

And the possible investment implications?

Not everywhere in the world has the same macro-impairment as the major Western economies, thereby allowing many corporates to develop growth strategies based outside of the G7. Having a cheap(er) currency certainly helps those companies. 

The market seemingly does not value cash sitting on the balance sheet highly. I wonder if that is a mistake. Cash, it is argued, offers optionality to the holder to take advantage of falling (asset) prices should they occur. On the same basis it may also be being undervalued on balance sheets.

I wonder if standard tests of “value” are missing the true value of the cash sitting on balance sheets? In a world where black swans are as common as starlings, having high net cash balances is a major plus. I also wonder whether that same optionality to use cash to buy cheap assets should also be valued higher.

In closing, he wondering whether the M&A department of foreign corporates would view weak currencies, like the pound or U.S. dollar, as an opportunity to acquire cash-rich businesses in the UK or U.S., respectively.

Full writeup here.